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Between 2009 and 2020, Josh published more than 10,000 blog posts. Here, you can access his blog archives.

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The Social Security Administration Shouldn’t Be Deciding Who’s Too “Mentally Defective” to Own a Gun

July 5th, 2016

Unable to legislate new restrictions on what kind of arms can be sold, the government has embarked on a long-term effort of adding an untold number of Americans to “no buy” lists—based on the unfounded conjecture that they pose a “danger” to others—and deprive them of a fundamental constitutional right. The Gun Control Act of 1968 and NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 requires that agencies with pertinent records on who is or is not “a mental defective” disclose those records to the attorney general so those people can be excluded from purchasing arms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).

The Social Security Administration (SSA) has proposed a new regulation that would create a process for transferring the records of those who seek a “representative payee” (legal proxy) under Social Security disability benefits programs to NICS, so that they may be considered a “mental defective” and thus lose their Second Amendment rights. The proposed SSA rule is arbitrary—there’s no evidence that someone who needs help with SSA paperwork can’t be trusted with a gun—and inconsistent with the regulatory and statutory scheme, not to mention blatantly unconstitutional.

Accordingly, for the first time ever, Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies, with the help of Ilya Shapiro, Gregory Wallace, and me, has filed a public comment objecting to the rule on 10 different grounds. No one disputes that the government has an interest in keeping guns out of the hands of those who could harm themselves or others, but depriving a constitutional right requires due process of law. Under existing law, the root requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is that an individual receive a hearing before she is deprived of a constitutional right by a federal agency, one where the government must justify its restriction.

Here, the process entails an SSA bureaucrat making the determination without the expertise necessary to tell if the applicant is a danger to herself or others and without necessarily having the benefit of medical evidence. Indeed, the criterion evaluated—whether a person is “a mental defective”—is the same unscientific and unspecific standard that the Supreme Court approved in 1927 when legalizing the sterilization of the mentally ill and other eugenic treatments. The term is antiquated and vague.

Moreover, it is unconstitutional to condition the receipt of benefits on the sacrifice of rights. The “condition” here could not be more clear: to gain or maintain a representative payee, needy disabled persons must submit to being placed on the NICS list and foregoing their Second Amendment rights. The government is not allowed to foist that Catch-22 onto those who qualify for Social Security disability but need help administering their benefits.

On a more practical level, the SSA is not the agency that should be making this sweeping policy. Determining whether someone satisfies the criteria for obtaining a representative payee is perfectly within SSA’s expertise, but determining who among its recipients is capable of responsible firearm ownership is far, far afield of the SSA’s area of expertise. The SSA’s job is to administer social-insurance benefits, not to implement gun-safety regulations. The agency is simply not staffed with the medical and gun-policy experts necessary to make such determinations on a regular basis.

Finally, the proposed rule treats the entire category of people who express a misgiving about their mental abilities as per se deprived of their right to armed self-defense. Surely the landmark case District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), which confirmed the individual right to keep and bear arms, did not mean to sweep every hypochondriac, arachnophobiac (spiders), coulrophobiac (clowns), or lepidopterophobiac (butterflies) into the federal mental-health gun-prohibition.

The SSA should abandon this ill-devised rule.

Declaring Independence from Unraveled

July 4th, 2016

It is fitting that on July 4, I finished writing the final chapter–the Epilogue–of Unraveled: Obamacare, Religious Liberty, and Executive Power. The book–all 226,256 words of it–will be released on September 27, 2016. Now that I’ve finished writing it, I can focus on writing about it, and scheduling events for the book tour in the fall. It will be fun.

Also, I have one YUGE publication to announce next week. Stay tuned.

Final-Unraveled-Cover

The Guardian’s Sober Take on Mass Shootings and Gun Violence

July 3rd, 2016

Since I published The Shooting Cycle in 2014, I have told anyone who would listen that mass shootings and so-called “assault weapons” make up only a tiny fraction of gun violence in the United States, and should not form the basis of our gun control policy. Rather, handgun violence in inner-city, mostly minority neighborhoods, makes up the overwhelming majority of gun deaths.

The Guardian (UK) offers a strikingly sober take on these two critical issues.

First, mass shootings constitute an extremely, extremely small sliver of gun deaths. Each year, on average, about 33,500 people are killed by a firearm. That is roughly the same rate as death by car accidents.

The CDC categorizes 4% as “unintentional,” “legal intervention” (shot by a cop), or some other undetermined cause.

unintentional

The over-whelming majority–over 60%–are death-by-suicide.

suicides

The remainder, about 11,000 per year, are homicides.

homicides

Of those, only a small sliver could count as mass shootings. The Guardian relies on Mothers Jones’s database, which uses a broader definition of mass shooting than the federal government does; I won’t quibble here, because even using a broad definition, the number of mass shootings as compared to the total number of other gun deaths is still extremely tiny. On the graph, you can barely even make out the yellow slivers at the bottom.

mass1

The Guardian concludes:

But next to the thousands of lives lost each year to suicide and more commonplace acts of violence, it becomes clear that mass shootings are only a tiny part of America’s gun problem. The US could end all mass shootings today and its rates of gun violence would still be many times higher than other rich countries.

This is exactly right.

Second, mass shootings attract a disproportionate share of attention, even as the disproportionate share of violence falls on minority, inner-city communities. Compare the reactions to 49 deaths in Orlando last month to the 71 people who were murdered in Chicago during the month of June (6o of whom were black). Elites tend only to react to gun deaths when they think it can affect them: who cares about inner cities, but if it is a gay night club or a kindergarten, we must take action!

The Guardian observes:

African Americans, who represent 13% of the total population, make up more than half of overall gun murder victims. Roughly 15 of the 30 Americans murdered with guns each day are black men. . . .

Because everyday gun violence is concentrated in racially segregated neighborhoods, it’s easy for millions of Americans to think they won’t be affected.

“As soon as it’s anybody’s kindergartener that can be at risk, we’re a hell of a lot more terrified, because there is no social class or geographic address that makes one exempt,” Zimring said.

A debate conducted in the aftermath of mass shootings has also prompted a huge public investment in guarding and fortifying public schools against shootings, even though the typical school can expect to see a student homicide only once every 6,000 years, according to safety expert Dewey Cornell.

Since the 1999 school shooting at Columbine high school in Colorado, the justice department has invested nearly $1bn to help put police officers in schools, though Cornell notes there is still little evidence that school security measures reduce crime.

Third, the focus on the AR-15 and so-called “assault weapons” is completely misplaced. The overwhelming amount of gun violence is caused by simple handguns. Rifles constitute less than a 4% share of murders. Shotguns–the weapon Joe Biden recommended Americans use to defend themselves–are involved in more murders.

murder-weapons

The New York Times in September 2014 (before their front page editorial) also recognized the myths about assault weapons.

But in the 10 years since the previous ban lapsed, even gun control advocates acknowledge a larger truth: The law that barred the sale of assault weapons from 1994 to 2004 made little difference.

It turns out that big, scary military rifles don’t kill the vast majority of the 11,000 Americans murdered with guns each year. Little handguns do.

In 2012, only 322 people were murdered with any kind of rifle, F.B.I. data shows.

Not too long ago, gun controllers were quite open about their goal of banning all handguns. Nelson “Pete” Shields III, a founder of Handgun Control, Inc.—the aptly named progenitor of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence—openly advocated for the elimination of all handguns:

‘We’re going to have to take this one step at a time. . . . Our ultimate goal—total control of all guns—is going to take time.’ The ‘final problem,’ he insisted, ‘is to make the possession of all handguns and all handgun ammunition’ for ordinary civilians ‘totally illegal.’

John Hechinger, a sponsor of the Washington, D.C., handgun ban and a board member of Handgun Control, Inc., put it simply: “We have to do away with the guns.” The same can be said for Michael Bloomberg’s group, Mayor Against Illegal Guns, which has as its ultimate goal confiscation of handguns.

Realizing that this is not a viable option they have instead focused on eliminating scary-looking guns (AR-15), with a scary sounding titles (“assault weapon”),  which have a strikingly small impact on actual gun deaths. Why? To stigmatize firearms altogether, and make it easier to confiscate handguns later.

Conservative columnist Charles  Krauthammer accurately summarized the reasoning for these measures in 1996. He argued that the assault weapons ban would not result in a decrease in violence, but would serve as an important symbolic step down the path to banning all guns by desensitizing Americans to gun control laws. Krauthammer stated:

Ultimately, a civilized society must disarm its citizenry if it is to have a modicum of domestic tranquility of the kind enjoyed in sister democracies like Canada and Britain. Given the frontier history and individualist ideology of the United States, however, this will not come easily. It certainly cannot be done radically. It will probably take one, maybe two generations. It might be 50 years before the United States gets to where Britain is today.

Passing a law like the assault weapons ban is a symbolic— purely symbolic—move in that direction. Its only real justification is not to reduce crime but to desensitize the public to the regulation of weapons in preparation for their ultimate confiscation. Its purpose is to spark debate, highlight the issue, make the case that the arms race between criminals and citizens is as dangerous as it is pointless.

De-escalation begins with a change in mentality. And that change in mentality starts with the symbolic yielding of certain types of weapons. The real steps, like the banning of handguns, will never occur unless this one is taken first, and even then not for decades.

My conclusion from The Shooting Cycle still holds:

The way to accomplish this cultural shift of reversing the trend line is not through flaming fears following mass shootings, and trying to pass through the backdoor proposals that people did not want before. This makes gun owners not trust gun controllers—with good reason. As Professor Winkler noted, “Many gun owners might have supported background checks had they not been distracted by the assault weapons issue, which caused them to distrust gun control proponents even more than before.” Why should they? Every time there is a tragedy and support for background checks is strong, gun controllers aim high and try to reintroduce failed gun-control bills. Professor Winkler reminds us that the ultimate aim of “disarmament is an unrealistic goal.” The fact that “[g]uns are permanent in America” is “perhaps the most important” fact that the “gun ban supporters failed to grasp.” As long as this fear persists, and remains the obvious end-goal of these groups, the NRA’s fanning the flames of confiscation remains viable.

 

Judge Posner Apologizes For Statements He Made Many Times Before About Constitution

July 1st, 2016

Last week, Judge Posner caused quite an uproar with his Slate column suggesting that studying the Constitution was a pointless exercise.

And on another note about academia and practical law, I see absolutely no value to a judge of spending decades, years, months, weeks, day, hours, minutes, or seconds studying the Constitution, the history of its enactment, its amendments, and its implementation (across the centuries—well, just a little more than two centuries, and of course less for many of the amendments). Eighteenth-century guys, however smart, could not foresee the culture, technology, etc., of the 21stcentury. Which means that the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the post–Civil War amendments (including the 14th), do not speak to today. David Strauss is right: The Supreme Court treats the Constitution like it is authorizing the court to create a common law of constitutional law, based on current concerns, not what those 18th-century guys were worrying about. In short, let’s not let the dead bury the living.

In a follow-up column, Posner offers this apology:

Some of my contributions this year have drawn an unusual number of criticisms, focused on language I used that could be read as suggesting that I don’t think the Constitution has any role to play in interpreting the law—that it should be forgotten; that constitutional law is and must and maybe should be entirely a judicial creation, like fields of common law.

That was not my intention, and I apologize if carelessness resulted in my misleading readers.

I would be inclined to chalk this up to a misunderstanding, but Posner–who is one of the most effective legal writers on planet earth–said in his Slate column what he had previously said many times before.

During his remarks at the Loyola Constitutional Law Colloquium, he said the text of the Constitution has no relevance:

I’m not particularly interested in the 18th Century, nor am I particularly interested in the text of the Constitution. I don’t believe that any document drafted in the 18th century can guide our behavior today. Because the people in the 18th century could not foresee any of the problems of the 21st century . . . . I think we can forget about the 18th century, much of the text. We ask with respect to contemporary constitutional issues, ask what is a sensible response.

(Judge Posner verified that my transcription of his remarks were accurate).

 

He made a similar same point last year in the Yale Law Journal:

Federal constitutional law is the most amorphous body of American law because most of the Constitution is very old, cryptic, or vague. The notion that the twenty-first century can be ruled by documents authored in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries is nonsense. . . . I think we can forget about the 18th century, much of the text. We ask with respect to contemporary constitutional issues, ask what is a sensible response.

There is no doubt what Judge Posner thinks of the actual text and history of the Constitution–it is “nonsense.”

In his apology, he resorted to the old saw that there are vague and specific provisions of the Constitution, and judges should enforce the specific provisions of the Constitution–such as the thirty-five year old requirement for the Presidency:

What I think is undeniably true is that while the Constitution contains a number of specific provisions—such as the prohibition of titles of nobility (a slap at our former English rulers, who mainly were kings and aristocrats), the requirement that the president be at least 35 years old, and the very detailed provisions regarding congressional authority—many other provisions are quite vague.

Yet last year at Loyola, he specifically said that the Supreme Court should allow a 21-year old elected as President to serve!

There are also provisions that are not regarded as justiciable. If a candidate for President happened to be 25, or 21 (like Napoleon) and was elected, and suit was brought to say he is too young, I would think a sensible court for the Supreme Court to say this is not not justiciable. If people want the young president, fine. There is no legal analysis to be performed. Not everything in any document, statute or Constitution, is necessarily justiciable.

He also rejected another one of the bright-line rules in the Constitution–the $20 amount-in-controversy requirement, which he called “absurd.”

There are things that are in the text of the Constitution that are absurd. One is the idea that if the matter in controversy is at least $20, you have the right to a jury trial. That is absurd. $20 in the 18th century meant something very different than in the 21st century. What the Supreme Court should say when people bring jury cases for $20 is that provision is archaic and will not be enforced.

He also dismissed the relevance of the oath which gives him the authority to decided cases:

It’s funny to talk about the oath judges take to uphold the constitution since the Supreme Court has transformed the Constitution in its decisions. The oath is not really to the original constitution, or to the constitution as amended. It is to some body of law created by the Supreme Court. You can forget about the oath. That is not of significance.

I’ll repeat what I wrote last November:

I could go on and on, but you get the point. I admire Judge Posner’s candor about rejecting the Constitution as a binding document. As an academic theory, his pragmatism offers a powerful rejoinder to other formalistic theories. But he isn’t just writing as a scholar. He practices what he preaches, and strikes down laws on that basis. If he truly believes what he believes, then he ought not to use that same nonsensical Constitution as his license to invalidate democratically enacted laws. You can’t have your Constitution, and eat it too.

Ironically, as much as Posner loved to ridicule Scalia, here Nino is having the last laugh. Posner came clean with his absolute disregard for the text and history of the Constitution, and now after a complete repudiation, he is forced to backtrack–unconvincingly. As Will Baude would say, “Originalism is our law.”

National Review Symposium on Justice Thomas’s Quarter-Century on #SCOTUS

July 1st, 2016

National Review hosted a symposium on Justice Thomas’s twenty-fifth anniversary on the Court, with contributions from Randy Barnett, Richard Epstein, John Yoo, and many others. My submission focused on Justice Thomas’s aspiration to revisit old precedents that conflict with original meaning in “an appropriate case.”

Justice Clarence Thomas’s quarter century on the Supreme Court has been defined by a principled devotion to understanding the Constitution’s original meaning and applying it to modern-day cases. His fidelity to text and history is embodied in a phrase he has used in 16 concurring or dissenting opinions: In “an appropriate case,” he would be willing to reconsider the Court’s longstanding precedents that cannot be reconciled with originalism. An example from his very first week on the bench illustrates his steadfast commitment to the Constitution.

After a bruising confirmation battle, Justice Thomas was sworn in to the Court on October 23, 1991. By that point, he had already missed all of the October cases and had to scramble to prepare for the next batch, which would be heard ten days later. On November 5, Thomas’s second day on the bench, the Court heard arguments in White v. Illinois. The facts were unsavory. A four-year-old told her babysitter that Randall White, who had just fled her bedroom, “touch[ed] her in the wrong places.” During White’s trial, the toddler was unable to testify due to “emotional difficulty,” so the state introduced as evidence the babysitter’s out-of-court statement. The trial court overruled the defendant’s objection that, under the Sixth Amendment, he had the right to confront his accuser. With the babysitter’s statement as evidence, White was convicted.

A few days after White was argued, Justice Thomas attended his first conference. The majority of the Court voted against White. Under settled precedent, the babysitter’s statement was admissible because it was “reliable.” Only a few days into the job, it would have been easy enough for Thomas to simply go along to get along. But from the very beginning, Thomas pursued the original meaning of the Constitution, even if that history conflicted with the Court’s settled precedents. This was true regardless of his personal preferences. Even though the law-and-order justice likely had little sympathy for a child molester, the procedural protections of the Sixth Amendment prevailed on him.

In an eight-page dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas wrote that his colleagues’ “Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause itself.” Realizing that he was only in dissent, Thomas wrote that he would reconsider this doctrine “in an appropriate case.” In the meantime, lawyers, scholars, and judges can study and consider the persuasive arguments from Thomas and Scalia. Thirteen years later, that “appropriate case” would arrive. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court voted to restore the Confrontation Clause’s original meaning and jettison the postmodern “reliability” framework.

From his first week on the bench, Justice Thomas understood that a single opinion cannot right the law right away. But given reason, logic, and time, “in an appropriate case” the Constitution will ultimately prevail. Thomas’s fidelity to the rule of law and the power of courts should inspire us all, and hopefully several more of his colleagues, for another quarter century to come.