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Analysis of IRAP v. Trump Part IV: Judge Niemeyer’s Dissent

June 2nd, 2017

This post is the fourth part of a five-part series on the Fourth Circuit’s recent en banc decision in IRAP v. Trump. Part I analyzed how the court considered pre- and post-inauguration statements. Part II analyzed how the court marshals the Supreme Court’s precedents concerning standing, reviewability of immigration decisions, and the Establishment Clause. In Part III, I analyzed the concurring opinions of Judges Keenan, Thacker, and Wynn. In this part, I will analyze Judge Niemeyer’s Dissent. Part V will analyze the dissents of Judges Shedd and Agee and discuss what happens as this case is appealed to the Supreme Court.

Judge Niemeyer’s dissent charges that the district court “seriously erred” and that its injunction was “not only unprecedented” but was “inappropriate under any standard of analysis” (pp. 148-49). The en banc Fourth Circuit’s analysis was likewise “unprecedented and unworkable,” he wrote. The dissent’s charges were based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), which constrained judges to the four corners of action when determining whether it was bona fide. In my view, a careful review of Mandel and its progeny is essential to understanding where the Fourth Circuit deviated from precedent.

Denial of Mandel’s Waiver

Ernest E. Mandel, a Belgian citizen, was a self-avowed “revolutionary Marxist.” He had previously visited the United States in 1962 and 1968 even though, by statute, his political beliefs rendered him inadmissible. His entry was made possible through a waiver granted by the Attorney General.

Three statutory provisions are relevant to the case. Section 212(a)(28)(D) and (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) deemed inadmissible aliens who “advocate[d]” for or “wr[o]te or publish[ed]” about, “world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship.” But section 1182(d)(3)(A) allowed the Attorney General to grant a waiver, in his “discretion,” so that an otherwise inadmissible alien can receive an entry visa. (This final provision, which is still in effect, appears in the same section that contains § 1182(f), which allows the President to deny entry to those he finds would be detrimental to American interests).

In September 1969, Mandel applied a third time for a nonimmigrant visa in order to lecture at several American universities, but this time his visa was denied. The specifics of the denial shed light on the scope and limitations of the Court’s decision. The Consul at Brussels informed Mandel by letter that he had previously been granted waivers in 1962 and 1968 (which he was unaware of), and that “another request for waiver was being forwarded to Washington in connection with Mandel’s second application for a visa.”

On December 1, the Consul at Brussels told Mandel that after further review, his visa had been declined. The State Department had in fact supported a waiver, but the Attorney General denied it, pursuant to his discretion under § 1182(d)(3)(A). A February 13, 1970 letter to Mandel’s attorney from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, stated that “it had determined that Mandel’s 1968 activities while in the United States ‘went far beyond the stated purposes of his trip, on the basis of which his admission had been authorized and represented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country.’” As such, “favorable exercise of discretion, provided for under the Act, was not warranted and that Mandel’s temporary admission was not authorized.” Ultimately, Mandel delivered his address by “transatlantic telephone.” This final letter afforded the basis or the Court’s ruling.

“Facially Legitimate and Bona Fide”

Mandel, joined by several other American scholars (including Noam Chomsky) brought suit in the Eastern District of New York, seeking “a declaratory judgment that on its face and as applied” that the three relevant statutory provisions were unconstitutional. A three-judge panel agreed in Mandel v. Mitchell. The court rejected the grounds for inadmissibility that were premised not on violent advocacy but on “restraining the entry of disfavored political doctrine.”

On appeal, only Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan would accept this argument. Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion did not dispute the underlying right of the professors to “hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person.” However, the First Amendments rights implicated by the denial of the visa were “not dispositive.” Rather, the “narrow issue” in dispute was whether the professors could “compel the Attorney General to allow Mandel’s admission.” The majority answered no. The Court deferred to the discretion Congress “properly . . . placed in the hands of the Executive.” (In contrast with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court in Mandel wasn’t even willing to assert a standard to determine importance of the underlying First Amendment claim, let alone to determine whether the Attorney General made an adequate showing of national security to justify Mandel’s exclusion.)

Solicitor General Griswold urged the Court that the government should prevail even “where no justification is advanced for denial of a waiver.” That is, the waiver can be denied without an accompanying letter of any sorts. The Court rejected this request to afford the government “sole and unfettered discretion” with respect to denial of visas. It is here that the oft-quoted “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard was adduced. Justice Blackmun determined the Court did not need to reach the government’s preferred position because in this case “the Attorney General did inform Mandel’s counsel of the reason for refusing him a waiver.” Even though “[t]he Government has chosen not to rely on the letter to counsel,” insisting that no reason needed to be given, the Court relied on the letter, in which the “official empowered to make the decision stated that he denied a waiver because he concluded that previous abuses by Mandel made it inappropriate to grant a waiver again.”

Critically, the Court stressed, the “reason” given in the letter was “facially legitimate and bona fide.” The subjective motivations of the Attorney General were not considered. In the following paragraph, the Court restated the standard in nearly-identical terms: “when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.” The “exercise” of the denial of the visa, and the “basis” of that denial are the reasons stated in the communiqué.

Here, the crux of the Court’s analysis focused on the denial letter sent by the government to the plaintiff. The discussion of legitimacy and bona fides was premised on the four corners of the letter—whether or not that was the actual purpose animating the Attorney General’s denial. This context reveals how far afield the Fourth Circuit’s analysis is from Mandel and subsequent cases in which the Court has reiterated the applicability of the standard.

Justice Marshall’s Dissent

The dissent written by Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, helpfully reaffirms the narrow meaning of “facially legitimate and bona fide” in the majority opinion. Marshall wrote, “[T]he majority demands only ‘facial’ legitimacy and good faith,” which “means that this Court will never ‘look behind’ any reason the Attorney General gives.” That is, the court’s review is limited to the reason given by the Attorney General in the letter, not anything outside the letter that would cast doubt on such a conclusion. In a footnote, Marshall distinguishes between the government’s “facially sufficient reason” from “subsequent challenges to the actual good faith and sufficient of the reasons.” The Court’s test permits judicial scrutiny of only the former. This was, to Marshall’s mind, a problem, because “[e]ven the briefest peek behind the Attorney General’s reason for refusing a waiver in this case would reveal that it is a sham.”

How did Marshall know the Attorney General’s citation to “Mandel’s behavior on his previous visit” was a sham? Marshall’s implication was that Mandel was denied a waiver because of his political beliefs. Bolstering this charge is the extremely small number of waivers that were denied: in 1971, only 14 out of 6,210 applications for waivers were denied (.23%) and the year before 4 out of 6,193 were denied (.06%). This miniscule denial rate was almost certainly due to arbitrary and capricious factors; that is, a purpose that was neither legitimate nor bona fide. But the Court was not concerned with any facts beyond those stated in the denial letter. So long as the message sent from the government to Mandel made no reference to illegitimate or bad faith decisions, the action is upheld. Justice Marshall was profoundly disturbed that the Court was turning a blind eye to what is behind the curtain. The Court would return to this issue five years later.

Fiallo v. Bell

In Fiallo v. Bell (1977), Justice Powell writing for seven Justices reaffirmed Mandel’s narrow scope of review for immigration decisions that affect the constitutional rights of citizens. Under the law in effect at the time, “parents” of U.S. citizen “children” were granted special preferences for immigration status. However, “children” of illegitimate fathers—that is, a father that never married the child’s mother, or never recognized the child—were not afforded the same special preferences. Several fathers of illegitimate children who were denied visas challenged the statute’s constitutionality on equal protection and due process grounds.

Justice Powell rejected the challenge. In doing so, he cited Mandel, among other cases, to establish “the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation.” He concluded this narrow review is appropriate even where the government’s actions implicate “the fundamental constitutional interests of United States citizens and permanent residents in a familial relationship.” In Mandel, he noted, the Court had declined to conduct a searching judicial inquiry notwithstanding the challengers’ contention that “the Attorney General’s statutory discretion to approve a waiver was limited by the Constitution and that their First Amendment rights were abridged by the denial of Mandel’s request for a visa.” Not so, said Justice Powell, as the Court “rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny is required,” even when “immigration legislation” intrudes “on other constitutional rights of citizens.” Though Mandel was limited to reviewing the Attorney General’s denial of a visa, the Court extended its rationale to “review[ing] the broad congressional policy choice at issue here,” which should not be performed “under a more exacting standard.”

Justice Marshall’s dissent, joined once again by Justice Brennan, distinguished Mandel on two grounds. First, he contended that unlike the admission statute at issue in Mandel, the provision here was designed to “accord rights, not to aliens, but to United States citizens.” Second, and far more importantly for purposes of our inquiry, Mandel is best read to apply to the case-by-case “individual determinations by the Attorney General,” not a broad policy statement like a statute—or, I would add, a President’s executive order affecting entire classes of aliens.

Kerry v. Din

More recently, in Kerry v. Din (2015), the Court reaffirmed Mandel’s instruction to limit review of negative immigration decisions to facial legitimacy and bona fides. Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen, was married to Kanishka Berashk, an Afghan national and former Taliban civil servant. Din applied for an immigrant visa for her husband, and the consular officer at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad told him that he was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), which deems inadmissible aliens who had engaged in “terrorist activities.” Berashk was not given any specific reason for the denial beyond the citation to the statute.

The case closely parallels Mandel. Judge Niemeyer explained that “[t]he similarities between Mandel and this case are numerous and significant.” In both cases, visas were denied based on an immigration official exercising discretion delegated by Congress. Mandel’s letter cited prior abuses of the visa program, while Din’s denial cited his prior “terrorist activities.” Were these the real reasons why the visas were denied? We don’t know because the Court cared only that the proffered reasons were rational and acceptable.

Because Berashk himself had no cause of action, Din filed for mandamus on his behalf in the Northern District of California and sought a “declaratory judgment that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)-(3), which exempts the Government from providing notice to an alien found inadmissible under the terrorism bar, is unconstitutional as applied.” Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas rejected Din’s claim. Because she could not assert a “life” or “property” interest, her claim depended on the recognition of a substantive due process right to be with her husband. Justice Scalia concluded that “no such constitutional right” exists. Citing Mandel, Justice Scalia concluded that Berashk has “no cause of action to press in furtherance of his claim for admission.”

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment. (The Fourth Circuit viewed this concurring opinion as the controlling opinion under the Marks rule). His opinion recognized that “even assuming” Din has a protected liberty interest, the “notice she received regarding her husband’s visa denial satisfied due process.” Kennedy’s opinion stressed that the Court did not decide “whether a citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of her alien spouse.” Beyond this holding, there is a discussion of Mandel. For reasons I explained in this post, Justice Kennedy’s discussion does not support the conclusion that courts can look beyond the four-corners of the consular officer’s denial for bad faith. Justice Kennedy’s oft-cited concurring opinion in Kerry v. Din (2015) stressed that the “facially legitimate and bona fide” test attached to the “consular officer’s” stated reasons for denying a spouse visa to an Afghan national—in other words, the statement of denial. He explained:

Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith on the part of the consular officer who denied Berashk a visa—which Din has not plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity—Mandel instructs us not to look behind the Government’s exclusion of Berashk for additional factual details beyond what its express reliance on § 1182(a)(3)(B) encompassed. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (emphasis added).

To stress a point that I did not focus on earlier, the penultimate sentence in Justice Kennedy’s opinion reaffirms the readings of Justice Blackmun, Marshall, and Powell that the “legitimate and bona fide” standard refers to the stated reasons give on the face of the letter, not to subjective purpose:

For these reasons, my conclusion is that the Government satisfied any obligation it might have had to provide Din with a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for its action when it provided notice that her husband was denied admission to the country under § 1182(a)(3)(B).

The “bona fide” reason is what the Government provided to Din; not some sort of introspection about the consular officer’s bad faith Both legitimate and bona fide are modified by facially. As Judge Niemeyer explained, “[f]aced with Din’s request for these underlying facts, the Supreme Court declined, instead applying Mandel’s requirement that the plaintiff must show that the government’s reasons were not facially legitimate and not facially bona fide.” (emphasis in original). To that end, what would facial bad faith look like? I offered an example in an earlier post on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Washington v. Trump:

There is no allegation of a deviation from the policy in bad faith by a rogue consular officer. One could imagine a situation where, under the executive order, a consular official modifies a visa application, such that a Pakistani national is incorrectly listed as an Iranian national, and is thus denied entry. That would be an exercise of bad faith. However, simply denying a visa because of a person’s nationality—an accurate fact—would not be in bad faith under the proclamation issued pursuant to § 1182(f).

But what is true, as Judge Niemeyer explained, is that none of the government’s asserted national security rationales have been “challenged as untrue or illegitimate.” Rather, the majority has concluded that they are simply inadequate.

At bottom, Mandel, Fiallo, and Din support a limited review of the four corners of the government’s case-by-case adjudication. It is unclear if this precedent can even be extended to an executive order that does not, by itself, result in the denial of any visa. Indeed, this misapplication of the precedents affords the Supreme Court an easy way to neatly resolve this issue without touching the difficult constitutional questions: hold that the lower courts improperly extended Mandel beyond a case-by-case denial of visas, and remand for further considerations. Or, the Court could reason that until the visas are actually denied, the claims are not yet ripe for a Mandel challenge. That is, any review is premature until there is an individualized reason given to assess for facial legitimacy and bona fides. (All of these options assume the case is not mooted by the time the Court reviews it; I will discuss this possibility in Part V.)

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s original proposal to ban Muslim immigration was born out of a prejudice that stopping Muslims from entering the United States would protect our security. This ignorant policy is apiece with the medieval notion that building a great wall on the southern border can keep us safe. Indeed, there are strong parallels to the facts at issue in Mandel, where the Attorney General believed that the United States could fight Marxism by stopping a professor’s lectures. These policies represent a flawed worldview, which I profoundly reject (see my conclusion in Part I). Or as Justice Marshall noted in his Mandel dissent, by denying the scholar entry, the United States “Government has departed from the basic traditions of our country.” Much the same can be said about President Trump’s unfortunate and immoral travel ban. However, Justice Marshall was in dissent. Mandel and Din provide our rule of decision in immigration matters, and they require only a facially legitimate and bona fide determination. The President’s executive order is precisely that.

Make no mistake: a similar order directed at Americans abroad would trigger traditional strict scrutiny, and would be unconstitutional. In such a case, the courts would be well-served to apply what Chief Judge Gregory called “normal constitutional tools,” including the consideration of Trump’s statements to establish purpose for the Lemon test. But that is the domestic law. For policies affecting aliens, the Supreme Court has commanded a far narrower review. If the same order would be valid had it been issued by President Obama or Bush, then it must be valid for President Trump.

Far greater than the desirability of any given policy is the rule of law itself, and the consistent application of precedent. As this post illustrates, in granular detail, the lower courts have not been faithful to Mandel or Din. The Supreme Court remains free to change its own precedent, but until that happens, the order survives.

Cross-Posted at Lawfare.

Instant Analysis of SG’s Petition for Certiorari and Applications for Stay in Travel Ban Case

June 2nd, 2017

After the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction in IRAP v. Trump, the government asserted it would file its appeal to the Supreme Court “soon.” Soon came late this evening, as the government filed three documents with the Court. First, a petition for certiorari in IRAP v. Trump; second, an application for a stay pending disposition of the cert petition in IRAP v. Trump; third, an application for a stay pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii v. Trump (H/T Chris Geidner).

IRAP v. Trump

The petition for certiorari asks the Court to review the en banc Fourth Circuit’s decision, upholding the injunction from the District of Maryland. The accompanying petition for a stay asks the Court for “expedited proceedings.”

The government also respectfully requests expedited briefing on and consideration of its petition for a writ of certiorari.1

1… It is therefore appropriate for this Court to grant relief under Rule 23.3, especially in light of timing concerns and the government’s request for expedited briefing on and consideration of its petition for a writ of certiorari.

If the Court chooses to expedite briefing, it is conceivable that a special hearing is held before the beginning of the October 2017 term, perhaps as early as September. If the Court decides not to expedite the case,  depending on how long the challengers take to reply, the case could linger until the long conference. Oral arguments would not be heard until 2018, at the earliest. I suspect the Court takes the matter seriously, and grants certiorari sooner rather than later.

Petitions for certiorari only require four votes. Applications for stays require five votes. If there are five votes for a stay, then there must be four votes for certiorari. In other words, if the Court can muster the votes to grant the stay, then certiorari is a foregone conclusion, and the travel ban can go into effect, at least, until the case is resolved on the merits. Conversely, if there are not five votes for a stay, the argument in favor of urgently vacating the injunction may be weakened by the slow litigation posture.

The SG adduces several factors in favor of granting certiorari:

ll of the relevant factors strongly support a stay of that extraordinary injunction. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (listing factors). First, there is a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari. The decision below globally enjoins a formal national- security determination by the President of the United States, on the basis that he — and, by implication, the Cabinet-level officials who recommended this measure — acted in bad faith. Second, there is more than a fair prospect that the Court will vacate the injunction. As explained more fully in the accompanying petition, Doe #1’s constitutional claim is neither justiciable nor meritorious. Third, preventing the Executive from effectuating his national-security judgment will continue to cause irreparable harm to the government and the public interest. At a minimum, the injunction — which bars enforcement of Section 2(c) as to all persons worldwide — should be stayed to the extent that it goes beyond addressing the wife of Doe #1, the sole plaintiff whom the court of appeals found to have standing.

I predict the Court will deny the stay, but grant certiorari. Here, the SG flags a number of significant executive-power cases where the Court has granted review:

This Court has granted certiorari to address interference with Executive Branch determinations that are of “importance * * * to national security concerns.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 520 (1988); see Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 12 (2008). It also has granted review of “important questions” concerning interference with “federal power” over “the law of immigration and alien status.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012); see United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). And it has granted review to address interference with presidential power, even in “one-of-a- kind case[s].” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 689 (1997); see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2558 (2014); American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003). All of those considerations exist here and counsel strongly in favor of review.

If certiorari is granted, I suspect the Court will hear the case on an expedited basis.

At this late hour, I will flag a few passages of note in the cert petition. First, the government stresses a point that I predicted would become more prominent on appeal: Article II:

“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sov- ereignty” that lies in the “legislative power” and also “is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.” Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542; see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-589 (1952) (Control of the Nation’s borders is “interwoven” with “the conduct of foreign relations” and “the war power.”).

The SG expressly cites Zivotofsky v. Kerry, which in turn quoted  Youngstown, for the proposition that we are in Jackson’s first tier– a point I have stressed from the earliest days.

The court did not dis- pute that the President acted at the height of his powers in instituting Section 2(c)’s temporary pause on entry by nationals from certain countries that sponsor or shelter terrorism . . . . Congress’s expansive grant of authority means that the President’s power “is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-2084 (2015) (citation omit- ted).

 

The stay petition frames the Article II issue in slightly different terms:

The injunction barring enforcement of Section 2(c) undermines the President’s constitutional and statutory power to protect national security.

Second, the petition quotes some of the greatest hits from the en banc dissents:

JudgesAgee,Niemeyer,andSheddfileddissents, and each judge joined each dissent. App. 146a-207a. Judge Agee opined that respondents’ Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable. App. 191a-207a. “[T]he imagined future denial of a visa to [Doe #1’s] wife is simply too vague and speculative” to confer standing, he concluded, and Doe #1’s alleged “stigma” from the Order “is not a cognizable injury” but “simply a subjec- tive disagreement with a government action.” App. 197a-198a. Judge Niemeyer opined that the majority’s Establishment Clause analysis “plainly violates” Man- del, and its “extratextual search for evidence suggest- ing bad faith” both “radically extends” this Court’s precedents and “has no rational limit.” App. 157a, 165a, 170a. Judge Shedd opined that the district court “totally failed to respect” the deference due to the Executive’s national-security judgments, and the “shortcomings” in its “selectively negative interpreta- tion of political campaign statements” are “obvious.”

Third, the government stressed that Mandel’s requirement of “bona fide” refers only to the face of the executive order (a point I elaborate on in Part IV of my series on IRAP v. Trump, which should be published on Lawfare on Friday):

Mandel compels rejecting Doe #1’s constitutional challenge. The court of appeals accepted that Section 2(c)’s entry suspension rests on a facially legitimate reason: protecting national security. App. 43a. And the Order supplies a bona fide factual basis for that reason: Section 1(d) explains that Congress or the Executive previously designated the six listed countries as pre- senting terrorism-related concerns that “diminish[] the foreign government’s willingness or ability to share or validate important information about” its nationals. App. 292a-293a.

Fourth, the government raised in a footnote an important point, which I also discuss in Part IV: Mandel concerns the denial of visas, not all executive-branch decisions.

Mandel’s substantive standard applies to challenges to decisions to deny visas to aliens seeking entry. It does not govern every issue concerning immigration—such as post-removal detention, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), or the procedure for exercising legisla- tive power over the suspension of deportation of aliens present in the United States, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

As I argue in my post (tomorrow), I don’t think any of these claims are ripe for the Mandel test until visas are denied. In other words, facial challenges are premature.

Fifth, the government (for what I think is the first time) uses the phrase “Muslim ban,” preceded by the word “not.”

Section 2(c) is not a so-called “Muslim ban,” and campaign comments cannot change that basic fact.

Sixth, the government addresses, head on, the President’s post-inauguration statements (along similar lines I noted in Part I):

The court of appeals cited statements by the President and aides made between the January Order and the Order—describing the Order as pursuing “the same basic policy outcome,” reflecting the same “principles,” or a “watered down version” of the January Order. App. 50a, 51a (citations omitted). But as the Order explains, both Orders aimed at the same national-security objec- tive: facilitating a review of existing screening and vetting procedures. App. 289a-298a (§ 1(b)-(i)). The Order pur- sues that objective through substantially revised provi- sions; the differences are clear on the Order’s face.

The court of appeals held that a passing remark by the President when signing the January Order signals an improper motive. After reading its title—“Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” App. 277a—he stated, “[w]e all know what that means.” App. 50a (citation omitted). Minutes earlier, in the presence of the newly sworn-in Secretary of Defense, the President had said, “I am establishing new vetting measures to keep radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States of America * * * . We want to ensure that we are not admitting into our country the very threats our soldiers are fighting overseas.”12 In context, the President’s passing remark is reasonably understood to refer to terrorist groups like ISIL and al Qaeda, not all Muslims. It is at least ambiguous, and the court erred in setting aside an Executive Order based on an offhand, six-word comment.

Seventh, the SG quoted President Trump’s recent remarks from Saudi Arabia as evidence of the President’s views towards Islam, and more broadly, as potentially undermining his ability to conduct foreign diplomacy (he needs all the help he can get):

By attempting to delve into the President’s supposed true motives for Section 2(c), the court of appeals also injected itself into sensitive matters of foreign affairs and risked “what [this] Court has called in another context ‘embarrassment of our government abroad’ through ‘multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.’” Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 226 (1962)). In his recent address to a gathering of Middle East leaders in Saudi Arabia, the President urged that the global fight against terrorism “is not a battle between different faiths, different sects, or different civilizations,” but one “between barbaric criminals who seek to obliterate human life and decent people” of all religions who “want to protect life.”7 Although the President decried “the murder of innocent Muslims” by terrorist groups, and called for “tolerance and respect * * * no matter [one’s] faith or ethnicity,” May 21 Speech, the court of appeals invalidated Section 2(c) as rooted in “religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination,” App. 2a. The court’s pronouncement — that the President of the United States took official action based on animus toward one of the world’s dominant religions, notwithstanding his own official statements to the contrary — plainly carries the potential to undermine the Executive’s ability to conduct foreign relations for and protect the security of the Nation.

I had planned to write a faux 28(j) letter to the Fourth Circuit, citing these remarks as justification to lift the taint. I’m glad the DOJ did so. I also predicted the government could raise similar arguments with respect to a decision to fire Robert Mueller, as his investigation was frustrating relations with Russia.

Eighth, the SG stated that the Fourth Circuit’s decision gives the President no guidance as to when the taint may be lifted:

Although the court offered assurances that the President’s statements do not “forever taint” his future conduct, App. 61a n.21 (quoting McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 873-874 (2005)), its opinion “gives the President no guidelines for ‘cleansing’ himself of the ‘taint’ [it] purportedly identified,” App. 171a (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). It states only that “[w]hether a statement continues to taint a government action is a fact-specific inquiry,” App. 61a n.21, which is a confession of uncertainty (and a portent of future litigation) over what action the President may take concerning Muslim-majority (or even non-Muslim-majority) countries.

Ninth, the SG looked to US v. Nixon to reject the proposition that courts should consider “extrinsic material” to second-guess the President’s determinations.

Attempting to do so also threatens impermissible intrusion on privileged internal Executive Branch deliberations, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974), and carries the potential for litigant-driven discovery that would disrupt the President’s execution of the laws, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-750 (1982). Litigants in other cases challenging the Order already have requested such discovery. The plaintiffs in the Washington litigation, for example, have sought nearly a year of discovery, including up to 30 depositions of White House staff and Cabinet-level officials. See Joint Status Report & Discovery Plan at 5-13, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-141 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2017) (ECF No. 177). This Court should reject a rule that invites such probing of the Chief Executive’s actions in this manner. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 616-617 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

I’m glad the government stressed that the remarks were made next to the “newly sworn in Secretary of Defense.” Watch the video, and you will understand the context.

Tenth, the government aims to rebut that it has not moved expeditiously:

As it stands, litigating the entire case — from the filing of the complaint to resolution by the en banc court of appeals — has taken under three months. The government’s conduct reflects the importance of these issues and the serious harm the injunction threatens to the public interest.9

9 Proceedings in Hawaii were extended slightly because the district court initially entered only a temporary restraining order; litigation over the preliminary injunction’s terms was not complete until March 29, 2017. Gov’t C.A. Stay Reply Br. 3-4.

The petition’s final paragraph is similar to closing remarks SG Wall made to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits:

This Order has been the subject of passionate political debate. But whatever one’s views, the precedent set by this case for the judiciary’s proper role in reviewing the President’s national-security and immigration authority will transcend this debate, this Order, and this constitutional moment. Precisely in cases that spark such intense feelings, it is all the more critical to adhere to foundational legal rules. The decision below departs from those rules, and calls into question the Executive and his authority in a way that warrants this Court’s review.

I couldn’t have phrased it any better.

Hawaii v. Trump

Though the document is styled as an “application for stay pending appeal” to the Ninth Circuit, it should also be considered a petition for certiorari before judgment. Specifically, on page 6, the SG explains:

For these reasons, the government respectfully requests that this Court enter a stay pending the government’s appeal. In addition, the Court may construe this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, see, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006) (per curiam), and grant the petition along with the petition for a writ of certiorari in IRAP, while staying the injunction pending a final disposition.

In the stay application from the Fourth Circuit, the SG explains the concurrent posutre:

imilarly here, the Hawaii injunction cannot justify denying a stay. If the Ninth Circuit vacates or stays the Hawaii injunction, the premise of respondents’ argument would evaporate. And if the Ninth Circuit affirms the injunction, that injunction could be brought before this Court, and a stay from this Court would be warranted for the same reasons as in this case. In any event, to enable Sections 2 and 6 of the order to go into effect without further delay, the government is also filing this same day an application for a stay by this Court of the Hawaii injunction pending disposition of the Ninth Circuit appeal and further proceedings in this Court.

Against this frame, if the Court decides to grant the petition for certiorari in IRAP v. Trump, it becomes very likely that the Court would also grant certiorari before the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Hawaii v. Trump. This two-pronged approach eliminates the possibility that the Ninth Circuit could affirm the district court’s injunction as to the travel ban, but vacate the injunction as to the “internal and diplomatic activities of government agencies.” As Amir Ali explained, such a vacatur would start the clock, and potentially moot the case by the time the Justices hear the appeal.

All things considered, the SG’s office must be commended for compiling these prodigious pleadings in a week.

 

 

Analysis of HHS Contraceptive Mandate 6.0

May 31st, 2017

Vox has published a leaked proposed rule of what is (by my count) the sixth version of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate. The 125-page document, if accurate, would allow employers and insurers (both for-profit and non-profit) to seek exemptions from the mandate based on both religious and moral objections. The operative RFRA analysis in Part II begins on page 27.

First, the rule addresses a question which the Court punted on in Hobby Lobby: does the contraceptive mandate advance a compelling governmental interest. Here the Trump Administration expressly repudiates the Obama administration’s finding, citing, inter alia, the inability to accommodate religious objectors as well as the never-ending litigation

The Departments previously concluded that the Mandate served compelling governmental interests, including “public health and gender equality interests.” (78 FR 39872) Based in part on that determination, the Departments provided a narrow exemption covering only churches and their integrated auxiliaries. Other organizations with religious objections were either required to comply with the Mandate or offered only the accommodation process. Despite multiple rounds of rulemaking, however, that accommodation process has not satisfied the religious objections of numerous organizations with sincere religious objections to contraceptive coverage or resolved the pending litigation. To the contrary, the Departments have been litigating RFRA challenges to the Mandate and related regulations for more than five years, and dozens of those challenges remain pending today. That litigation, and the related modifications to the accommodation, have consumed substantial governmental resources while also creating uncertainty for objecting organizations, issuers, third party administrators, and employees and beneficiaries. One significant reason for granting the exemptions set forth in these interim final rules is the Government’s desire to resolve the pending litigation.

Beyond these interests, the government has determined that expanding the exemptions is the best way to comply with RFRA.

But the expanded exemptions for religious objectors also rests on an additional, independent ground: the Departments have determined that, in light of RFRA, an expanded exemption, rather than the existing accommodation, is the most appropriate administrative response to the substantial burden identified by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby.

Note the government stops short of saying RFRA compels this result, but that it is “appropriate.” The government makes this point explicit later in the rule:

At the same time, the Departments’ decision to exercise discretion to exempt objecting entities does not rest solely on the Departments’ conclusion that applying the contraceptive coverage requirement to those entities would violate RFRA.

But relying on RFRA is essential in order to reverse the position of the Obama administration, and rebalance the interests.

Nevertheless, given the Departments’ previous assertion that they had a compelling interest to overcome the objections when they were defending challenges to the Guidelines, see, e.g., 78 FR 39886–88, the Departments consider it important to rebalance the Government’s general interest in contraceptive coverage and with the respect the Government owes to the interests of conscientious objectors, and under RFRA, religious objectors specifically.

Further, the government restricts its findings whether a compelling interest exists to “this specific context” and “certain objecting employers.”

That determination rests in part on the Departments’ reassessment of the interests served by the application of the Mandate in this specific context. Although the Departments previously took the position that the application of the Mandate to certain objecting employers served a compelling governmental interest, the Departments have now concluded, after reassessing the relevant interests and for the reasons stated below, that it does not.

To this end, the government looks to RFRA as affording the requisite discretion to decide whether to grant a mere accommodation, or simply exempt objecting employers.

Particularly under those circumstances, the Departments believe that agencies charged with administering a statute that imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion under RFRA have discretion in determining whether the appropriate response is to provide an exemption from the burdensome requirement or instead to attempt to create an accommodation that would mitigate the burden. Here, the Departments have now determined that the appropriate administrative response is to create a broader exemption, rather than limiting non-church objecting entities to the accommodation process. That determination is informed by the Departments’ reassessment of the relevant interests, as well as by their desire to bring to a close the more than five years of litigation over RFRA challenges to the Mandate.

This is, to a tee, the precise remedy requested by the Little Sisters of the Poor and other plaintiffs in the contraception mandate litigation–grant a full exemption (as houses of worship received), and not an accommodation (whereby employees still receive coverage).

The question here is not whether the Government’s broad interests in health and equality are compelling. Instead, it is whether, under the ACA, the Government has a compelling interest in denying exemptions to those who object to the contraceptive coverage requirements, after the Departments have rebalanced the broad interests of coverage with the Government’s interests in providing for conscientious objection. Upon further examination of the relevant provisions of the ACA and the administrative record on which the Mandate was based, the Departments have concluded that the application of the Mandate to such entities does not serve a compelling governmental interest.

Apart from RFRA, government stressed the fact that the “Mandate was not imposed by Congress, but rather was the result of HRSA’s discretionary decision to include contraceptives among the preventive services required.”

We begin by noting that Congress did not mandate that contraception be covered at all under the ACA—merely that, among other preventive services to be covered are “such additional preventive care and screenings” for women “provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA].” Congress, thus, left the identification of the required preventive services to administrative discretion. And the fact that Congress granted HHS (through HRSA) discretion to decide whether to require contraceptive coverage at all indicates that the Departments’ judgment about the relative importance of the Government’s interest in applying the Mandate to the narrow category of entities at issue here should carry particular weight.

This argument inverts a point I raised at length in Cato’s brief in Zubik v. Burwell and in Gridlock. The fact that the contours of this mandate came not from Congress, but from an agency, should give pause before allowing the agency to intrude upon fundamental religious rights. (Ironically enough, this was the gravamen of Judge Wynn’s concurring opinion in the Fourth Circuit’s travel ban decision). However, the government claims that this delegation supports the fact that the agencies should be entitled to deference when deciding what the government’s interest is. To the contrary, the fact that Congress showed no awareness of the religious liberty implications of the provision suggests that the agencies don’t have the power to burden free exercise in this fashion. In the end, we reach the same conclusion, but the executive branch’s position (unsurprisingly) leaps over the implications of the major question doctrine.

Critically, the government highlighted what I deemed to be the most objectionable aspect of the HHS rulemaking: the conclusion that because houses of worship are more likely to employ people of the same faith, they receive an exemption, rather than an accommodation.

In previously denying an exemption to eligible organizations, the Departments did not identify data to support a distinction between the beliefs of employees of churches and their integrated auxiliaries on the one hand, and employees of non-profit organizations on the other. Yet the Departments reasoned that the exemption for churches “does not undermine the governmental interests furthered by the contraceptive coverage requirement” because “[h]ouses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection.” (78 Fed. Reg. 39874) As explained above, that reasoning extends further than the Departments had previously acknowledged, so as to include other non-profit organizations whose principles oppose contraceptive coverage.

This bifurcation, I wrote, was completely arbitrary, not supported by any evidence, and was not subject to any deference. Here, the government expressly repudiates this finding.

Further, the government notes that a number of states that have contraception mandates also have wide-ranging exemptions.

The Departments now find it significant that most other states either offer broader exemptions or impose no contraceptive requirement in the first place.17 The broadening of exemptions contained in these interim final rules does not remove any of the exemptions the Departments previously offered to churches, so that the exemption the Departments provided to group health plans established or maintained by religious employers (78 FR 39874) is continued by these interim final rules. =

This is a point that the original HHS rulemaking completely ignored.

Towards the end of Part II, the government reiterates that it is under no obligation to pay for these services:

As the Government is under no constitutional obligation to fund contraception, cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), even more so may the Government refrain from requiring private citizens to cover contraception in violation of their religious beliefs or moral convictions. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991) (“A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”).

In my forthcoming article, Presidential Maladministration, I discus the concept of presidential reversals, where one administration changes a regulatory position simply because it disagrees with another administration’s policies. This precise issue will be litigated in the context of whether the change is arbitrary or capricious, or is the needed to comport with court rulings, end lengthy litigation a sufficient justification, and accommodate conscientious objectors. The rulemaking tees up this issue at page 54:

We acknowledge that the foregoing analysis represents a change from the policies and interpretations the Departments previously adopted with respect to the Mandate and the governmental interests that underlie the Mandate. These changes in policy are within the Departments’ authority. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[a]gencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) Here, for all of the reasons discussed above, the Departments have determined that the Government’s interest in the application of contraceptive coverage requirements in this specific context to objecting entities does not outweigh the objections of entities and individuals that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds or, based on the distinct analysis set forth above, on moral grounds.

Indeed, the government cites the fact that there have been so many modifications as evidence of why deference is appropriate:

Since the beginning of rulemaking on this Mandate, HRSA and the Departments have repeatedly exercised their discretion to create and modify various exemptions within the Guidelines. Over the past almost six years, the Departments: created an exemption only for houses of worship that primarily serve persons who share their religious tenets, and later expanded that exemption to all houses of worship; created a non-enforcement safe harbor for other religious nonprofit organizations, then an accommodation process for those organizations, and later an expanded accommodation to include some for-profit entities; adjusted the forms to be submitted under the accommodation process, expanded it to included additional notices, and later treated other documents as constituting constructive notice. As in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., “the fact that the agency has adopted different definitions in different contexts adds force to the argument that the definition itself is flexible, particularly since Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the statute.” 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984).

Recall that the initial rulemaking was issued without going through the notice and comment process, citing the urgency of getting contraception coverage to female students at religious universities before the fall semester began. Alas, that deadline extended many, many times, so the urgency was misplaced.

This rule will almost certainly be challenged. Another chapter for the trilogy.

 

Who will be the next #SCOTUS? Predict now!

May 31st, 2017

Shortly after the 2016 election, LexPredict launched a market to predict whom President-Elect Trump would nominate. Quickly, Judge Gorsuch jumped to the lead, and we called his nomination long before anyone else did.

Now, as the tumultuous October 2017 term winds down, we have launched a new market for the next seat. To keep things simple, we limited the roster to the judges on Trump’s final list, minus Judge Gorsuch. If a new list is issued, we will be happy to update our roster.

Predict your favorite choice!

 

Korematsu and the Travel Ban

May 31st, 2017

In Politico, Richard Primus writes that the imminent petition for certiorari in IRAP v. Trump affords the Court–really Justice Kennedy–an opportunity to overturn Korematsu. A few weeks ago, I explained why Judge Paez’s questions about Korematsu were non sequiturs–the civilian exclusion order at issue in that case was not facially neutral, but made explicit references to people of Japanese ancestry.

Primus makes a different points:

In both cases, the executive branch acts on the theory that members of a marginal demographic group are dangerous but officially insists that its actions are warranted by legitimate policy imperatives rather than flowing from prejudice. In both cases, the executive branch claims that the judiciary must not second-guess the executive because the case concerns dangerous subject matter where the executive’s expertise vastly exceeds that of any court and in which a mistake could be catastrophic: wartime national defense in Korematsu, immigration control as a form of defense against terrorism today.

If these two propositions amount to overruling Korematsu, then the deed has already been done, if not in name. First, there are many cases that infringed on the rights on “marginal demographic group”on the prejudiced belief that they are “dangerous.” Look no further than the Court’s free speech and association jurisprudence, which afforded protection for purportedly “dangerous” communists and marxists. More generally, racial classifications under the 5th or 14th Amendment are subjected to the strictest of scrutiny. Second, in the years following 9/11, the Supreme Court (and Justice Kennedy) voiced increasing skepticism towards the Bush administration’s invocation of national security as a defense its policies at Guantanamo Bay. Remember Justice Scalia’s vituperative dissent in Boumedienne, where he charged that the majority opinion “will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” If there was ever an opportunity for Justice Kennedy to flat-out overrule Korematsu, that was the case (it was not cited in the decision).

Theses lines of cases are relevant, because they involve applications of domestic constitutional law. For purposes of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, courts routinely apply rigorous review. In contrast, the travel ban concerns aliens outside of our borders who have no connection to the United States. (The executive order’s waivers, which are available for relatives of U.S., have largely been forgotten in this litigation, especially with respect to ripeness concerns). Under Mandel, courts only perform a review of facial legitimacy.

Primus does raise a very important distinction that was also missing in Judge Paez’s questions.

And although the Japanese internment and the Trump administration’s travel ban are different in several important ways—discriminatorily refusing entry to aliens is not morally equivalent to discriminatorily imprisoning America’s own citizens—the constitutional issues surrounding the travel ban easily evoke central issues of Korematsu.

There are similarities and difference between discriminating against people within the United States and aliens without. Both are morally wrong, but only the former raises traditional forms of constitutional scrutiny. For this reason, the Korematsu comparisons are not apt.