Jay Sterling Silver (St. Thomas) has a disquieting Op-Ed in the National Law Journal, titled “Law Schools’ Shell Game of Minority Enrollment.” (Via TaxProf). Silver writes that law schools are taking example of a reporting “loophole” to increase diversity numbers without hurting their LSAT numbers and rankings. What’s the loophole? First, schools report the median LSAT of the incoming 1L class, not 2L transfers. Schools have every incentive to get this number as high as possible, in order to improve the all-important U.S. News & World Rankings. As a result, fewer minority applicants are admitted as 1Ls. Second, schools report the diversity numbers for the entire student body, not just the incoming 1Ls. As a result, schools then admit minority students as 2L transfers. Silver writes:
As one law school administrator explains: It is not a terribly well-kept secret that many upper-tier schools or aspiring upper-tier schools will take no chances at all on their entering classes and then will raid places like here for students of color who have done well and give them lots of money and take them in. Then they can report that their overall student population has diversity even though their first-year class looks very white.
But why? It’s simple. As a group, the LSAT scores of minority students are lower than nonminority students. In a gaping and opportunistic loophole, the ABA requires law schools to report the racial makeup of the student body as a whole, but only the LSAT scores of first-year students. Neither the race nor the LSATs of transfer students must be disclosed. Admitting more minority students after the first year thus kills two birds with one stone: It inflates the number of minorities enrolled at the school while, at the same time, preserving the school’s all-important, LSAT-related ranking in U.S. News.
This “shell game,” Silver writes, creates the “illusion of minority access.”
The cost of the practice, of course, is that these schools have produced nothing more than the illusion of expanded minority access to the profession, often provide these students with smaller scholarships, and, in the process, have successfully gamed the rankings by averting the inclusion of lower LSAT scores into the LSAT profile they must disclose.
Silver offers this anecdote, though he doesn’t name names:
Elite schools — two of which ushered in transfers last year roughly equal in number to one-fifth of their first-year class — are hardly exempt from the temptation.
Many schools, not content to wait for transfer applications to show up in the mail, aggressively recruit transfers. And often it’s not pretty. At some schools, administrators write and phone students on the dean’s list at neighboring law schools, sometimes disparaging the students’ current school. But perhaps the seamiest ploy of all was a recent dinner party thrown by a law dean who implored his guests, almost all of whom were minority students who’d done well at another school, to transfer and to convince their classmates to do so as well.
This behavior is shameful, not just from a policy perspective, but from a constitutional perspective. In his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice Thomas contends that if schools really want to increase diversity–and this is indeed a “compelling” interest that satisfies strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause–then there is a much easier way of accomplishing this goal. Instead of using using race-based preferences, schools should drop the discriminatory admission criteria (LSAT). Thomas cites the success of historical black colleges that do no have stringent admission criteria. But of course, Thomas writes, “elite” schools will not do this as it will impact their academic selectivity.” Priorities: academic standing comes before diversity. Instead, schools turn to affirmative action as a way to keep their elite rankings, and admit more minority students, without harming their overall academic standing.
Read Justice Thomas’s analysis.
One must also consider the Law School’s refusal to entertain changes to its current admissions system that might produce the same educational benefits. The Law School adamantly disclaims any race-neutral alternative that would reduce “academic selectivity,” which would in turn “require the Law School to become a very different institution, and to sacrifice a core part of its educational mission.” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 33—36. In other words, the Law School seeks to improve marginally the education it offers without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status.4
4. The Law School believes both that the educational benefits of a racially engineered student body are large and that adjusting its overall admissions standards to achieve the same racial mix would require it to sacrifice its elite status. If the Law School is correct that the educational benefits of “diversity” are so great, then achieving them by altering admissions standards should not compromise its elite status. The Law School’s reluctance to do this suggests that the educational benefits it alleges are not significant or do not exist at all.
Apparently, even with affirmative action policies in place, schools refuse to admit the minority candidates as 1Ls, and let them in as 2Ls, to keep their rankings high. The critical benefits from diversity, it seems, are only needed for the 2nd and 3rd years of law school.
If diversity were such a compelling interest, that it can overcome equal protection strict scrutiny–a distinction only achieved previously in Korematsu–it would be unthinkable for law school deans to sacrifice minority admission in the 1L class, and amplify them for the 2L class, so rankings would not take a hit. If diversity is important for a 2L class, why should it be any less important for the 1L class. If anything, new wide-eyed law students would stand to benefit most from a broad-range of perspectives, far more than the jaded 2Ls, no? This does not suggest that the commitment to diversity is consistent, let alone compelling. Justice Thomas, at least in this part of his Grutter dissent, is exactly right. Indeed, the decision of George Washington University to drop the SAT requirement, in the hopes of attracting more minority students, is an example of putting their money where their mouth is. (Although, it may be the case that eliminating the SAT requirement means there are fewer bad scores to report, and thus rankings are higher).