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Justice Douglas on Public Purpose and Federal Eminent Domain in Youngstown

January 22nd, 2015

While teaching Youngstown today, I noticed something that I hadn’t seen before. In Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion, he explains that the federal government can condemn property for any “public purpose.” Not public use, as the 5th Amendment provides, but public purpose.

The power of the Federal Government to condemn property is well established. It can condemn for any public purpose; and I have no doubt but that condemnation of a plant, factory, or industry in order to promote industrial peace would be constitutional. But there is a duty to pay for all property taken by the Government. The command of the Fifth Amendment is that no “private property be taken for public use, without just compensa- tion.” That constitutional requirement has an important bearing on the present case.

Only two years later in Berman v. Parker, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court that the appropriate standard is one of public purpose, not public use.

It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.

The Kelo Court would go on to apply the public purpose standard, effectively writing the public use clause out of the Constitution. Douglas telegraphed his view on the eminent domain power, which the other Justices elided, in an emergency case.

As an aside today I asked my students whether Congress could have passed a statute seizing all of the steel mills under its federal eminent domain power. The Justices, Douglas in particular, seem to assume such a statute would be within Congres’s powers.

In light of Will Baude’s excellent article on the federal eminent domain power, I don’t know if the answer is clearly correct, to the extent that Congress has to rely on its necessary and proper powers. Seizing still mills nationwide–and their employees–for an indeterminate period of time may be for a public purpose, and probably for a public use, but I think it would amount to “a great substantive and independent power which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers or used as a means of executing them.” And if this is correct–that not even Congress could have seized the mills–than Truman most certainly lacked the power to do it. Even if we were in Zone 1 or 2, Congress could not have delegated this power to the President.

Michael Greve on the Last Day of This Supreme Court Term

January 22nd, 2015

I think he sums it up quite well:

To “realist” minds King may have been actually decided with the cert grants in the gay marriage cases. The cases will come down on the same day at the end of the Term, and so the justices will split the difference that way: freedom for gays and lesbians and then Justice Kennedy will ride off to Colorado with Dagney I-am-IJ, or whatever.

 

ConLaw Class 3 – The Separation of Powers

January 22nd, 2015

The lecture notes are here. The live chat is here.

The Separation of Powers

This is a postcard of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Mill.

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Here are photographs of the actual steel mill at issue in Youngstown, Ohio.

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This is Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, whom Truman ordered to seize the steel mill.

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 The lead opinion in Youngstown was authored by Justice Hugo Black.

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There were also concurring opinions written by five Justices. This is Justice Felix Frankfurter.

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This is Justice William O. Douglas.

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This is Justice Robert H. Jackson. Justice Jackson, who would serve as the lead prosecutor at Nuremberg, authored what has been seen as the definitive opinion in Youngstown.

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This is Justice Tom C. Clark (a graduate of University of Texas at Austin).

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Chief Justice Vinson dissented, joined by Justices Reed and Minton.

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You can read Executive Order 10340, Executive Order 10340 – Directing the Secretary of Commerce to Take Possession of and Operate the Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel Companiesm, here:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized and directed to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities, and other property of the companies named in the list attached hereto, or any part thereof, as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense; and to operate or to arrange for the operation thereof and to do all things necessary for, or incidental to, such operation.

2. In carrying out this order the Secretary of Commerce may act through or with the aid of such public or private instrumentalities or persons as he may designate; and all Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary of Commerce to the fullest extent possible in carrying out the purposes of this order.

3. The Secretary of Commerce shall determine and prescribe terms and conditions of employment under which the plants, facilities, and other properties possession of which is taken pursuant to this order shall be operated. The Secretary of Commerce shall recognize the rights of workers to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, adjustment of grievances, or other mutual aid or protection, provided that such activities do not interfere with the operation of such plants, facilities, and other properties.

4. Except so far as the Secretary of Commerce shall otherwise provide from time to time, the managements of the plants, facilities, and other properties possession of which is taken pursuant to this order shall continue their functions, including the collection and disbursement of funds in the usual and ordinary course of business in the names of their respective companies and by means of any instrumentalities used by such companies.

5. Except so far as the Secretary of Commerce may otherwise direct, existing rights and obligations of such companies shall remain in full force and effect, and there may be made, in due course, payments of dividends on stock, and of principal, interest, sinking funds, and all other distributions upon bonds, debentures, and other obligations, and expenditures may be made for other ordinary corporate or business purposes.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary of Commerce further possession and operation by him of any plant, facility, or other property is no longer necessary or expedient in the interest of national defense, and the Secretary has reason to believe that effective future operation is assured, he shall return the possession and operation of such plant, facility or other property to the company in possession and control thereof at the time possession was taken under this order.

7. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to prescribe and issue such regulations and orders not inconsistent herewith as he may deem necessary or desirable for carrying out the purposes of this order; and he may delegate and authorize subdelegation of such of his functions under this order as he may deem desirable.

This was Marshall’s original draft opinion in M’Cullough v. Maryland.

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ConLaw Class 2- Why is the Constitution Supreme?

January 20th, 2015

The lecture notes are here. The live chat is here.

Why is the Constitution Supreme?

Today’s class will focus on these clauses of the Constitution:

Article II, Section 2: He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . [to] nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United State, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.

Article II, Section 3: He  . . . shall Commission all the Officers of the United States

Article III, Section 2: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

Article VI, Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Article VI, Clause 3: The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution .

During my recent trip to Little Rock, I visited the Little Rock Central High School. This is the locus of Cooper v. Aaron, and the school where the famous Little Rock 9 were escorted into the desegregated school by federal troops. What makes this national park site remarkable is that it is *still* an active high school.

Across the street from the school, they refurbished a gas station to appear as it did during the 1950s. It was at this gas station that the media filed their reports.

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Gas was $.22 per gallon. Adjusted for inflation, that would be about $2.50 today.

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As I approached the school, and climbed those famous steps, I was overcome by a very powerful feeling. Constitutional history was made right here. Looking across the street, I imagined the lynch mobs tormenting those poor students. As I came to the front door of the school, I peered inside, and imagined what those students felt when they entered. (I understand they were rushed to the Principal’s office so they were not intercepted). As chance would have it, classes were in session, so I could not enter the school.

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The school is huge. It takes up an entire block, and has many sections.

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Across the street from the High School was a visitor center that had some interesting exhibits.

Alas, this sign states an inaccuracy–We the People , as written in in 1787, “included only white male landowners.” I understand the point they were trying to make, but the Constitution itself was not so limited. In fact, it spoke in broad terms of people, and not men. It didn’t even use the word “slave,” but reverted to other euphemisms (other persons, etc.). At the time of the framing, in New Jersey at least, women had the right to vote. They may have even participated in the Constitutional ratification conventions. It would be more accurate for the Museum to have explained how the Constitution was interpreted. But it is not accurate–and somewhat misleading–to state it like this.

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One of the cooler exhibits in the Visitor Center was a telegram President Eisenhower sent Governor Orval Faubus.

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Here is a PDF of the original, courtesy of the National Archives:

When I became President, I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. The only assurance I can give you is that the Federal Constitution will be upheld by me and by every legal means at my command.

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Also at the Visitor Center were passes given to White Students, giving them permission to beat up the Black Students.

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This was the original docket sheet for Cooper v. Aaron.

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A very worthwhile trip if you ever make it to Little Rock.

Faithfully Executing The Law

January 19th, 2015

In my article, “The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law,” I provide an overview of the text and history of the Take Care clause, with an eye towards understanding what “faithfully” means. Specifically, I recount the evolution of the clause during the Constitutional Convention, with changes made to accentuate the duty of good faith. Here is an excerpt of the paper, with footnotes omitted (though I cite passim the works of Zachary Price, Robert Delahunty and John Yoo, Saikrishna Prakash, Randy Barnett, and others).

The Take Care clause draws from a rich pedigree of colonial-era Constitutions limiting state executives from suspending the law. The post-revolutionary Constitutions of New York,[1] Pennsylvania,[2] and Vermont[3] employed similar standards to define the role of the executive, all requiring some variant of “faithfully executed.” By 1787, six states “had constitutional clauses restricting the power to suspend or dispense with laws to the legislature”[4]—Delaware,[5] Maryland,[6] Massachusetts,[7] North Carolina,[8] New Hampshire,[9] and Virginia.[10]

During the Constitutional Convention, the President’s duty to execute the laws went through several evolutions. These changes highlight the importance of the duty of faithfulness to the framers. An early version of the Take Care clause appeared in the Virginia Plan on May 29, 1787. It vested the “National Executive” with the “general authority to execute the National laws.”[11] On June 1, James Madison “moved,” and “seconded by” James Wilson, the Convention adopted a version of the clause: the Executive was “with power to carry into execution the national laws.”[12] At this point, there were no qualifications for faithfulness. A proposal to give the President the power “to carry into execution the nationl. [sic] Laws” was agreed to unanimously on July 17.[13]

On July 26, this provision was sent to the Committee of Detail.[14] The Committee of Detail considered two different formulations. First, “[h]e shall take Care to the best of his Ability.”[15] Second, John Rutledge suggested an alternate: “[i]t shall be his duty to provide for the due & faithful exec[ution] of the Laws.”[16] The final version, reported out by the Committee on August 6, hewed closer to Rutledge’s proposal: “he shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed.”[17] Elliot’s Debates recorded the same draft.[18] The Committee of Detail rejected a provision that would have been linked to the “best of” the President’s “ability,” which was ultimately adopted in the oath of office.[19]  Rather, the Committee focused on “due” and “faithful” execution.

The draft that was “referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement”[20] on September 8 still included the phrase “duly.”[21] However, the final report of the Committee of Style dated September 12, phrased the “take care” clause in its final form, dropping the “duly.” It read, “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”[22] There is no recorded account of why “duly” was dropped, and the focus was placed solely on “faithfully.”

The progression over the summer of 1787 speaks to the designs of the framers. The initial draft from the Virginia Plan imposed no qualifications—the President was simply to “execute the National laws.”[23] Full stop. The Committee of Detail considered proposals that would restrict the duty to either (a) “the best of his Ability” or (b) “the due & faithful exec[ution] of the Laws.”[24] The Committee chose the latter. Finally, the Committee of Style—staffed by Madison and Hamilton, 2/3 of Publius—narrowed the duty to focus only on “faithfully.” This account is confirmed by Alexander Hamilton’s Plan, which though “not formally before the Convention in any way,” was read on June 18 and proved to be influential.[25] His plan eliminated the phrase “duly” and only focused on “faithfully”—“He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”[26] Hamilton echoed this phrasing in Federalist No. 77, where he wrote about the President “faithfully executing the laws.”[27]

What is the difference between “duly” and “faithfully”? Johnson’s Dictionary defines “due” as “that which any one has a right to demand in consequence of a compact.”[28] The omission of “duly” and focus on “faithfully” suggests a shift away from legal duties to one of faithfulness on the part of the President.

This construction was confirmed by the Oath Clause of Article II: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Again, the framers required the President to swear that he will “faithfully execute” those duties charged to him. However, unlike the “Take Care” clause, which is imposed without qualification, the Oath only binds the President “to the best of [his] Ability.” In this sense, the imperative to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” though it must be “faithfully executed,” exists to a lesser degree—to the “best of my Ability.”[29] In contrast, the New York Constitution of 1777 provided that the governor is “to take care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of his ability.”[30] Further, the “Take Care” clause did not include language such as “shall think proper,” as this optional language is used in the adjournment clause.[31] The duty looks to one of faith. This understanding was further confirmed in the ratification conventions.

At the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, James Wilson—himself a member of the Constitutional Convention and a future Supreme Court Justice—explained the relationship between the President and Congress: “It is not meant here that the laws shall be a dead letter; it is meant, that they shall be carefully and duly considered, before they are enacted; and that then they shall be honestly and faithfully executed.”[32] Wilson equates the duty of “faithfulness” with that of “honesty.”[33] Ten days later, Wilson stressed that the “Take Care” clause was “another power of no small magnitude entrusted to this officer,” the President. [34]

During the North Carolina Ratification Convention, delegate Archibald Maclaine stressed the importance of the “Take Care” clause: “One of the best provisions contained in it is, that he shall commission all officers of the United States, and shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If the takes care to see the laws faithfully executed, it will be more than is done in any government on the continent, for I will venture to say that our government, and those of the other states, are, with respect to the execution of the laws, in many respects, mere cyphers.”[35]

The history of the Take Care clause reveals a focus execution based on faith and honesty. As Prakash explained, “If the officer performed his duties honestly, adequately, and within the boundaries of his statutory discretion, the presidential inquiry would end, for the President would have taken care that the laws were faithfully executed.”[36]

Dr. Samuel Johnson’s 1755 A General Dictionary of the English Language, defines “faithfully” as imposing a very precise standard: acting “[w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance,” “[w]ithout failure of performance; honestly; exactly,” and “[h]onestly; without fraud, trick or ambiguity.”[37] Noah Webster’s influential 1828 defines faithfully as “in a faithful manner; with good faith.”[38] The second definition imposes an even higher standard: “with strict adherence to allegiance and duty.” Webster even offers as an example with reference to the Constitution, “the treaty or contract was faithfully executed.” With this selection of “faithful,” the framers seem to have adopted a standard stretching back to the times of Herodotus[39] to Roman law[40] to Canon law[41], and was well known in the 17th[42] and 18th[43] century English common law of contracts[44]—one of “good faith.”[45] As Professor Price observes, “the term ‘faithfully,’ particularly in eighteenth-century usage, seems principally to suggest that the President must ensure execution of existing laws in good faith.”[46]

Delahunty and Yoo conclude that the Take Care clause is “naturally read as an instruction or command to the President to put the laws into effect, or at least to see that they are put into effect, ‘without failure’ and ‘exactly.’”[47] However, this duty is not so mechanical. As Price counters, “the very separation of legislative and executive functions implies that enforcing the laws may be a matter of judgment, a task of applying general laws appropriately—‘faithfully’—in particular factual circumstances.”[48] The good faith standard, as developed in the common law of contract, provides a framework to understand for the scope of this discretion.

Steven Burton’s canonical work on the common law duty to perform in good faith is consistent with how the text and history of the Take Care clause.[49] Burton sketches two views of failing to comply with a contract. First, a party may deviate from the terms of the contract, resulting in the “deprivation” of “anticipated benefits” based on a “legitimate” or “good faith” reason.  Here, there is no breach of contract, even though the contract was not strictly complied with. Second, however, “[t]he same act will be a breach of the contract if undertaken for an illegitimate (or bad faith) reason.” How should we distinguish between the former (lawful) and the latter (unlawful)? It is not enough to focus on the contractual duties owed to the promisee, and what “benefits [are] due” to him. Rather, to determine “good faith,” an inquiry must be made into the motivations of the promisor’s actions.

Burton explains, “Good faith performance, in turn, occurs when a party’s discretion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation—to capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract.” To put this in constitutional terms, we would ask whether the President is acting within the realm of possible discretion contemplated when Congress enacted a statute. If the answer is yes, the deviation from the law is in good faith, and is permissible. However, if the departure from the law is “used to recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting,” the action is not in good faith. As Randy Barnett explains, “According to Burton, when a contract allows one party some discretion in its performance, it is bad faith for that party to use that discretion to get out of the commitment to which he consented.”[50] To place this dynamic into constitutional terms, when the President relies on a claim of authority Congress withheld, as a means to bypass that statute, the action is in bad faith, and unlawful.

Under this theory, “[w]hat matters is the purpose or motive for the exercise of discretion.”[51] Good faith deviations that “honor the spirit” of the law or rely on “scarcity of enforcement resources” are valid motives for discretion. But the same action, “intended to evade the commitment,” is unlawful if premised on a “disagreement with the law being enforced.” It is not the case that “any deliberate deviation. . . is presumptively forbidden.”[52] Rather, the deviation must be done in bad faith, as an intentional means to bypass the legislature. The duty of the Take Care clause applies, “regardless of [the President’s] own administration’s view of its wisdom or policy.”[53]

Burton’s conclusion provides further insights into the Committee of Style’s decision to amend the Take Care clause. First, the Committee eliminated the reference to “duly.” Here, the framers moved away from focusing on what obligations the President owes to the Congress. Instead, they focused on “faithfully” alone. This inquiry directs attention to the President’s motivations, instead of the legal obligations to Congress in the abstract. The important qualification of “faithfully” vests the President with additional discretion, so long as he is acting with good faith.