Blog

Between 2009 and 2020, Josh published more than 10,000 blog posts. Here, you can access his blog archives.

2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009

Understanding Texas’s New Challenge to the ACA’s Individual Mandate: Part III

June 20th, 2018

Part I of this series explained that “[e]ven though the [Affordable Care Act’s] penalty is [now] set to $0, the individual mandate still plays an important social function to reduce adverse selection, and plays a role in the operation of employer-based coverage.” It still has a legal effect. Part II “focus[ed] on how the recent tax reform legislation affects Chief Justice Roberts’s saving construction in NFIB v. Sebelius.” Specifically, because the mandate can no longer fall within the NFIB saving construction—because the penalty is $0—it is no longer constitutional. This third installment will address the issue of severability: if the mandate is now unconstitutional, should other portions of the law also be set aside.

A “Convergent Constitutional Violation” in Frost

Prior to December 22, 2017, Section 5000A(a) of the Affordable Care Act—that is, the individual mandate—was constitutional by virtue of Chief Justice Roberts’s saving construction in NFIB v. Sebelius. However, when President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) into law, thereby reducing the penalty to $0, a conflict arose. Neither the mandate, nor the tax cut, by themselves, pose any problems. But cannot both exist in harmony. A new article from two recent Yale Law School graduates describes this conflict as a “convergent constitutional violation.” James Durling and E. Garrett West contend that if the TCJA of 2017 renders the individual mandate of 2010 unconstitutional, then the “court should strike the repeal of the tax penalty in the Tax Cuts Act.” When I first read their article, I quickly assumed that this argument was insane. (Perhaps you had the same reaction). But, after letting the concept marinate for a few weeks, I began to see its insight. I encourage you to do the same, and read the eighteen-page essay in its entirety. Even if you ultimately disagree with the authors, you will see this case in a new light.

The starting point for their severability analysis is Frost v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma. 278 U.S. 515 (1929). W.A. Frost was allowed operated a cotton gin, pursuant to a permit granted by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, because he made a “satisfactory showing of public necessity.” 278 U.S. at 517. Subsequent to the issuance of Frost’s permit, Oklahoma modified the pre-existing statutory regime with a new “proviso” that required the Commission to issue a license for a “gin to be run cooperatively” if a petition was “signed by one hundred (100) citizens and tax payers of the community where the gin is to be located.” Id. Critically, the “proviso made it mandatory to grant the permit applied for without regard to [public] necessity.” Id. at 518 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Sutherland, found the proviso violated the Fourteenth Amendment, because “its effect is to relieve all corporations organized under the [pre-existing legislation] from an onerous restriction upon the right to engage in a public business which is imposed by the statute.” Id. at 521-22. In other words, the original statutory regime was sound; the proviso, however, rendered that regime unconstitutional. (The similarities to the facts in Texas v. U.S. quickly become apparent).

Next, Justice Sutherland turned to the question of severability by considering two different scenarios. First, what would happen if the same legislature had enacted both the unconstitutional proviso and the otherwise-constitutional substantive provision? That is,

the original statutory scheme excluded cooperative gins from having to demonstrate a public necessity. In such a case, he wrote, “the effect would be to render the entire section invalid,” for it would not be sufficient to simply strike out the proviso. Id. at 525. The Court would not “extend the scope of the law in that regard so as to embrace corporations which the Legislature passing the statute had, by its very terms, expressly excluded.” Id. (Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, which I will discuss infra, relies on this first scenario.)

In the second scenario, which described the facts at issue in Frost, “the proviso here in question was not in the original section.” Id. at 526. Rather, “[i]t was added by way of amendment many years after the original section was enacted.” Id. In other words, the proviso “repeal[ed] by implication the requirement of the existing statute in respect of public necessity,” rendering that old statute unconstitutional. The Court’s conclusion is worth quoting in full:

“Here it is conceded that the statute, before the amendment, was entirely valid. When passed, it expressed the will of the Legislature which enacted it. Without an express repeal, a different Legislature undertook to create an exception, but, since that body sought to express its will by an amendment which, being unconstitutional, is a nullity and, therefore, powerless to work any change in the existing statute, that statute must stand as the only valid expression of the legislative intent.” Id. at 526-27.

To clarify, because the later-in-time proviso rendered the original statute unconstitutional, it is a “nullity” and cannot “work any change in the existing statute.” What is the “only valid expression of the legislative intent”? The original statute, enacted by the earlier-in-time legislature.

My initial reaction was to question whether Frost was still good law. As a threshold matter, this was not a new rule. Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion favorably cited an 1866 opinion from the Michigan Supreme Court by Chief Justice Thomas M. Cooley involving a “similar situation.” Id. at 527. In that case, the renowned jurist wrote, “nothing can come in conflict with a nullity, and nothing is therefore repealed by this act on the ground solely of its being inconsistent with a section of this law which is entirely unconstitutional and void.” Id. The Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment in United States v. Jackson: a recently-added “clause authorizing capital punishment [was] severable from the remainder of the kidnaping statute and that the unconstitutionality of that clause does not require the defeat of the law as a whole.” 390 U.S. 570, 586 (1968).

I could not find any case that cast Frost in doubt. Several federal and state court decisions favorably cited and applied it. See e.g., White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 261 (6th Cir. 1983) (“It has long been held that a statute which is unconstitutional does not repeal a prior statute on the subject when a contrary construction would create a void in the law which the legislative body did not intend. The prior statute is ‘revived’ to avoid a chaotic hiatus in the law.”); In re Benny, 812 F.2d 1133, 1148 (9th Cir. 1987) (Norris, J., concurring) (“My second reason for disagreeing with the Department’s position that Congress in 1984 impliedly or explicitly repealed the prior holdover provision is that any attempt by Congress to terminate the holdover tenure of incumbent judges would itself have constituted an independent constitutional violation.”); Matter of Certification of Questions of Law from U.S. Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit, Pursuant to Provisions of SDCL 15-24A-1, 1996 S.D. 10, ¶ 88, 544 N.W.2d 183, 204 (“An act or amendment to an act which violates the Constitution has no power, and can neither build up nor tear down. It can neither create new rights nor destroy existing rights.”).

The most detailed discussion of Frost by the Supreme Court appeared in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.531 U.S. 533, 538 (2001). This 2001 opinion warrants a careful study. Through § 504(a)(16) of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Congress prohibited the Legal Services Corporation from funding any organization

“that initiates legal representation or participates in any other way, in litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system, except that this paragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from representing an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation.”

This provision was challenged in court. On appeal, the Second Circuit declared unconstitutional the “the qualification that representation could ‘not involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law,’ because it ‘clearly seeks to discourage challenges to the status quo.’” Id. at 539. This, the court of appeals found, constituted an “impermissible viewpoint discrimination.” Id. Because “congressional intent regarding severability was unclear,” the Second Circuit “decided to ‘invalidate the smallest possible portion of the statute, excising only the viewpoint-based proviso rather than the entire exception of which it is a part.’”

On the merits, the Supreme Court agreed, and found that the “funding condition” in § 504(a)(16) violates the First Amendment, and is “invalid.” With respect to severability, the Court noted that the Second Circuit “reached the reasoned conclusion to invalidate the fragment of § 504(a)(16) found contrary to the First Amendment, leaving the balance of the statute operative and in place.” Id. at 549. However, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion “decline[d] to address” anew the question of severability because “[t]hat determination was not discussed in the briefs of either party or otherwise contested here.” Id. Instead, the majority simply affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit, and left the remainder of § 504(a)(16) in place. In other words, the Legal Services Corporation could now fund organizations that represent an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency even if such relief involves an effort to “amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation.”

Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas, dissented from the majority’s severability analysis. He posed the relevant question succinctly: “whether, without the restriction that the Court today invalidates, [would] the permission for conducting welfare litigation . . . have been accorded.” Id. at 1059. That is, would Congress have allowed any funding for individualized welfare benefits litigation unless the organizations were also prohibited from challenging existing welfare laws? “One determines what Congress would have done,” Justice Scalia explained, “by examining what it did.”

And what did Congress do in 1996? The dissent found that the amendment linked together the “funding of welfare benefits suits and its prohibition on suits challenging or defending the validity of existing law.” These provisions, Justice Scalia concluded, are “conditions, considerations [and] compensations for each other” that cannot be severed.” Id. at 558-59 (quoting Warren v. Mayor and Aldermen of Charlestown, 68 Mass. 84, 99 (1854) (Shaw, C.J.)). Stated differently, the dissent imagines a legislative bargain: Congress would fund individuals who seek to challenge the application of welfare laws, so long as welfare laws themselves were not challenged. “The statute concocted by the Court of Appeals,” he wrote, “bears little resemblance to what Congress enacted, funding without restriction welfare-benefits litigation that Congress funded only under the limitations of § 504(a)(16).” Id. at 559. And so, the majority opinion errs. Under Justice Scalia’s analysis, “[t]o strike the restriction on welfare benefits suits is to void § 504(a)(16) altogether.” Id. at 561. Why? “To remove that limit [on litigation] is to repeal subsection (a)(16) altogether, and thus to eliminate a significant quid pro quo of the legislative compromise.”

Justice Scalia cited Frost v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma. He noted that the Court has “in some cases stated that when an ‘excepting proviso is found unconstitutional the substantive provisions which it qualifies cannot stand,’ for ‘to hold otherwise would be to extend the scope of the law . . . so as to embrace [situations] which the legislature passing the statute had, by its very terms, expressly excluded.’” Id. at 560 (quoting 278 U.S. at 525). Again, this discussion from Frost considered the first scenario where the same legislature enacted both the “excepting proviso” and the “substantive provision which [the proviso] qualifies.” These were the facts in Velazquez, because the same Congress in 1996 enacted the objectionable, and unobjectionable portions of the statute. Such were not the facts of Frost itself, where legislatures at different points in time enacted the “excepting proviso” and the “substantive provision which [the proviso] qualifies.” For the latter scenario, the Frost Court set aside the proviso itself, and not the original substantive provision.

Under Justice Scalia’s analysis, if a single Congress enacted a statute—part of which is unconstitutional and part of which is constitutional—than that entire statute should be set aside if Congress would not have intended the constitutional part to operate independently. Justice Scalia’s analysis does not speak to the second Frost scenario where a later-in-time Congress took an action that rendered an earlier-in-time statute unconstitutional. That is, the 1996 amendments did not render the original 1974 Legal Services Corporation Act unconstitutional

A “Convergent Constitutional Violation” in Texas

Frost illustrates why Durling and West are, at least in the abstract, correct. The 2010 individual mandate remained constitutional until the 2017 TCJA eliminated the revenue-generating tax that saved its constitutionality. The two provisions cannot coexist. Durling and West write “[w]hen Congress enacts an amendment that renders a broader statutory scheme unconstitutional, the default rule should be to strike down the amendment and restore the law to the pre-amendment status quo.” The key word here is “render.” Neither the mandate nor the tax cut are independently unconstitutional, but the latter renders the former unconstitutional.

Durling and West explain that Congress could have resolved any doubts by drafting the 2017 TCJA differently:

For example, a legislature could write that, if the amendment is unconstitutional, then the rest of the statutory scheme should also be held unconstitutional—what is often called an “inseverability clause.” After all, if Congress includes that language in the statute, then it’s just as much a part of the legislative bargain as the first-order statutory language. And even if the initial amendment is an unconstitutional “nullity,” the fallback provision can itself be a constitutional revision to the law. In these two ways, legislatively adopted fallback rules do not undermine the separation-of-powers and judicial- restraint values that underlie severability doctrine. (p. 11).

When zeroing out the penalty in 2017, Congress did not include an “inseverablity” clause. Indeed, it expressed no concern, whatsoever, that it was about to render another statute unconstitutional, even though “Congress is presumed to act with full awareness of existing judicial interpretations.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 460 n.6 (1987) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987) (per curiam)). Yet, Congress passed a statute that flouted the terms of NFIB’s saving construction. (Many members were quite vocal about their intent to repeal the individual mandate, even though they could not do so under the reconciliation process they adopted.)

The New Jersey Attorney General—perhaps after reading Durling and West’s essay—suggested this unconventional remedy to any convergent constitutional violations: “The proper remedy is to strike the amendment that reduced the tax liability to $0 and revert back to the prior tax penalty found constitutional in NFIB.” Brief at 2.

While I agree in the abstract with Durling and West’s proposed default rule, I cannot agree with New Jersey’s argument in this case for a simple reason: Frost considered a challenge to the unconstitutional proviso, while Texas does not. Because of how Texas structured its challenge, the district court is presented with a narrower menu of options with respect to severability. Federal courts do not have a roving license to flip through the U.S. Code with a red pencil to strike out one statute to save another. Invalidating the 2017 tax cut is simply not an option in the Texas litigation, because it has not been challenged.

To understand this dynamic, it is important to carefully parse the relevant statutory framework, and what Texas has, and has not challenged. Section 11081 of the TCJA, titled “elimination of shared responsibility payment for individuals failing to maintain minimum essential coverage,” provides in full:

(a) In General.—Section 5000A(c) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)(B)(iii), by striking “2.5 percent” and inserting “Zero percent”, and

(2) in paragraph (3)—

(A) by striking “$695” in subparagraph (A) and inserting “$0”, and

(B) by striking subparagraph (D).

(b) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to months beginning after December 31, 2018.

The following table illustrates how the relevant provisions of Section 5000A(c) of the ACA appeared before the TCJA, and how those provisions were amended by Section 11081 of the TCJA. (I’ve highlighted the changed portions in red).

Section 5000A(c) before TCJA Section 5000A(c) as Amended by TCJA

(2)(B) Percentage of income

An amount equal to the following percentage of the excess of the taxpayer’s household income for the taxable year over the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer for the taxable year:

(i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014.

(ii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2015.

(iii) 2.5 percent for taxable years beginning after 2015.

(2)(B) Percentage of income

An amount equal to the following percentage of the excess of the taxpayer’s household income for the taxable year over the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer for the taxable year:

(i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014.

(ii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2015.

(iii) 2.5 Zero percent for taxable years beginning after 2015.

(3) Applicable dollar amount

For purposes of paragraph (1)-

(A) In general

Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar amount is $695.

(3) Applicable dollar amount

For purposes of paragraph (1)-

(A) In general

Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar amount is $695 $0.

(D) Indexing of amount

In the case of any calendar year beginning after 2016, the applicable dollar amount shall be equal to $695, increased by an amount equal to-

(i) $695, multiplied by

(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year, determined by substituting “calendar year 2015” for “calendar year 2016” in subparagraph (A)(ii) thereof. If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.

(D) Indexing of amount

In the case of any calendar year beginning after 2016, the applicable dollar amount shall be equal to $695, increased by an amount equal to-

(i) $695, multiplied by

(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year, determined by substituting “calendar year 2015” for “calendar year 2016” in subparagraph (A)(ii) thereof. If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.

In the Amended Complaint, Texas prayed for the court to “Declare the ACA, as amended by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, to be unconstitutional either in part or in whole.” Texas challenged the right-hand column of the above table. It did not in any way challenge Section 11081 of the TCJA.

The notation in the U.S. Code illustrates this point:

Pub. L. 115–97, title I, §11081, Dec. 22, 2017, 131 Stat. 2092 , amended subsection (c) of this section, applicable to months beginning after Dec. 31, 2018. After amendment, subsection (c) reads as follows:

After December 31, 2018, Section 5000A(c), standing by itself, will now always calculate a penalty of $0. Section 11081 of the TCJA is not part of the ACA, and is not subject to a lawsuit here.

There is, however, another option that could give rise to the remedy the intervenors seek: if New Jersey (or another similarly situated party) challenged the constitutionality of the tax cut as rendering the individual mandate unconstitutional. In that collateral attack—assuming there is standing to challenge the elimination of a tax burden—a federal court could in fact set aside the TCJA, leaving the mandate in place. After giving this issue some thought, I was frankly surprised that none of the usual suspects have filed suit in a favorable forum, arguing that the tax cut was unconstitutional. Nothing came of threats that blue states would challenge the modification to deductions for state and local taxes (SALT). But a challenge to the elimination of the penalty enforcing the individual mandate could be viable. Such a suit, however, would pose a distinct risk. Conflicting rulings may set up a circuit split, presenting the Supreme Court with a tough choice: increase the taxes for millions of Americans, or invalidate the individual mandate—and potentially other ACA provisions. This risk may explain why a progressive group or a Democratic Attorney General has not challenged the constitutionality of the tax cut.

Durling and West offer a more generalized response to the argument that the Court is unable to set aside Section 11801 of the TCJA. They note “the Court does not confine itself to the plaintiff’s requested relief.” For example, in Session v. Morales-Santana, the Court considered a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that imposed a gender-based classification. 137 S.Ct. 1678 (2017). The respondent in this case could only derive citizenship if his unwed father had been physically present in the United States for five years.  However, citizenship could be derived from an unwed mother who was “continuously present in the United States for one year at any point in her life prior to the child’s birth.” Id. at 1698. This “gender-based differential,” Justice Ginsburg found for the Court, violated the “equal protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 1686. The Respondent urged the Justices to level-down, and apply the one-year limit to unwed fathers. While “the preferred rule in the typical case is to extend favorable treatment,” Justice Ginsburg observed, “this is hardly the typical case.” Id. at 1701. As a result, the Court left in place the five-year requirement for unwed fathers, and increased the requirement for unwed mothers from one year to five years. This level-up remedy was proposed by the Solicitor General: “The proper way to cure any equal protection violation would be to apply, on a prospective basis, the longer physical-presence requirements in Section 1401 to children born out of wedlock to U.S.-citizen mothers.” Petitioner Brief at 12. Congress was left with one option: “settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.” Id. The Respondent’s victory was pyrrhic.

Without question Durling and West are correct that in cases involving severability, “the Court does not confine itself to the plaintiff’s requested relief.” Indeed, Morales-Santana’s victory was pyrrhic: he could not benefit from the one-year requirement, and, prospectively, neither would other children of unwed mothers. Morales-Santana, however, does not stretch far enough to resolve the question presented in Texas v. United States: if an earlier-in-time statute is rendered unconstitutional by a later-in-time amendment, can the court invalidate the latter, even if the latter was never challenged?

The individual mandate and the tax cut can exist independently, but cannot exist simultaneously. If the tax cut is invalidated, the individual mandate remains constitutional. That is, the right-hand column is eliminated, and we revert back to the left-hand column. Conversely, if the individual mandate is invalidated, the tax cut remains constitutional. Call it Schrödinger’s Mandate. Morales-Santana presented a very different scenario. The one-year requirement for unwed mothers and the five-year requirement for unwed fathers cannot exist independently. The presence of one provision, by itself, amounts to an unconstitutional gender based classification. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion determined that the only viable remedy was to put everyone on the same page. Morales-Santana does not address the question presented in Texas.

Congress’s Intent in 2017

Part II of New Jersey’s brief contends that if the court finds that the mandate is no longer constitutional, the correct remedy is to reinstate the prior tax amount. I view this position as its much stronger argument—it is no surprise that the intervenors led off with it. Part III offers an argument in the alternative: even if the individual mandate is unconstitutional, the remainder of the ACA should be severable. The severability analysis, as always, turns on Congress’s intent. But which Congress: the Congress that enacted the ACA in 2010 or the Congress that enacted the TCJA in 2017?

New Jersey argues that what matters is the “intent of the Congress that passed that amendment” in 2017. In a footnote, the brief adds:

Plaintiffs focus exclusively on the intent of the Congress that passed the ACA. But that is the wrong focal point. None of Plaintiffs’ cases involved a statutory provision amended by a subsequent Congress in a manner that purportedly makes the amended provision unconstitutional. Under these circumstances, the intent of the Congress that amended the provision should govern.

The American Medical Association, represented by former Solicitor General Don Verrilli, agreed with New Jersey that the only the intent of Congress in 2017 matters; not the intent of Congress in 2010:

Both the Plaintiffs and the Federal Defendants nonetheless argue that two ACA provisions—the guaranteed-issue and community rating requirements—are inseverable from § 5000A. But their entire analysis turns on a congressional finding from 2010—not 2017. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501 (2010). While it is true that one Congress found that the “guaranteed issue and community rating requirements would not work without” the minimum essential coverage provision, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015), a later Congress manifestly disagreed. And that Congress’ intent is the only one that matters. Brief at p. 21 (emphasis in original).

Likewise, five law professors—Jonathan Adler, Nicholas Bagley, Abbe Gluck, Ilya Somin, and Kevin Walsh—argued in an amicus brief that the intent of Congress in 2010 no longer matters:

This time-shifting of congressional intent misapplies severability doctrine. By expressly amending the statute in 2017 and setting the penalty at zero while not making other changes, Congress eliminated any need to examine earlier legislative findings or to theorize about what Congress would have wanted. Congress told us what it wanted through its 2017 legislative actions—“One determines what Congress would have done by examining what it did.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 560 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whatever Congress may have believed about the connection among these provisions in 2010, the relevant question now is what Congress intended in 2017 when it took the action that provides the basis for plaintiffs’ challenge, i.e., when it reduced the mandate’s penalty to zero. And Congress demonstrated that intent not through mere findings but through amendments to the operative provisions of the ACA. It repealed the penalty while leaving the insurance reforms in place. Cf. Association of Am. Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“A preamble no doubt contributes to a general understanding of a statute, but it is not an operative part of the statute . . . . The operative provisions of statutes are those which prescribe rights and duties and otherwise declare the legislative will.”).

As an intuitive matter, this argument makes sense, but I have been unable to find any authority to support the proposition that the earlier findings of Congress in 2010 are irrelevant. Texas challenged the ACA as amended (with the penalty dropped to $0). It did not challenge the TCJA. Indeed, the closest case I can find is Frost, which involved–to quote New Jersey’s brief–“a statutory provision amended by a subsequent Congress in a manner that purportedly makes the amended provision unconstitutional.” I welcome submissions for authority that rejects the “time-shifting of congressional intent” approach to severability. There may be something, but I haven’t found it yet.

The law professors’ citation to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Velazquez is not on point. In that case, he was considering the first scenario from Frost where the same legislature enacted the unconstitutional proviso and the otherwise constitutional provision. No “time-shifting” was involved . When Justice Scalia referred to “Congress” in Velazquez, he was referring to a single statute enacted by the same legislators. He did not consider the second scenario in Frost, which mirrors the facts of Texas, in which the unconstitutional proviso was enacted later-in-time. In any event, Justice Scalia’s statute delenda est approach stands for a much broader conception of severability: he would throw out the baby, the bathwater, the bathtub, the bathroom, and even the kitchen sink. (And in hindsight, we know he was willing to jettison the entire ACA in NFIB v. Sebelius.) To the contrary, Frost supports the “time-shifting of congressional intent.”

Congress’s Intent in 2010

If the Supreme Court follows the reasoning in Frost, then the proper remedy is to invalidate the tax cut, and restore Section 5000A(c) to its original form. From a pragmatic perspective, the Supreme Court may not be keen on reimposing a tax on millions of Americans–especially if this case takes some time to trickle upstairs. Confronted with the choice of invalidating the mandate–which has minimal legal effect–and raising taxes, the Court could choose the former. (Of course, the Court could, as it often does, punt the issue by finding there is no standing.)

If the Court does choose to leave the tax cut in place, Frost still informs which intent to follow: the Congress in 2010 or the Congress in 2017. Frost speaks to this specific issue of which legislature’s intent matters.

“Here it is conceded that the statute, before the amendment, was entirely valid. When passed, it expressed the will of the Legislature which enacted it. Without an express repeal, a different Legislature undertook to create an exception, but, since that body sought to express its will by an amendment which, being unconstitutional, is a nullity and, therefore, powerless to work any change in the existing statute, that statute must stand as the only valid expression of the legislative intent.” 278 U.S. at 526-27 (emphasis added).

The “only valid expression of the legislative intent” is the “will of the Legislature” which enacted “the statute, before the amendment.” That is, the Congress that enacted the ACA in 2010. What about the “will” of the “different Legislature” that enacted the amendment in 2017? That “will” was “a nullity and, [is] therefore, powerless to work any change in the existing statute.” The ACA reverts back from the right-hand column to the left-hand column Because of Frost’s bite, the legislative intent of the Congress that enacted the TCJA is not legally irrelevant for purposes of severability.

New Jersey wisely argues in the alternative that “even if it were proper to consider the legislative intent of the 2010 Congress that passed the minimum coverage provision in its original (and fully constitutional) form—and to graft that intent onto a statutory amendment passed by a different Congress—that would still be of no assistance to Plaintiffs.” If Frost is the appropriate rule, then the “will of the Legislature” in 2017 with respect to the zeroing out the penalty is truly a “nullity.” In short, the “expression of legislative intent” in 2017 was “powerless to work any change in the existing statute” from 2010. And that includes Congress’s findings in Section 18091 of the Affordable Care Act.

As I discuss in my first book, Unprecedented, this section was added in order to bolster the government’s defense of the individual mandate against any potential constitutional challenge:

Ultimately, the 2,700-page Affordable Care Act contained three pages of constitutional findings to show that the “requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage” was constitutional. First, “the individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce.” Second, the findings listed a number of “effects on the national and interstate commerce” that resulted from uninsured people shifting costs. Third, the “findings” stated that “the requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased [emphasis added].” The word “activity” would prove decisive. Fourth, “in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation.”

(Ironically enough, the taxing power was not mentioned anywhere in the findings, which were put together by the Constitutional Accountability Center.) There was a fifth finding which I did not mention in Unprecedented that has now become relevant once again. Section 18091(2)(I) provides in part:

if there were no [individual responsibility] requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold. (emphasis added).

The emphasized portion refers to the ACA’s guaranteed issue and community rating provisions which require (to grossly oversimplify) that insurers do not charge more for, or deny coverage to, customers with pre-existing conditions. This finding played an important role in the Obamacare litigation. For example, Chief Justice Roberts cited Section 18091(2)(I) in NFIB v. Sebelius:

The individual mandate’s regulation of the uninsured as a class is, in fact, particularly divorced from any link to existing commercial activity. The mandate primarily affects healthy, often young adults who are less likely to need significant health care and have other priorities for spending their money. It is precisely because these individuals, as an actuarial class, incur relatively low health care costs that the mandate helps counter the effect of forcing insurance companies to cover others who impose greater costs than their premiums are allowed to reflect. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (recognizing that the mandate would “broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums”). If the individual mandate is targeted at a class, it is a class whose commercial inactivity rather than activity is its defining feature. 132 S.Ct. at 2590.

As I noted in Part I of this series, the TCJA did not repeal, expressly or impliedly, this statutory finding. DOJ made a similar argument in its brief: “Those findings cannot be deemed to have been impliedly repealed by Congress’s mere elimination of the financial penalty.” Brief at 15-16. Indeed, because Congress enacted the tax cut through the budget reconciliation process, under its “rules of proceeding”—to which courts ought to defer—the other provisions of the ACA, including the findings, could not be amended. The question, then, is what is the relevance of these findings?

New Jersey counters that these findings only concern Congress’s constitutional authority to enact the mandate, and do not implicate severability:

For starters, these congressional findings were designed to show that the requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage “is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(1) (emphasis added). In other words, these findings were drafted to demonstrate that Congress had constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to require that most Americans purchase health insurance. Id. They do not reflect Congress’s judgment as to whether the community-rating and guaranteed-issue provisions should cease to exist if the minimum coverage requirement were invalidated. And in light of NFIB—which held that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to require individuals to purchase insurance—these congressional findings are no longer relevant to the constitutional analysis for which they were crafted. Brief at 37.

New Jersey is correct that Congress did not include these findings in a section about severability. Rather, they were expressly added to bolster the constitutional defense of the mandate. This fact did not trouble then-Solicitor General Verrilli, who relied on the findings Section 18091 in his severability brief:

The question of severability is one of congressional intent, and Congress expressly found that the minimum coverage provision is “essential” to the guaranteed-issue reforms. 42 U.S.C.A. 18091(a)(2)(I). Brief at p. 52.

Verrilli made the point more directly in his reply brief:

In this case, however, it is evident that Congress’s finding on the “essential” connection between the provisions, 42 U.S.C.A. 18091(a)(2)(I), “though directed at the antecedent constitutional question, can also be read to answer the severability question.” Court-Appointed Amicus Br. 33. This is so because the finding rested on evidence showing that, unless paired with a minimum coverage provision, the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions would actually undercut Congress’s goals because they would cause premiums to rise and coverage to decline. As both a logical and practical matter, therefore, Congress’s finding on the “essential” role of the minimum coverage provision in effectuating the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions effectively serves as an inseverability clause—albeit one limited to only those two provisions, given that Congress did not find the minimum coverage provision to be “essential” to any other part of the Act. Brief at p. 10.

Verrilli had the better argument in his NFIB brief. The findings in Section 18091, though directed at the constitutional question, also serve as reliable indicia of Congress’s intent in 2010 concerning the relationship between the individual mandate, and the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions.

Finally, New Jersey argues that Congress’s concerns in Section 18091(a)(2)(I) should be discounted because they have not come to fruition:

Any concern about adverse selection is not well founded in 2018. First, as Congress stated at the time, the three-prong approach that it adopted was intended to assist in “creating effective health insurance markets. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (emphasis added). Congress was attempting to create brand new insurance markets from scratch, a major undertaking that involved tremendous uncertainty. But those markets were successfully created years ago, and even Plaintiffs do not assert that the minimum coverage provision is essential to maintaining those already-created health insurance markets. In fact, Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that the “death spiral” scenario is far-fetched when they cite a 2017 CBO report about the effect of eliminating the shared responsibility payment. CBO found that repealing the minimum coverage requirement would cause average premiums in the nongroup market to rise by about 10%, but that “nongroup insurance markets would continue to be stable in almost all areas of the country throughout the coming decade.” Brief at 40.

To borrow a phrase from the law professors’ brief, “[t]his time-shifting of congressional intent misapplies severability doctrine.” Hindsight is always 20/20. Of course, if Congress knew in 2010 what it knows today about health care markets, it would have acted in a very different fashion. Congress may not even have bothered to enact the individual mandate, which proved to not be nearly as essential as was thought. But it did not know today what it knows now. The relevant question is, what would Congress in 2010 have intended to happen if the individual mandate was invalidated. The findings in Section 18091(a)(2)(I) provide a strong indication of that intent. Indeed, these findings may be the best evidence we have of that intent, as they are in the actual text of the statute, and not in the legislative history.

The Attorney General’s Severability Decision

In Part II of this series, I discussed the Attorney General’s decision not to defend the constitutionality of the individual mandate. As a matter of first principles, I generally agree with Sai Prakash and Neal Devins that the President, through his Attorney General, has no duty to defend laws he has determined are unconstitutional—even in the absence of a judicial declaration. (Michael McConnell takes the opposite position on this question.) With respect to the individual mandate, where the Attorney General has determined that the saving construction no longer applies, and the mandate is now unconstitutional, his decision is defensible.

A different analysis applies to his opinion concerning severability, which the Attorney General discussed in the following paragraph:

In their lawsuit the plaintiffs further argue that Section 5000A(a) [the individual mandate] is also inseverable from the rest of the ACA, and therefore that the statute and all of its implementing regulations should be invalidated. In NFIB, the Department previously argued that if Section 5000A(a) is unconstitutional, it is severable from the ACA’s other provisions, except those “guarantee[ing] issuance of coverage in the individual and group market” (“guaranteed issue”), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a), and “prohibiting discriminatory premium rates” (“community rating”), id. 300gg(a)(I), 300gg-4(b). I concur in the Department’s prior determination. Post-Jobs Act, Congress’s express findings in the ACA continue to describe Section 5000A(a) as “essential” to the operation of the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions. because otherwise individuals could wait until they become sick to purchase insurance, thus driving up premiums for everyone else. See 42 U.S.C. 18091(2)(1). This question of statutory interpretation does not involve the ACA’s constitutionality and therefore does not implicate the Department’s general practice of defending the constitutionality of federal law. Outside of these two provisions of the ACA, the Department will continue to argue that Section S000A(a) is severable from the remaining provisions of the ACA. (emphasis added).

As the emphasized portion explains, his decision concerning severability does not implicate the Department’s obligation to defend the constitutionality of laws. (This point has been lost in most commentary about the Attorney General’s decision.) The standards articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(B)(ii) are simply irrelevant with respect to decisions concerning severability. For example, in 2011, the Holder Justice Department argued that if the individual mandate was invalidated, the Court should also set aside the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions. See Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1299 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (“I note that the defendants have acknowledged that the individual mandate and the Act’s health insurance reforms, including the guaranteed issue and community rating, will rise or fall together as these reforms “cannot be severed from the [individual mandate].”). There was no need for DOJ to notify Congress about this decision, even though it is tantamount to a decision not to defend the constitutionality of other provisions. Accordingly, Bartow Farr-the Court appointed amicus—explained that “Petitioners and the United States are asking this Court to invalidate perfectly lawful provisions of a federal statute.” That is, the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions. Brief at 2.

Precisely because this decision does not implicate the Attorney General’s independent constitutional judgment, he has a much, much stronger obligation to defend Congress’s handiwork. As my analysis in this post illustrates, the severability doctrine is extremely murky. It is not well-settled, and much of the resolution may turn on how the Court interprets a 90-year old decision by Justice Sutherland. There is more than enough ground for the Attorney General to make arguments along the lines that New Jersey advanced. With respect to severability, Sessions’s decision is not defensible.

I pause to note briefly one related issue that results from the Attorney General’s decision. The District Court found that New Jersey satisfied the requirements of Rule 24(b), and could intervene. The order, however, did not address whether New Jersey has Article III standing to intervene in light of Windsor. Though the Attorney General submitted a 530D letter, there has been no indication that Congress intends to authorize counsel to defend the mandate, such as through the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG). Windsor found that the BLAG had standing to defend DOMA, but there is no indication that a state attorney general has such authority. This issue has not been raised in the District Court, as far as I can tell—Windsor is not cited in New Jersey’s motion to intervene. Because jurisdiction can be raised at any time, it should be addressed in future pleadings.

United States v. Ardoin

I will close this already-too-long post with a brief rejoinder to an argument raised by the AMA brief: “Plaintiffs ignore binding Fifth Circuit precedent that expressly rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that a law cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s tax power unless it actually raises revenue. United States v. Ardoin, 19 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 1994).” The Supreme Court already held that Congress did not exercise its taxing power in enacting Section 5000A. The Chief Justice only found that the exaction could be construed as a tax for purposes of the saving construction. If the saving construction no longer applies, then Section 5000A cannot be supported by Congress’s taxing powers. Rather, Congress can only fall back on its Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause powers to justify the mandate. Five Justices already held that Congress lacks the power to impose the mandate through these provisions. The argument based on Ardoin is foreclosed by NFIB.

Conclusion

In this third installment, I raised many questions about the state of severability doctrine, and only answered some of them. Why? Because I haven’t made up my mind yet. This case presents a lot of really, really difficult issues that have been dismissed far too easily. My goal here is not to persuade anyone how the case should turn out. I’m still thinking it through. Rather, my purpose has been to raise issues that have not yet been addressed in the briefing, and hopefully will be addressed in the future.

Commentary, Media Hits, and Events (March 5 – May 30)

May 31st, 2018

Here are my commentaries, media hits, and speaking engagements from March 5, 2018 through May 30, 2018. The bulk of these hits concern the CUNY protest, as well as the travel ban.

 

Articles

  1. Defiance and Surrender, 59 So. Texas L. Rev. (2018).

 

Commentary

  1. Conservative and Libertarian Lawyers in the Era of Trump, Lawfare (May 29, 2018).
  2. Dueling Cosmic Injunctions, DACA and Departmentalism, Lawfare (May 22, 2018).
  3. The Easy Way Forward on Trump v. Hawaii, Lawfare (Apr. 25, 2018).
  4. CUNY Law students heckled my talk on campus free speech, NY Daily News (Apr. 21, 2018).
  5. Students at CUNY Law Protested and Heckled My Lecture about Free Speech on Campus, National Review (Apr. 12, 2018).
  6. Testing California’s “Sanctuary Law,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 13, 2018) (with Ilya Shapiro) (Reproduction).
  7. Analysis of IRAP v. Trump Part I: The Fourth Circuit’s Reliance on Pre- and Post-Inauguration Statements, Lawfare (May 27, 2017).
  8. Analysis of IRAP v. Trump Part II: The Fourth Circuit’s Misuse of Mandel, Din, Lemon, and Town of Greece, Lawfare (May 28, 2017).

 

Media

  1. Quoted in What’s Missing From Stories on Campus Free Speech?, Education Writers Association (May 25, 2018).
  2. Guest on The Michael Berry Show to discuss ruling about the President’s Twitter account (May 24, 2018).
  3. Quoted in Gorsuch Takes Inside-Player Role in Second Term on Supreme Court, Bloomberg (May 24, 2018).
  4. Guest on the Michael Berry Show to discuss the Supreme Court (May 23, 2018).
  5. Cited in When it Comes to Sharing a Laugh at SCOTUS, the Late Justice Scalia is Still Supreme, Texas Lawyer (May 22, 2018).
  6. Quoted in Kennedy retirement rumors shift into overdrive, The Hill (May 21, 2018).
  7. Cited in First they came for Josh Blackman: why censorship isn’t the answer, Oxford University Press Blog (May 17, 2018).
  8. Quoted in PETA lawsuit against Texas A&M turns Facebook comments into a First Amendment issue, Houston Chronicle (May 16, 2018).
  9. Quoted in DACA’s legal labyrinth, Politico (May 14, 2018).
  10. Quoted in Mobs Against Our Rule, Townhall (May 6, 2018).
  11. Quoted in Five legal headaches facing Trump, The Hill (May 6, 2018).
  12. Quoted in Tennessee Again Rejects Anti-Discrimination Ethics Rule, Bloomberg BNA (May 1, 2018).
  13. Quoted in NBC reports Feds monitored Cohen’s phone, The Hill (May 3, 2018).
  14. Quoted in Parsing presidential intent, World (May 3, 2018).
  15. Guest on KURV to discuss the CUNY Protest (May 2, 2018).
  16. Quoted in Trump Claims Immunity In Bid To Ditch Emoluments Case, Law360 (May 2, 2018).
  17. Quoted in Texas lawsuit brings DACA déjà vu, CNN (May 2, 2018).
  18. Quoted in Does Mueller’s probe infringe upon Trump’s constitutional authority?, Yahoo News (May 2, 2018).
  19. Guest on the Texas Standard to discuss DACA Suit (May 2, 2018) (Audio).
  20. Cited in Free Speech Norms should be Different on a Law School Campus, The Faculty Lounge (May 2, 2018).
  21. Cited in Colleges: Anti-Diversity and Pro-Exclusion, Creators: Walter E. Williams (May 2, 2018).
  22. Quoted in As the Supreme Court considers Trump’s travel ban, some want justices to remember a case they decided 74 years ago, WUNC North Carolina Public Radio (May 2, 2018).
  23. Quoted in Lawyers have enhanced duty of confidentiality when engaging in public commentary, ABA Journal (May 1, 2018).
  24. Quoted in Administrators at CUNY and Duke Aren’t Going to Do Anything About Students Who Disrupted Events, Reason (Apr. 27, 2018).
  25. Quoted in 8 Minutes Hate, No Big Deal, Says CUNY Law Dean, Forbes (Apr. 27, 2018).
  26. Quoted in US judge rules against Trump move to end DACA program, Tri-Lake Tribune (Apr. 27, 2018).
  27. Guest on National Constitution Center – We the People Podcast: The Supreme Court considers the travel ban case (April 26, 2018) (Audio).
  28. Guest on SCOTUS 101 Podcast (Apr. 26, 2014).
  29. Quoted in La corte no permite a Trump finalizar DACA, pero abre la puerta a una victoria en la apelación, La Grane Poca (Apr. 26, 2014).
  30. Supreme Court Notebook, A.P. (Apr. 26, 2018).
  31. Quoted in Experts Say Trump Has Strong Position in Supreme Court’s Travel Ban Case, Lifezette (Apr. 25, 2018).
  32. Quoted in As College Decision Day Approaches, Parents Should Beware, Townhall (Apr. 25, 2018).
  33. Quoted in Kennedy, conservatives appear to back Trump on travel ban, CNN (Apr. 25, 2018).
  34. Guest on WBAL News Now with Bryan Nehman to discuss the Travel Ban (Apr. 25, 2018).
  35. Guest on KTRH’s Houston Morning News to discuss the Travel Ban (Apr. 25, 2018).
  36. Guest on KPCC’s AirTalk with Larry Mantle to discuss the Travel Ban (Apr. 25, 2018).
  37. Guest on BBC World Service to discuss the Travel Ban Case (Apr. 25, 2018).
  38. Quoted in Courts Give Trump a Possible Path Through a Legal Minefield on Immigration, New York Times (Apr. 25, 2018).
  39. Quoted in As Supreme Court hears travel ban, questions of presidential authority also on docket, Christian Science Monitor (Apr. 25, 2018).
  40. Quoted in Why All Libertarians Should Hope that the Supreme Court Throws Out Trump’s Travel Ban, Reason (Apr. 25, 2018).
  41. Quoted in When childish law students protest against speech with impunity, we all lose, The Hill (Apr. 25, 2018).
  42. Quoted in Supreme Court appears split on Trump’s travel ban, Politico (Apr. 25, 2018).
  43. Quoted in As Trump travel ban (finally) reaches Supreme Court, his talk and tweets are center stage, USA Today (Apr. 24, 2018).
  44. Quoted in Federal judge orders complete restart of DACA, Washington Times (Apr. 24, 2018).
  45. Quoted in The Supreme Court is about to weigh in on Trump’s Muslim ban, Salon (Apr. 24, 2018).
  46. Cited in The Problem With Social Media Isn’t The Media, It’s The Social, The Federalist (Apr. 24, 2018).
  47. Quoted in Trump’s Travel Ban Comes Before Supreme Court in Test of Presidential Power, Bloomberg (Apr. 23, 2018).
  48. Quoted in Supreme Court justices to weigh in on Trump’s powers with travel ban case, Washington Times (Apr. 23, 2018).
  49. Cited in Student group disrupted law professor’s talk because dean ‘failed to provide a safe space’, College Fix (Apr. 23, 2018).
  50. Cited in CUNY law students explain what protesters meant when they said ‘f**k the law’ at conservative speech, Twitchy (Apr. 23, 2018).
  51. Cited in CUNY National Lawyers Guild actually issued a Statement on “What We Mean When We Say “F*ck the Law’”, Legal Insurrection (Apr. 23, 2018).
  52. Quoted in Travel ban case comes as Supreme Court’s first dive into Trump Policy, A.P. (Apr. 23, 2018).
  53. Guest on WBUR’s On Point to discuss the travel ban (Apr. 23, 2018) (Audio).
  54. Quoted in CUNY law professors refuse to speak about student mob that disrupted scholar’s talk on free speech, The College Fix (Apr. 23, 2018).
  55. Quoted in Supreme Court takes on Trump’s travel ban, Washington Examiner (Apr. 23, 2018).
  56. Quoted in Senate Judiciary Committee drafts bill to protect Mueller from Trump firing, Washington TImes (Apr. 22, 2018).
  57. Quoted in In travel ban case, Supreme Court considers ‘the president’ vs. ‘this president’, Washington Post (Apr. 22, 2018).
  58. Quoted in Mobs Win at CUNY and Duke, Commentary (Apr. 22, 2018).
  59. Quoted in More campus concerns, The Oklahoman Editorial Board (Apr. 21, 2018).
  60. Quoted in Supreme Court to consider Trump’s travel ban, The Hill (Apr. 21, 2018).
  61. Quoted in ‘F*** the Law!’: CUNY Law School Students Disrupt Professor’s Lecture on Free Speech, Fox News (Apr. 19, 2018).
  62. Guest on Tucker Carlson Tonight, Fox New Channel to discuss CUNY Protest (Apr. 19, 2018) (Video).
  63. Quoted in On the ground in Josephine Co.: Why some want cannabis grows gone, Portland Business Journal (Apr. 19, 2018).
  64. Cited in Are CUNY Administrators Mobsters?, Accuracy in Academia (Apr. 19, 2018).
  65. Quoted in Heckled law prof: CUNY Law would have sicced cops on pro-life protest of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The College Fix (Apr. 18, 2018).
  66. Guest on Federalist Society Podcast – Preview of Trump v. Hawaii (Apr. 16, 2018) (Audio).
  67. Cited in Yes, student protesters are capable of controlling themselves, The College Fix (Apr. 18, 2018).
  68. Quoted in Conservative Law Prof Heckled by CUNY Protestors Warns of Troubling Trend, National Law Journal (Apr. 17, 2018).
  69. Quoted in “‘It is a bizarre thing to say “f-ck the law” when you are in law school’” The College Fix (Apr. 17, 2018).
  70. Quoted in University won’t punish students who disrupted conservative professor’s speech, The College Fix (Apr. 17, 2018).
  71. Quoted in CUNY’s Law Dean Is Wrong About the Attempted Shutdown of Josh Blackman, Reason (Apr. 17, 2018).
  72. Cited in Blame The Left For The Rise Of Moralizing In America, The Federalist (Apr. 17, 2018).
  73. Guest on The Michael Berry Show to Discuss the CUNY Protest (Apr. 16, 2018).
  74. Cited in KCRW’s Left, Right, and Center (Apr. 15, 2018).
  75. Cited in Travel Ban Case Is Shadowed by One of Supreme Court’s Darkest Moments, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16, 2018).
  76. Quoted in CUNY Law’s Disgrace, City Journal (Apr. 16, 2018).
  77. Cited on WBAL’s Brett Hollander Show regarding CUNY Protest (Apr. 15, 2018).
  78. Guest on The Laura Ingraham Show to Discuss CUNY Law Protest (Apr. 13, 2018).
  79. Quoted in Using Speech to Disrupt Speech – Drawing Sensible, Constitutional Lines, In a Crowded Theater (Apr. 13, 2018).
  80. Quoted in ‘F*** the law’: Watch law students disrupt law professor’s speech. His topic is sadly ironic, The Blaze (Apr. 13, 2018).
  81. Guest on WLS’s Big John and Ramblin’ Ray to discuss CUNY Potest (Apr. 13, 2018) (Audio).
  82. Quoted in Campus free speech is threatened. But how much?, Washington Post (Apr. 13, 2018).
  83. Quoted in Professor Talks of Heckling — at Free Speech Lecture, Lifezette (Apr. 13, 2018).
  84. Quoted in CUNY students call law prof ‘racist’ for supporting free speech, Campus Reform (Apr. 13, 2018).
  85. Quoted in New York Law Student: ‘F*** The Law!’, Daily Caller (Apr. 12, 2018).
  86. Guest on Cam and Company, Student Hecklers Disrupt Campus Free Speech Lecture (Apr. 12, 2018) (Video).
  87. Quoted in CUNY Students Tried to Shout Down Josh Blackman. Here’s Why They Failed, Reason (Apr. 12, 2018).
  88. Quoted in CUNY Law Students Disrupt Free-Speech Lecture, National Review (Apr. 12, 2018).
  89. Quoted in Students At CUNY Attempt To Shut Down Speech By Law Professor Josh Blackman, Hot Air (Apr. 12, 2018).
  90. Quoted in Can Donald Trump fire Special Counsel Robert Mueller?, Politifact (Apr. 12, 2018).
  91. Quoted in Organized Heckling at CUNY School of Law of Prof. Josh Blackman Talk on Free Speech, Reason (Apr. 12, 2018).
  92. Quoted in Law Students Shout ‘F–k the Law’ While Disrupting Free Speech Lecture, Law & Crime (Apr. 12, 2018).
  93. Quoted in Justice Gorsuch forms conservative triumvirate on Supreme Court, Washington Times (Apr. 8, 2018).
  94. Guest on WNYC’s The Takeaway to discuss Justice Gorsuch’s first year (Apr. 10, 2018).
  95. Quoted in Four Circuits to Watch as Trump Nominees Face Time Hurdle, Bloomberg BNA (Apr. 4, 2018).
  96. Quoted in Justice Gorsuch confirms conservatives’ hopes, liberals’ fears in first year on Supreme Court, USA Today (April 8, 2018).
  97. Quoted in In Extraordinary Filing, Former Nat Sec Officials Urge SCOTUS To End Travel Ban, Daily Caller (April 6, 2018).
  98. Quoted in Trump v. California: The Biggest Legal Clashes, N.Y. Times (April 5, 2018).
  99. Quoted in The executive branch pushes the boundaries of the separation of powers, ABA Journal (April 1, 2018).
  100. Quoted in Judge’s death gives Trump the opportunity to overhaul the liberal 9th Circuit, Washington Examiner (Mar. 31, 2018).
  101. Guest on Fox 5 New York to discuss Justice Stevens’s proposal to repeal 2nd Amendment (Mar. 28, 2018).
  102. Quoted in Orange County Pushes Back against California’s Sanctuary-State Laws, National Review (Mar. 28, 2018).
  103. Quoted in New judicial litmus test, used to select Gorsuch, aims to shrink the ‘administrative state’, ABA Journal (Mar. 28, 2018).
  104. Guest on KLIF 570 News to discuss Justice Stevens’s proposal to repeal 2nd Amendment (Mar. 28, 2018).
  105. Guest on KNX Radio (Los Angeles) to discuss Justice Stevens’s proposal to repeal 2nd Amendment (Mar. 27, 2018).
  106. Quoted in Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State’, N.Y. Times (Mar. 26, 2018).
  107. Quoted in Justice Dept. Proposes Banning Bump Stocks, Setting Aside Its Own Recommendations, N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2018).
  108. Guest on AirTalk with Larry Mantle – 89.3 KPCC to discuss Zervos v. Trump (Mar. 21, 2018).
  109. Quoted in Trump’s Newest Tweet Target: Solicitor General Noel Francisco, National Law Journal (Mar. 21, 2018).
  110. Quoted in How Trump Could Fire Mueller, Valuewalk (Mar. 20, 2018).
  111. Quoted in Constitutional and legal ethics scholar Ronald Rotunda dies at 73, ABA Journal (Mar. 20, 2018).
  112. Mentioned on The Jim Bohnannon Show with respect to Obamacare individual mandate (Mar. 18, 2018).
  113. Quoted in The NRA’s lawsuit against Florida is flimsy, The Economist (Mar. 17, 2018).
  114. Guest on Daily Journal Podcast, “Sanctuary and Supremacy,” (Mar. 16, 2018).
  115. Quoted in Jeff Sessions made ‘error’ in DACA legal memo, says Justice Department, Washington Times (Mar. 14, 2018).
  116. Quoted in Defense Dept. charged nearly $140,000 at Trump branded properties, CNN (Mar. 14, 2018).
  117. Quoted in Jeff Sessions’ Case Against California’s Sanctuary Cities Is a Constitutional Loser, Reason (Mar. 14, 2018).
  118. Quoted in Pressured by Trump, A.T.F. Revisits Bump Stock Rules, N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2018).
  119. Guest on Supreme Court Landmark Case – Yick Wo v. Hopkins, C-SPAN (Mar. 12, 2018) (Video).
  120. Quoted in Can ‘Texas v. United States’ Set Us Free From Obamacare?, The American Spectator (Mar. 12, 2018).
  121. Quoted in Suing California: What Washington’s move means for future conflicts, Christian Science Monitor (Mar. 8, 2018).
  122. Guest on AirTalk with Larry Mantle – 89.3 KPCC to Discuss the new Sanctuary CIty suit (Mar. 7, 2018) (Audio)
  123. Quoted in Campus Speech Protest Draws Call to Discipline Law Students, Bloomberg Law (Mar. 7, 2018).
  124. Quoted in Lawyers for Mexican journalist blame his detention in the U.S. on Trump’s ‘anti-Mexican bias’, L.A. Times (Mar 6. 2018).
  125. Quoted in The Supreme Court May Revive a Legal Theory Last Used to Strike Down New Deal Laws, Slate (Mar. 5, 2018).
  126. Quoted in The resistance is using the courts to fight Trump, but Trump is winning there, too, Washington Examiner (Mar. 5, 2018).
  127. Quoted in DACA case could hit the Supreme Court in a matter of months, experts say, Washington Examiner (Mar. 5, 2018).

 

Academic Presentations

  1. Presidential Speech, Yale Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference (Apr. 29, 2018).
  2. The Presidency Beyond Trump: The Perils of Judging Executive Action by Motives, NYU Law School (Mar. 30, 2018).
  3. The Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, Northern Kentucky University Faculty Workshop (Mar. 14, 2018).

 

Events

  1. Free Speech on Campus, Educational Writers Association National Seminar (May 16, 2018).
  2. Cosmic Injunctions and DACA, Chicago Federalist Society Lawyers Chapter (May 15, 2018).
  3. Debate: The Affordable Care Act, Boston College Federalist Society Chapter (Apr. 18, 2018).
  4. Predicting the Supreme Court, Vermont Law School Federalist Society Chapter (Apr. 12, 2018).
  5. Debate: Restoring the Lost Confirmation, Roger Williams Federalist Society Chapter (Apr. 12, 2018).
  6. Debate on the Emoluments Clauses: University of Chicago Federalist Society Chapter (Apr. 9, 2018).
  7. Panel Discussion on Immigration, University of North Dakota Federalist Society Chapter (Apr. 6, 2018) (Video).
  8. Predicting the Supreme Court, Rutgers-Camden Federalist Society Chapter (Apr. 4, 2018).
  9. Debate: The Second Amendment after Parkland, SMU Federalist Society and American Constitution Society (Apr. 2, 2018).
  10. Presidential Maladministration, NYU Federalist Society Chapter (Mar. 28, 2018).
  11. Bioethics and the Supreme Court, Villanova Federalist Society Chapter (Mar. 28, 2018).
  12. Economic Liberty and the Criminal Law, Waynesburg University (Mar. 15, 2018).
  13. Richard Cordray, Donald Trump, and the CFPB: Constitutional Questions, Cincinnati Federalist Society Lawyers Chapter (Mar. 15, 2018).
  14. Debate on the Travel Ban, Northern Kentucky University Federalist Society Chapter (Mar. 13, 2018).
  15. The Travel Ban and Sanctuary Cities, Indianapolis Federalist Society Lawyers Chapter (Mar. 12, 2018).
  16. Becoming an Academic: 2018 Federalist Society National Student Symposium (Mar. 10, 2018).
  17. Debate on Sanctuary Cities, McGeorge Federalist Society Chapter (Mar. 7, 2018) (Video).
  18. Debate on the Travel Ban, Santa Clara Federalist Society Chapter (Mar. 5, 2018).
  19. Fake News and the First Amendment, Houston Bar Association (Feb. 3, 2018).

 

Court Filings and Comments

  1. Comments on states considering the adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g).

 

Conservative and Libertarian Lawyers in the Era of Trump

May 29th, 2018

At the 2017 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, conservative and libertarian lawyers squeezed red stress balls that were adorned with the now-famous slogan: “But Gorsuch!” The Washington Examiner explained that the stress balls, distributed by the R Street Institute, would give relief to those “who seek reasons to remain hopeful amid Trump’s first year in office.” This meme has become a mantra: Everything is terrible, but at least we have judges. According to Politico Magazine, the anti-Trump tweets of George Conway (Kellyanne’s husband) “is seen as rebuking the silence of his fellow Federalist Society members—the elite, conservative lawyers who have generally chosen to give Trump a pass on his breaches of long-cherished legal norms and traditions in exchange for the gift of Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch.” Bill Kristol agreed: “Having big-name conservative lawyers consistently rebuking Trump could have made a difference. Their silence is taken as acquiescence.” In the New York Times, David Leonhardt faults Paul Clement, Ted Olson, and other Federalist Society stalwarts who are apparently not “willing to take a little heat in defense of the American system of justice.” This post will explain one facet of that silence, with respect to what this blog has broadly labelled, L’Affaire Russe.

As a threshold matter, it is a mistake to view the Federalist Society as a monolithic entity that can take an official position on the Russia probe, or any issue for that matter. Indeed, the organization expressly states that it does not “take positions on legal or policy issues.” In April, the president of the American Constitution Society—which does take positions on legal and policy issues—asked the president of the Federalist Society to urge his members “to join in a united effort to avert a constitutional crisis relating to Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller’s investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election.” I am certain that the ACS is aware of the Federalist Society’s opposition to taking such official positions, so I viewed this overture—announced in a press release—largely as a media ploy. And it worked. Reuters published a column, titled “Federalist Society is silent on liberal counterpart’s call for joint defense of Mueller probe.” After more than a decade of being a Federalist Society member, in which I’ve spoken at more than 100 of their events, not once has anyone at the organization ever told me what position to take. That’s not how the group works. Rather, the organization consists of thousands of members (including me) who hold a wide range of views that generally fall under the big tent of conservative or libertarian legal thought.

Therefore, the question is not why the Federalist Society as an organization has failed to fault Trump. The proper way to frame the question is why have Federalist Society members not faulted Trump.

Except it’s not true that Trump has escaped criticism. Before the election, I joined group of likeminded conservative and libertarian lawyers known as “Originalists Against Trump.” I do not regret joining this group, even though that decision has not inured to my benefit. Eighteen months into the administration, my criticisms have continued. The president’s attacks on judges and his own Justice Department are improper. Despite supporting the travel ban’s legality, I continue to oppose it on policy grounds. I feel much the same way about DACA—an important policy, but one that must be enacted by Congress, not by the pen-and-phone. I faulted the president’s unfortunate pardon of Joe Arpaio. Though I have filed briefs arguing that the president’s actions do not violate the emoluments clauses, I have stated in court pleadings that his “business activities raise ethical conflicts under modern good governance standards.” During an interview on Fox Business Network, I explained to the host that it would be a terrible idea for Trump to fire Rosenstein and others in his administration to end the Muller probe. I wrote on this blog that “Mueller’s firing would likely accelerate the end of the Trump administration.” I find his never-ending torrent of tweets—in which he insults and demeans people, the media, and his own government—to be beneath the dignity and honor of the presidency. Every time I receive an alert about a new tweet from @realDonaldTrump, I cringe. And so on. I suspect I am not alone in holding such views among conservative and libertarian lawyers.

Why, then, have other conservative and libertarian lawyers not been more vocal? I can think of several reasons. The first is a pragmatic rationale: People are under no obligation to voice their opinions on anything. Everyone is in a different position—professionally, morally, or otherwise—with different commitments. Whether a person wants to speak out is his or her personal decision, especially for those who lack the benefits of academic and other types of tenure. Furthermore, there is nothing wrong with keeping silent because of “but Gorsuch.” People order priorities differently. For people who value the courts highly, it is a rational tradeoff. The “Originalists Against Trump” stated that “we do not trust him” to “nominate qualified judicial candidates who will themselves be committed to the Constitution and the rule of law.” He has, without question, kept this promise. Furthermore, it is not only “but Gorsuch,” but “and Gorsuch.” Putting aside the reality-show drama in the White House, the conservative agenda is moving forward with respect to deregulation, foreign policy, health care, tax cuts, abortion policy, and countless other areas. There are many reasons why Trump is not being criticized from the right.

There is also an important constitutional dimension to the Mueller probe in particular that is often lost in current debates: Conservatives have been extolling Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson for nearly three decades. Even SCOTUS-shortlister Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who drafted the Starr report, has seen the light. In 2016, he predicted that Scalia’s Morrison dissent would become a majority opinion. I suspect if we took a poll at the 2015 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention—well before a President Trump was even imaginable—an overwhelming majority of attendees would have said that Morrison v. Olson was incorrectly decided. (George Conway, who was one of the fiercest supporters of the charges against President Clinton, may be in the minority.) I’d be willing to wager that a sizeable majority would have said that Humphrey’s Executor was wrong, and that we should go back to the rule in Myers v. United States. That is, every officer within the executive branch can be removed by the President, at will.

It is ironic that David Leonhardt faulted Ted Olson of all people for not speaking out about the Mueller probe, when it was Olson who lost to Morrison. Indeed, Olson wrote an op-ed that articulated what I had long viewed as part of the conservative catechism: The independent-counsel statute was unconstitutional. Without question, Robert Mueller has far more constraints on his autonomy then did Ken Starr, yet these two investigations share one important hallmark: to quote Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent, the President is “deprive[d] … of substantial control over the prosecutory functions.” Under the extant regulations, the special counsel can only be removed for certain reasons and—in certain cases—can publicize his findings. That these restrictions fall far short of the protections afforded by the independent-counsel statute does not mean they are consistent with Justice Scalia’s dissent.

In my writings on whether President Trump could fire Mueller, I have worked from the presumption that Morrison was correct. But as a matter of first principles, the president should be able to fire anyone in the Justice Department, for any reason, or no reason at all. And, as I noted over a year ago, mere regulations should not be able to bind the president’s exercise of his own constitutional authority. Don’t forget that during the Bush administration, the notion of the unitary—or as some would say, imperial—presidency, loomed large. This position laid somewhat dormant, as President Obama was loath to invoke the unitary-executive theory, but it remained active on the right. With this perspective, Trump’s invective against Mueller and his team is unfortunate, but his perspective is supported by what many conservatives view as a correct application of the separation of powers: Mueller is an employee within the executive branch, who must be accountable to the president, and can be removed at will.

My colleague Benjamin Wittes tweeted that Conway faulted the Federalist Society for “its silence in the face of the violation of everything it stands for.” I respectfully disagree. This silence is largely a byproduct of how conservative and libertarian lawyers understand the separation of powers. Three decades ago, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Constitution gives the president awesome power over his own wrongdoings:

Is it unthinkable that the President should have such exclusive power, even when alleged crimes by him or his close associates are at issue? No more so than that Congress should have the exclusive power of legislation, even when what is at issue is its own exemption from the burdens of certain laws. No more so than that this Court should have the exclusive power to pronounce the final decision on justiciable cases and controversies, even those pertaining to the constitutionality of a statute reducing the salaries of the Justices. A system of separate and coordinate powers necessarily involves an acceptance of exclusive power that can theoretically be abused.

Many conservative and libertarian lawyers who ascribe to Scalia’s vision of the separation of powers have long ago accepted that such exclusive power can be abused. For these reasons, I do not fault my colleagues on the right who view Trump as championing a constitutional principle they have long advocated, even if he has no actual concern for the constitutional principle he is advancing: that is, the separation of powers and the rule of law are being subverted by the Mueller probe itself, and not by President Trump’s attacks on the Mueller probe.

I also do not fault my colleagues who view Trump as an existential threat to the Republic. There are those on the left who always rejected the unitary vision of the executive. For them, Trump’s attacks on Mueller probe and on the Justice Department are inconsistent with the separation of powers and the rule of law. As I wrote earlier this year, the actions of the so-called legal resistance are “completely rational.” There are also lawyers on the right who have had second thoughts about the unitary-executive theory because of Trump’s excesses. (Perhaps George Conway is in this camp, though, as noted earlier, he was a leading advocate against Bill Clinton’s assertion of executive power in the 1990s.) All of these views, which are reached in good faith, are entitled to respect.

How you approach this divide reminds of the classic debate between Yanny and Laurel: The exact same facts about L’Affaire Russe can enter two sets of eye and ears, and, based on how one’s brain operates, completely different answers are reached. I view most constitutional debates through this same prism. It is largely futile to try to persuade one side or the other to shift. We are all guilty of motivated reasoning—all we can do is be cognizant of how and why the other side believes what it believes.

Cross-Posted at Lawfare

The Missing Necessary & Proper Clause in Murphy v. NCAA

May 16th, 2018

Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Murphy v. NCAA purports to faithfully apply Printz v. United States. But it doesn’t. Part III.C of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Printz explains that the textual basis of the commandeering doctrine is the Necessary and Proper Clause:

The dissent of course resorts to the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary and Proper Clause. It reasons, post, at 941, that the power to regulate the sale of handguns under the Commerce Clause, coupled with the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,” Art. I, § 8, conclusively establishes the Brady Act’s constitutional validity, because the Tenth Amendment imposes no limitations on the exercise of delegated powers but merely prohibits the exercise of powers “not delegated to the United States.” What destroys the dissent’s Necessary and Proper Clause argument, however, is not the Tenth Amendment but the Necessary and Proper Clause itself.

Yet, the Necessary and Proper clause is mentioned nowhere in Justice Alito’s majority opinion. The Court invalidates PASPA without considering “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.”

Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion provides the correct framework: first, ask if PASPA is authorized by a specific enumerated power, and if not, second, ask if PASPA is authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause:

I agree with the Court that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) exceeds Congress’ Article I authority to the extent it prohibits New Jersey from “authoriz[ing]” or “licens[ing]” sports gambling, Unlike the dissent, I do “doubt” that Congress can prohibit sports gambling that does not cross state lines. Post (opinion of GINSBURG, J.); see License Tax Cases (1867) (holding that Congress has “no power” to regulate “the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States,” including the intrastate sale of lottery tickets); United States v. Lopez (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (documenting why the Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to regulate purely local activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). But even assuming the Commerce Clause allows Congress to prohibit intrastate sports gambling “directly,” it “does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.” New York v. United States (1992). The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress this power either, as a law is not “proper” if it “subvert[s] basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.” Gonzales v. Raich (2005) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Commandeering the States, as PASPA does, subverts those principles. See Printz v. United States (1997).

Why does the majority opinion not mention the Necessary and Proper clause? Mike Dorf hinted at one possible explanation: Justice Breyer, who dissented in Printz, may have been unwilling to go along with this aspect of Printz. As a result, the Court’s opinion, which said nothing about the Necessary and Proper Clause, managed to invalidate PAPSA without enhancing a doctrine that could be used to invalidate other federal laws.

The Easy Way Forward on Trump v. Hawaii

April 27th, 2018

This morning, I attended oral arguments in Trump v. Hawaii. The only surprise (and a pleasant one at that) was that Lin-Manuel Miranda—the creator of the Broadway smash hit Hamilton—was kind enough to sign my pocket Constitution. (If I had a copy of my in the emoluments clause litigation, I would have asked him to sign that instead.)

Everything else at the Supreme Court went more-or-less how I anticipated. The justices asked questions concerning the scope of the president’s authority, and what the relevant precedents are with respect to construing the establishment clause claims. Unlike the , the justices did not ask about the president’s campaign statements or tweets. Rather, Justice Elena Kagan alluded to his remarks with a series of sharp and perceptive hypothetical questions. On the whole, as , the Supreme Court has continued to “turn down the temperature” concerning the travel ban litigation. These proceedings should send a signal to parallel litigation on the travel ban and related matters.

In light of the fact that a majority of the court allowed the entire travel ban to temporarily go into effect in December, I expected the same majority to rule that the travel ban could go into effect permanently in June. Nothing I heard at today’s arguments changes that prediction. The more pressing question is how the court proceeds on the statutory and constitutional claims.

Avoid the Statutory Claim Altogether

Early on in the proceedings, Chief Justice John Roberts floated an argument that would be in keeping with his . Traditionally, under the , visa decisions by consular officials—that is decisions based on statutory authority—are not subject to judicial review. (This doctrine does not apply to claims based on the Constitution). Were this doctrine to apply, all of Hawaii’s statutory arguments would have to be dismissed.

However, there is one Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. As Hawaii points out in its (p. 21), “in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), the court evaluated whether the president violated various provisions of the INA by invoking his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to ‘suspend[] the entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas.’” And in a footnote, Hawaii stresses, “In Sale, the Government argued extensively that the plaintiffs’ claims were unreviewable. U.S. Br. 13-18 (No. 92-344); Oral Arg. Tr., 1993 WL 754941, at *16-22. No Justice accepted that argument.” The (p. 22) that “Sale, however, rejected the aliens’ claims on the merits without addressing, much less rejecting, the argument that their claims were unreviewable, and it therefore does not control that issue here.” But of course, rejecting a claim on the merits is an acknowledgment that the claim is reviewable.

There is an easy unravel this knot: Disavow Sale. That argument would not fly in the lower courts, but it works at the Supreme Court. The court could simply concede that the Sale Court was mistaken in ruling that claims under § 1182(f) were justiciable, but, because the court ultimately ruled for the government, the error was harmless. Sale is the outlier. How can it be that individual decisions of a low-level consular officer are not reviewable, but an executive order issued by the President of the United States is? This approach gets the structure of the executive branch backwards.

Short of overruling Sale, Solicitor General Noel Francisco also on which Sale may be distinguished:

The Court in Sale also considered only the aliens’ asserted right under a U.S. treaty and implementing statute not to be returned to their home country, see 509 U.S. at 158-159, whereas the aliens here have no such claim but rather seek entry into the United States. Moreover, the Court in Sale did not question the President’s determination under Section 1182(f) that entry of the affected aliens would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. See id. at 171-172, 187-188. Respondents here, by contrast, have asked the courts to second-guess that very determination.

Parting ways with Sale will allow the justices to avoid the , as well as the claims of .

This argument, however, would not resolve the constitutional claims. Kleindienst v. Mandel, as well as Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion in Kerry v. Din, recognize that constitutional claims are subject to review. Yet Mandel provides the rule of decision for the constitutional claims.

Apply Mandel, not McCreary

I have that the Supreme Court’s domestic establishment clause precedents simply do not apply in the immigration context, and I noted today that there was no indication from the justices today that such precedents, including McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky or the dreaded Lemon v. Kurtzman, apply. (Recall that Kennedy joined Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in .) Rather, the controlling precedent is Mandel. And Mandel only asks if the policy is “facially legitimate and bona fide.” There are two ways of reading this phrase. Does the word “facially” modify only “legitimate,” or does it modify both the words “legitimate and bona fide”? (I discussed this question in depth .)

If the court holds that “facially” modifies both phrases, then the resolution of this case is straightforward. Such a holding would be . The four corners of the presidential proclamation are, without question, “legitimate” and “bona fide.” Neal Katyal, arguing for Hawaii, conceded during arguments that if then-candidate and now-President Trump had not made the statements that he made, the establishment clause question would vanish. A review of the four corners of the document is apiece with not considering Trump’s statements.

If there is a majority of the court willing to uphold the travel ban, the two suggestions I discussed above would neatly resolve the statutory claim and dispose of the constitutional claim.

Cross-Posted at Lawfare