Obama Administration Adopts Same Position on 2nd Amendment as Bush Administration

October 19th, 2011

Intermediate scrutiny. That’s what SG Paul Clement sought in Heller, and what SG Verrilli wants in Mascindaro.

In other words, even if this Court were to grant certiorari and hold that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right of a law-abiding citizen to possess and carry a firearm outside the home, petitioner does not explain why the Court would apply a stricter standard of review than the one the court of appeals applied in upholding Section 2.4(b).2

Plus there is this discussion of sensitive places:

Although the court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide the issue, national parks — heavily traveled, government-controlled areas where “large numbers of people, including children, congregate for recreation,” Pet. App. 15a — can readily be described as “sensitive places” within the meaning of Heller. At a minimum, they implicate specific public- safety interests, and their “circumstances justify reasonable measures to secure public safety.” Ibid. This case would therefore be a poor vehicle in which to address whether and to what extent the Second Amendment right applies “outside the home” generally (Pet. i), as opposed to whether and how the right may be regulated in national parks specifically.

This footnote should see Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller II:

Petitioner suggests (Pet. 13) that, although the court of appeals purported to apply intermediate scrutiny, it effectively applied a “balancing test” of the sort Heller rejected. See 554 U.S. at 634-635. But when the court evaluated whether Section 2.4(b) was sufficiently tailored to the government’s “substantial interest in providing for the safety of individuals who visit and make use of the national parks,” Pet. App. 14a, it did not claim to be “balancing” interests, id. at 14a-15a. And this Court should not lightly assume that the court of appeals implicitly watered down the standard of review, when the court repeatedly and explicitly stated that the relevant standard was “intermediate scrutiny.” Id. at 3a, 11a-15a. Cf. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 386 (2008) (“An appellate court should not presume that a district court intended an incorrect legal result when the order is equally susceptible of a correct reading.”).