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Between 2009 and 2020, Josh published more than 10,000 blog posts. Here, you can access his blog archives.

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Congratulations to Columbia Law School – The Winner of the Inaugural FantasySCOTUS Law School Challenge

July 5th, 2011

Congratulations to the students of Columbia Law School for winning the inaugural FantasySCOTUS.net Law School Challenge. Kudos to Southern Illinois, NYU, Michigan, and St. Thomas (Michigan) for rounding out the top 5.

1 .Columbia 21 Members 6220 Join
2 .Southern Illinois 19 Members 5290 Join
3 .New York University 39 Members 4900 Join
4 .Michigan 17 Members 4850 Join
5 .St. Thomas (minnesota) 12 Members 4470 Join
6 .Valparaiso 20 Members 3850 Join
7 .Charleston 15 Members 3680 Join
8 .Georgetown 43 Members 3230 Join
9 .Louisiana State 23 Members 3210 Join
10 .Virginia 22 Members 3100 Join
11 .Santa Clara 18 Members 2920 Join
12 .Campbell 8 Members 2570 Join
13 .Thomas M. Cooley 34 Members 2330 Join
14 .Chicago-kent 29 Members 2240 Join
15 .Brooklyn 33 Members 2100 Join
16 .Northern Kentucky 20 Members 2070 Join
17 .Georgia State 16 Members 1910 Join
18 . Other Law School 124 Members 1890 Join
19 .Capital 12 Members 1840 Join
20 .Utah 11 Members 1740 Join
21 .Seton Hall 16 Members 1690 Join
22 .Northeastern 35 Members 1680 Join
23 .George Washington 55 Members 1540 Join
24 .Regent 6 Members 1520 Join
25 .Saint Louis 27 Members 1460 Join

 

JoshCast: Interview with Jacob Berlove, Chief Justice of FantasySCOTUS OT 2010

July 5th, 2011

Congratulations to Jacob Berlove–whose username Melech appropriately means “The King”–the Chief Justice of FantasySCOUTS for the October 2010 Term. Jacob predicted approximately 80% of the cases correctly, and beat his next-closest competitor by over 200 points. Jacob also beat Tom Goldstein’s predictions, and scored higher than Columbia Law School, the highest-ranked team in the FantasySCOTUS Law School Challenge.

Jacob never went to law school, and taught himself constitutional law in High School by reading a Constitutional Law textbook cover-to-cover. In this JoshCast, I ask Jacob about how he makes his predictions, which cases were hardest to predict, and which cases were easiest to predict. Good job Jacob! Your golden gavel is in the mail. Definitely worth a listen! Check out the full leader-board here.

[podcast]https://joshblackman.com/podcasts/berlove-chiefjustice.mp3[/podcast]

Download the JoshCast here.

Update: Some photos of the Chief with the Golden Gavel!

Jacob Berlove

Jacob Berlove

Congratulations to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of FantasySCOTUS OT 2010

July 5th, 2011

The results are in for FantasySCOTUS October 2010 Term. Congratulations to Melech, also known as Jacob Berlove, who is the Chief Justice of FantasySCOTUS. I have a JoshCast with Jacob, where I talk about how he makes his predictions, and his legal background–he never went to law school. Amazing! The Chief Justice, Senior Associate Justice, and the Associate Justices, scored a remarkably high accurate rate–approaching 80%. Well done!

Member Points
1
Melech – Chief Justice 6,540
2
nbcrcc – Senior Associate Justice 6,330
3
tcampbell1950 – Associate justice 6,310
4
lawnerd – Associate Justice 6,100
5
Jakes553 – Associate Justice 5,910
6
corteal – Associate Justice 5,890
7
abbamouse – Associate Justice 5,870
8
TheConstitutionsChamp – Associate Justice 5,400
9
vivekn – Associate Justice 5,340

 

The Declaration of Independence and the Force of Law

July 3rd, 2011

Exactly one year ago, I posed the question of whether the Declaration of Independence has the Force of Law. It was a question which I had considered for some time, but could not find an answer that satisfied me. I closed that post with this prediction: “Hopefully, by this time next year this post will have blossomed into something a bit more substantive.”

I am happy to report that this post blossomed into something much more substantive in much less than one year–more like 6 months. This past January I published Original Citizenship in PENNumbra, which sought to answer just this question–does the Declaration of Independence have the Force of Law.

Here is an excerpt from the piece:

While Americans are fond of celebrating the birthday of the Unit- ed States every year on July 4th, this date, as well as the Declaration, has no constitutional significance.7 Fireworks and barbecue aside, for legal purposes the practical starting date of the U.S. is 1789, when President Washington was inaugurated and the first Congress met.8 Our courts do not take cognizance of the Declaration. Yet to a mem- ber of the first Congress or a federal judge in 1789, the United States was not an infant, but was an old, familiar friend, and by 1789, such congressmen and judges had no doubt considered themselves to be U.S. citizens for quite some time. The Constitution merely represented a new form of government for a preexisting country. Article VII concludes that the Constitution was submitted to the states in the year “of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth.”9 The Constitution includes a direct textual and historical link to the Declaration and the year 1776.10

In the future, I intend to research further how the Declaration did not just broadly pronounce certain rights, and liberties, but actually established a nascent–albeit incomplete–form of government that enacted laws passed by the Continental Congress. As the concluding paragraph of the Declaration notes:

“…and that as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do….”

The United States, now a “free and independent state” had the power of such a state. What did this power include? Under the auspices of the Continental Congress–the provisional government of sorts–the United States could levy war, enter into a treat of peace, form alliances, establish trade and commerce, and “do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.” What were these things that a state could do? What exactly did the Continental Congress, as a sovereign government, actually do?

The Supremacy Clause of our Constitution directly references “debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution” and “all Treaties made . . .  under the Authority of the United States.” These are debts, Engagements, and Treaties made (past tense) before the ratification of the Constitution. While the clause about Debts and Engagements specifically references the Confederation, the clause about the Treaties does not. I hope, in future works, to explore how the framers of the Constitution viewed the effect of Treaties–and perhaps other types of laws–enacted by the Continental Congress.

A more complete understanding of the significance of the Declaration—and the laws that the Continental Congress and the states passed “in pursuance of” and “under the Authority of” the Declaration—sheds new light on the Constitution.209

209 The nature and scope of laws—in the words of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI—passed “in pursuance of” and “under the Authority of” the Declaration of Independence, will be analyzed in future works.

Additionally, in future works, I intend to address how a redefined understanding of the Declaration can impact our 9th, 10th, 11th, and 14th amendment jurisprudence, which I teased in the article:

Like “citizenship of the United States,” which is based on doctrines that emerged from our Independence, other portions of our Constitution are premised on powers and rights predating 1789—including a state’s reserved pow- ers,210 a state’s sovereign immunity,211 the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship,212 preexisting enumerated rights,213 and the rights retained by the people.214

210 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“The Tenth Amend- ment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.” (emphasis added)).

211 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The American Colonies did not enjoy sovereign immunity, that being a privilege unders- tood in English law to be reserved for the Crown alone . . . .”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (“In determining the sense in which Georgia is a sovereign State, it may be useful to turn our attention to the political situation we were in, prior to the Revolu- tion, and to the political rights which emerged from the Revolution.” (emphasis added)).

212 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3078 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Clause is thus best understood to impose a limitation on state power to infringe upon pre-existing substantive rights.” (emphasis added)); see also Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, the Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010) (encouraging originalists to embrace the clause); Alan Gura, Ilya Sha- piro & Josh Blackman, Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: The Tell-Tale Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 163, 164-68 (analyzing the interpretation of privileges or immunities clause in McDonald v. Chicago).

213 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”).

214 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“And in my view that right [of parents to direct the upbringing of their children] is also among the ‘othe[r] [rights] retained by the people’ which the Ninth Amendment says the Con- stitution’s enumeration of rights ‘shall not be construed to deny or disparage.’” (em- phasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IX)).

Please don’t forget, today is about much, much more than fireworks and barbecues. Now go blow some stuff up and grill some meat!

The Constitutionality of Social Cost and the Restoration of 2nd Amendment Rights to the Formerly Mentally Ill Who No Longer Pose a Threat to Public Safety

July 3rd, 2011

The Times has a lengthy piece titled Some With Histories of Mental Illness Petition to Get Their Gun Rights Back. What is interesting in this article, to me at least, is how closely the discussion tracks with my analysis in the Constitutionality of Social Cost. In my article, I argue, that what really undergirds the Supreme Court’s novel Second Amendment jurisprudence is considering the negative externalities, or social costs, of the exercise of the fundamental Second Amendment right.

A number of states, both pre and post Heller, have instituted proceedings to allow those determined mentally infirmed–and thus stripped of their 2nd Amendment rights–to have these rights restored. The TImes recognizes, and discerns that the intent of “these state laws is to enable people to regain the right to buy and possess firearms if it is determined that they are not a threat to public safety. Or, as I put it in my article, “the inquiry revolves around the propensity or likelihood of the applicant to use the firearm dangerously.”

The TImes phrases the debate in terms of comprehending individual liberty, and the threat to others–the Constitutionality of Social Cost.

The issue goes to the heart of the nation’s complicated relationship with guns, testing the delicate balance between the need to safeguard the public and the dictates of what the Supreme Court has proclaimed to be a fundamental constitutional right.

Or, as I phrased it:

Although the historical debate over the Second Amendment is likely to rage for some time, the future of this jurisprudential skirmish will be waged on a battlefield with two fronts— liberty and social costs.

The issue of social cost does not just apply to those deemed mentally infirm–it also applies to those convicted of crimes, both violent, an non-violent. We should also be cognizant that just because someone committed a crime in the past, does not mean they should be perpetually rendered ineligible for this civil right. Let’s not forget that Martha Stewart, guilty of a relatively benign white collar crime, will never be allowed to legally own a gun (not that she probably would want to anyway).

This is not to say that felons of all stripes should be perpetually dis‐ armed, as the very nature and number of felonies has prolifer‐ ated to include many types of non‐violent crimes537—crimes that say nothing about the defendant’s propensity for harming others (Martha Stewart for example).538 This burden is not insurmountable, but the individual must show that he no longer poses such a threat. Even the National Rifle Association is in favor of limiting firearm ownership to law‐abiding citizens.539 This limiting principle would assuage concerns on both sides of the issue, and provide the Court with a judicially manage‐ able standard to balance liberty and social costs.

Expressing the view that underlies all Second Amendment cases, the Commonwealth Attorney (District Attorney) in Virginia (no enemy of gun rights) notes that people have a right to firearms so long as society is safe:

“I think that reasonable people can disagree about issues of the Second Amendment and gun control and things like that, but I don’t believe that any reasonable person believes that a mentally ill person needs a firearm,” Mr. Fleenor said. “The public has a right to be safe in their community.”

 

There are a few issues that I alluded to in my article that the laboratories of democracy are already fleshing out.

First, a question raised by my article, which I don’t attempt to answer (and probably will address in future works) is how to adjudge someone’s propensity for violence. The Times notes that Judges are currently tasked with this responsibility. According to the Times, they are doing an incomplete job.

But an examination of restoration procedures across the country, along with dozens of cases, shows that the process for making that determination is governed in many places by vague standards and few specific requirements. . . . In case after case examined by The New York Times, judges made decisions without important information about an applicant’s mental health.

There is no central repository for cases heard around Virginia, but to get a picture of how the process works in one state, The Times obtained dozens of petitions and judges’ orders, mainly from 2009 and 2010, along with supporting documentation, and interviewed petitioners, lawyers and judges. The hearings were often relatively brief, sometimes perfunctory, and judges had wide latitude in handling the petitions.

Second, a fascinating issue raised is who should bear the burden to restore the rights. I argued in my article that people who have shown a propensity for violence in the past (perhaps through committing a violent felony or exhibiting mental infirmity) should bear the burden.

For deprivation of the liberty of people lacking this propen‐ sity, the burden should remain with the State.534 . . . In contrast, for those who have demonstrated a propensity for harm and are likely to inflict said harm in the future—such as violent felons—the burden should rest with the felon.

Curiously, in Los Angeles, the state bears the burden to oppose restoration of the right, and show that to grant them a firearm would result in too great of a risk of social cost. In essence, this creates a presumption of liberty, rather than  presumption of constitutionality.

In California, anyone placed on a 72-hour or 14-day psychiatric hold and determined to be a danger to themselves or others loses gun rights for five years. But upon discharge, the person can apply to have these prohibitions lifted. Applicants in Los Angeles County are required to provide records from all involuntary hospitalizations, which are checked against a list provided by the State Department of Justice. They must also be examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist, who can call friends or relatives to gather more information.

Under the statute, the burden is on the district attorney to establish that the petitioner “would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner.”

Over all, 1,579 petitions have been filed in Los Angeles Superior Court since 2000. More than 1,000 were dismissed, usually because applicants did not furnish the required documentation or failed to show up. Of those who actually got hearings, 381 won their cases.

Virginia has a similar standard that looks at whether the person will likely act in a “manner dangerous to public safety.”

Lawmakers in Virginia, the scene of Mr. Cho’s rampage, were among the first to respond to the federal legislation by amending the state’s existing restoration statute to reflect the new law. To restore firearms rights, judges must find that the petitioner “will not likely act in a manner dangerous to public safety” and that “the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” There are few specific standards or guidelines beyond that.

Third, the article addresses the role studies showing a potential risk, ex ante, that people adjudged mentally infirm will use guns for harming others.

Supporters of gun rights and mental health advocates point out that a vast majority of people with mental illness are not violent. At the same time, though, a variety of studies have found that people with serious mental illness are more prone to violence than the general population.

Most people with mental health issues, of course, will never be violent. But there is widespread consensus among scientists that the increased risk of violence among those with a serious mental illness — schizophrenia, major depression or bipolar disorder — is statistically significant. That risk rises when substance abuse, which is more prevalent among people with mental illness, is also present.

As I note in my article, this generalized, ex ante deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights based on studies is unprecedented in our constitutional law jurisprudence.

Under our current Second Amendment jurisprudence people who have shown no propensity for violence may be denied the exercise of their constitutional right without any specific rea‐ son, based solely on legislative judgments grounded on dis‐ puted statistics499 that show a person with a firearm may be likely to engage in violence.500 This ex ante deprivation of liberty with restrained judicial oversight is unprecedented…

Read it. It’s good.

A relevant issue–food for thought really–is the role of restoring a felon’s right to vote. Arguments against restoring a person’s Second Amendment rights rely on the same arguments against restoring a felon’s right to vote. I think neither are persuasive.