Suppose I resolve to purchase (with the two dollars in my billfold) a coffee at the first convenience store I pass on my way to work. I am indifferent to what store that might be. I catch sight of a 7-Eleven, pull in, and, with my cash, buy the drink. That it is a 7-Eleven coffee rather than a Sheetz coffee is “wholly fortuitous,” ibid. Still, no one would say that I had not obtained 7-Eleven coffee by means of my two dollars. So too with the handbag swindler: Regardless of whether the cash is the victim’s or, technically, the bank’s, and regard- less of whether the swindler cared which it was, would we not say that the fraudster has obtained it by means of the trick?
And Sheetz gets a shoutout in Justice Kagan’s majority opinion!
To illustrate the point, he offers an example: Someone “ob- tain[s] 7-Eleven coffee by means of [his] two dollars” even if he went to 7-Eleven rather than Sheetz only because it happened to be the closest. Post, at 3.
Sheetz run at One First Street.