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Yes, that is probably right.

There is an extending discussion in the Harvard Law Review Foreword about Empirical Fact Finding:

This pattern is, in fact, a conspicuous feature of the Court’s constitutional ju-risprudence generally. In cases involving sex equality, gay rights, the death penalty, police seizures, drug testing, and other charged matters, the Court has invoked empirical evidence—or sometimes the lack of it—as warrant for its decisions. When it does so, the genuineness of its reasoning has provoked accusations of bad faith, not only from within the court but from without.169

There are many potential explanations for this recurring form of empirical-point, denunciation-counterpoint. When Justices rely on empirical data in contro-versial decisions, they no doubt often honestly believe that such evidence compels a particular result. If so, it’s possible that their perceptions, those of their critics, or both could be influenced by motivated reasoning.170 The impact of motivated

reasoning on the Justices themselves could also explain apparent discrepancies across cases in how the Court treats standards of review 171 or other doctrines re-levant to the impact of empirical proof—including whether it is appropriate for judges to consider “empirical data” at all.172 It’s also likely, though, that the Court sometimes consciously resorts to em-pirical factfinding for strategic reasons.173 The Justices might well believe that their decision—particularly if it is likely to disappoint one side or the other on an issue that is the focus of cultural status competition—will provoke less conflict, or impose less insult on the losing side, if framed in the seemingly neutral idiom of fact rather than in the morally evocative idiom of constitutional principle.174 The contribution empirical arguments are thought to make to muting contested values is part of their appeal in political discourse generally.175 If the prudential concerns of this sort are motivating them, the Justices needn’t be viewed as using empirical evidence to “hide” their reliance on their partisan values. More likely they are try-ing to avoid invoking one or another of the Constitution’s liberal principles in a manner that could be understood as denigrating a particular group’s vision of the good life—as opposed to merely placing a barrier between any particular group’s vision and obligations that are legitimately enforced on all.

This passage seems quite apt to the competing debates about the Second Amendment:

The only citizens who are likely to see the Court’s decision as more authorita-tive and legitimate when it resorts to empirical fact-finding in culturally charged cases are the ones whose cultural values are affirmed by the outcome. If they were not already impelled by identity-protective cognition to believe the “facts” in ques-tion before the decision, they will be after by the Court’s designation of them as “objective” and appropriately “neutral” grounds for their position. These citizens will thus react defensively and dismissively in response to those who dispute those facts—whether dissenting Justices, unpersuaded academics, or other citizens—and will suspect them of duplicity and self-delusion.

On Scalia’s “extraoridinary dissent” in Plata:

In effect, Scalia is telling us to wise up, not to be snookered by the Court. Sure, people claim that their “policy positions” on matters such as crime control, fiscal policy, and national security are based on empirical evidence. But we all know that things are in fact the other way around: what one makes of empirical evidence is “inevitably” and “necessarily based . . . upon policy views.”189 At one point, Scalia describes the district court judges as having “dress[ed]-up” their “pol-icy judgments” as “factual findings.”190 But those judges weren’t, in his mind, doing anything different from what anyone “inevitably” does when making “broad empirical predictions”: those sorts of “factual findings are policy judgments.”191 Empirical evidence on the consequences of public policy should be directed to “legislators and executive officials” rather than “the Third Branch,” Scalia in-sists.192 The reason, though, isn’t that the former are better situated to draw relia-ble inferences from the best available data. On the contrary, it is that it is a conceit to think that reliable inferences can possibly be drawn from empirical evidence on policy consequences—and so “of course”193 it is the “policy preferences”194 of the majority, rather than those of unelected judges, that should control.

For my own thoughts on Plata and experts, see here and here.

On Heller:

The Court actually did something like that, I believe, in District of Columbia v. Heller. 350 In Heller, the Court paints a richly detailed picture of guns and civic vir-tue in the early Republic, and discovers within it an individual “right to bear arms” that extends to possession of a handgun for personal self-defense in the home.351 But the opinion, written by Justice Scalia, doesn’t end with that. Rather, it proceeds to outline a surprisingly detailed list of the sorts of arms-bearings to which the Second Amendment right does not extend. “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,” the Court states.352 “From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”353 “For example,” the opi-nion continues, “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”354 The Court added that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”355 Thus, in disregard of its usually scrupulous avoidance of “advisory opinions,” the Court had effectively identified a capacious safe harbor for continuing regula-tion. And lest anyone think to try an expressio unius est exclusio alterius maneuver on these passages, the Court added in a footnote: “We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaus-tive.”356 Likely added to the opinion to nail down Justice Kennedy’s critical fifth vote, this language nevertheless placed an expressive-overdetermination shield between the Court and the dueling cultural constituencies that were most likely to question its neutrality. Guns have tremendous expressive significance for individuals with hierarchical and individualistic values, for whom they enable roles like father and protector, and symbolize virtues like honor, courage, and self-reliance. By the same token, guns are anathema to citizens with egalitarian and communitarian val-ues, who associate them with patriarchy, Southern resistance to civil rights, and societal distrust.357 The consequences of gun control for health and safety are ge- 350 554 nuinely ambiguous. 358 But the consequences of the gun control debate for the sta-tus of those subscribing to these cultural outlooks has been clear for decades.359 As a result of the safe-harbor language in the Court’s opinion, the victory of the hierarchical individualist position in Heller did not equate to a complete defeat of the egalitarian communitarian side.

But even more important, the crafting of the opinion made it doubtful that either side could be put in a position of domination at the hands of the other in the future. The safe-harbor language left the egalitarian communitarians free to continue seeking regulation of guns; indeed, it remained open to them, the Court was making clear, to continue opposition to concealed carry laws, which had been at the heart of the battle to control the expressive capital of gun laws for decades. Yet whatever they might achieve at this point would be constrained by the consti-tutional individual right to own a gun. Woven out of the civic republican cloth of Founding era mythology, the simple articulation of that right conferred on gun owners the unequivocal and durable recognition of status that Justice Kennedy had wanted the Court to give abortion opponents in Hill. Without being denied the power to participate in the continuing political conversation about guns, egali-tarian communitarians would not after Heller be able to make the law speak in a denigrating voice.360

Higher than any other Justice. So Roberts did not cite a single law review, but cited teh most amici. I suppose this says something about how he views academics, and how he views attorneys who submit briefs. What would be interesting, though, is how many of the amici he cited were authored by academics.

The justice least likely to cite an amicus brief is… Justice Antonin Scalia. Last year, he cited amicus briefs in only 12% of his opinions. Justice Scalia’s sparing approach is consistent with his past statements noting the limitations of amicus briefs. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617- 18 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). More surprising, however, is that Justice Stephen Breyer — who has stated that amicus briefs help improve the quality of high court decisions (Collins, supra, at 4) — had the second-lowest citation rate. Justice Breyer cited amicus briefs in only three of his 20 opinions last year (15%). The top amicus citers, by contrast, were the newest members of the Court, as reflected in the accompanying chart. Last term, Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor both cited amicus briefs in more than 60% of their opinions. Only Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. cited amici at a higher rate; seven of his 10 opinions cited at least one amicus brief. Interestingly, even though a justice’s propensity to cite amicus briefs does not appear to correspond with ideology, Justice Anthony Kennedy landed in the middle once again

From NPR:

Psychologist Dan Willingham at the University of Virginia, who studies how our brains learn, says teachers should not tailor instruction to different kinds of learners. He says we’re on more equal footing than we may think when it comes to how our brains learn. And it’s a mistake to assume students will respond and remember information better depending on how it’s presented . . .

When he reviewed studies of learning styles, he found no scientific evidence backing up the idea. “We have not found evidence from a randomized control trial supporting any of these,” he says, “and until such evidence exists, we don’t recommend that they be used.”

Willingham suggests it might be more useful to figure out similarities in how our brains learn, rather than differences. And, in that case, he says, there’s a lot of common ground. For example, variety. “Mixing things up is something we know is scientifically supported as something that boosts attention,” he says, adding that studies show that when students pay closer attention, they learn better.

At Prawfs Prof. Wasserman quips:

So now I have a scientific basis for not being defensive when I get my annual “Use PowerPoint, some of us are visual learners” student comment.

Professor Wasserman thinks that the Roberts Court will be known as a civil procedure Court.

The New Deal Court of Charles Evan Hughes is associated with the extension of government power and ultimately upholding the constitutionality of the New Deal;1 the Warren Court is associated with the expansion of individual liberties, especially racial equality, the freedom of speech, and criminal procedure;2 the Rehnquist Court is associated with federalism.3 Even if the Court never fully completes its doctrinal project,4 it targets a piece of the law and it develops that piece in a particular direction.

Entering the seventh term of the Roberts Court in October 2011, we see a Court newly engaged in an unexpected area—civil procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court’s membership now includes four justices whose backgrounds suggest particular solicitude for and perhaps keen interest in civil procedure: Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg both were civil litigators, Ginsburg and Justice Kagan both taught Civ Pro, Justice Ginsburg has written extensively on civil procedure (both as a judge and prior), and Justice Sotomayor was a district court judge for six years, meaning she alone among the justices has worked with the Federal Rules and understands how they function on the ground. Over the past six terms, the Court has heard and decided more than twenty cases in core civil procedure areas, including pleading,6 summary judgment,7 relation back of amendments,8 personal jurisdiction,9 federal question jurisdiction,10 diversity jurisdiction,11 jurisdictionality,12 removal procedure,13 class actions,14 civil representation,15 arbitration of civil and civil rights claims in lieu of litigation,16 appealability,17 remedies,18 and Erie/Hanna.19 Several of these decisions have been significant and potentially far-reaching.

I’d say the Roberts court is very concerned with procedural type rules–of which the civil rules are prominent. We’ll see.