In Krupski v. Costa Crociere, Justice Scalia again concurred separately from a unanimous opinion to express his disapproval of citing legislative history. I wonder if his clerks just copy and paste these concurrences, because they are all quite similar.

I join the Court’s opinion except for its reliance, ante, at 10–11, 15, n. 5, on the Notes of the Advisory Committee asestablishing the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-dure 15(c)(1)(C). The Advisory Committee’s insights intothe proper interpretation of a Rule’s text are useful to thesame extent as any scholarly commentary. But the Com-mittee’s intentions have no effect on the Rule’s meaning.Even assuming that we and the Congress that allowed the Rule to take effect read and agreed with those intentions, it is the text of the Rule that controls. Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 167–168 (1995) (SCALIA, J., concur-ring in part and concurring in judgment).