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Justice Alito asked a stellar hypo during arguments in Staub v. Proctor:

JUSTICE ALITO: Could I just ask where -could I ask where your argument leads? Let’s say that an employer calls in an employee and says: Now, we have to decide who to lay off, and we have looked at your record over the last 10 years, and here it is, all the evaluations you’ve gotten over the past 10 years, and based on all of that, we — we’ve decide that you are going to be the person to be laid off. Now if it turns out that one of those evaluations was rendered by someone who had an anti-military bias, would that make the employee — would that be a prima facie case against the employer?
MR. SCHNAPPER: It would. But the affirmative –
JUSTICE ALITO: Even — even if the employer at that time did every — made every reasonable effort to investigate the validity of all the prior evaluations, still the employer would be on the hook?
MR. SCHNAPPER: Yes. There is nothing in the statute or in the common law that creates a special rule for thorough investigation.

Zing. It’s like a Mariano Rivera Cutter. No matter what you do, it’s a strike, and if you take a swing, you’ll miss.

Alito hit the nail on the head, or perhaps in this context, he hit the cat on its paw.
Even Justice Kennedy noticed the sweeping implications of that concession.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, that’s a sweeping rule. I was going to ask a related hypothetical. Suppose the — the officer who is in charge, charged with the decision to terminate or not to terminate says: I’m going to have a hearing. You can both have counsel. And you have who, is it — suppose Buck — suppose the two employees that were allegedly anti-military here testified and they said there was no anti-military bias, and the person is then terminated. Later the employee has evidence that those two were lying. Could he bring an action then?
MR. SCHNAPPER: Yes. Yes.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: That’s sweeping. That’s almost an insurer’s liability insofar as the director of employment is concerned.
MR. SCHNAPPER: It’s –
JUSTICE KENNEDY: He has to insure. He has — he has done everything he can, he has an hearing, and he has almost absolute liability.

Likewise Justice Sotomayor picked up on this hypo:

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Isn’t that — the government’s formulation that the discrimination has to play a substantial role in the termination a limiting principle? I mean, you answered or appeared to be answering Justice Alito that in a 10-year history if one report of discrimination existed that that would shift the burden to the employer.

Is that an accurate statement of law? That one report has to play a role that is more than a mere existence, doesn’t it?

As did Justice Scalia:

JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Schnapper, I guess this goes back to Justice Alito’s question. I find it difficult to grasp the distinction that you draw or what is seems could possibly exist between a willful motivating factor and a non-willful motivating factor. I mean, to say that it’s motivating is — is to say that it’s willful, it seems to me. But you want us to draw a distinction between a willful motivating factor and a non-willful motivating factor?

Alito’s hypo caused Kennedy, Sotomayor,and Scalia to take notice, and return to the hypo. Cutter from the one-justice delta force.

Petitioner based his entire argument on absolute liability for respondeat superior under agency law and the Restatement of Agency. I don’t think the Justices are buying that argument.

Alito, looking at the text of the bill rather than principles of agency law, further cornered Schnapper:

JUSTICE ALITO: That isn’t what the statute says. You jump over the language of the statute. It has to be a motivating factor in the decision to discharge. And that speaks — that looks natural — the natural reading of that is that it looks at the motivation of the person who actually makes the decision to discharge. Now, I’m not suggesting that’s the right rule. That’s a very unattractive rule. But the rule that you have suggested is also a very unattractive rule, one that I doubt the Congress intended to adopt. Is there no reasonable middle position here? It’s all or nothing?

An interesting exchange in Sossamon v. Texas discussing a state’s dignity and sovereign immunity:

JUSTICE GINSBURG: And I think that the -the core question here is the State — and Justice Alito just posed it: the State is being treated with less dignity than the Federal Government, because your position is that the Federal Government is shielded by its sovereign immunity, and you say the State is not.
MS. HARRINGTON: On the contrary, as to the dignity point, Your Honor, if — the State voluntarily waives its immunity when it accepts Federal funds that clearly condition the acceptance of the funds on the waiver of its immunity. The State in this case doesn’t contest that it has waived its sovereign immunity voluntarily to some universe of suits to enforce RLUIPA.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But we are talking about general principles of interpretation and the proposition that we are suggesting is that the State surely should be entitled to the same dignity, the same protection against suits as the Federal Government, and you suggest just the opposite.
MS. HARRINGTON: No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: And it seems to me that’s contrary to standard principles of the Federal — of protecting the Federal balance.

During oral arguments in Sossamon v. Texas, Chief Justice Roberts incorrectly announced the case and counsel:

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear argument next in Case 09-400, Staub v. Proctor Hospital.

Mr. Schnapper.

MR. RUSSELL: Actually, it’s Mr. Russell.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, I’m sorry. I’m looking ahead. And, oh, I’ve got the argument wrong, too. We will hear argument in 08-1438, Sossamon v. Texas. You don’t look like Mr. Schnapper. Mr. Russell.

MR. RUSSELL: By accepting Federal funds for its prisons, Texas consented to suit for appropriate relief for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

After this flub, Kevin Russell didn’t begin his argument with the obligatory “Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.”

Eric Schnapper, a Professor at the University of Washington, argued Staub v. Proctor the same at 1:00 p.m. Sossamon was the 11:00 case.

Woops 🙂

Very cool article from the eminent property scholar Carol Rose, titled Game Stories. The abstract:

Many scholars of law and economics have taken an interest in game theory. This article, part of a symposium on new developments in law and literature, focuses on the narrative structures of the most standard of the game theory names: Prisoners’ Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Chicken, and Stag Hunt. These names tell stories, and the stories breathe life into the game theory matrices that they exemplify. While other names and situations could have illustrated the games’ strategic elements, these standard stories all have a punchy and somewhat macho appeal. The most cited of all is Prisoners’ Dilemma, even though, oddly enough, it is the least punchy and the least macho of all; and even though it blurs with the other stories, particularly when iterated. The article queries the particular appeal of Prisoners’ Dilemma, and concludes that among other things, an offbeat and unfortunately unexplored promise of redemption is one source of the PD story’s great appeal.

This is kind of like Constitutional Places, Constitutional Faces for Law & Economics (yes, we are still working on that book. it is just not a high priority now in light of the Harlan Institute’s FantasySCOTUS launch).

Freakonomics has this post on Multitasking, discounting whether it can actually raise effectiveness.

If you think your multitasking skills are improving your productivity, think again.  Consistent with other multitasking research, a new working paper(ungated version) by Decio Coviello, Andrea Ichino and Nicola Persico analyzes a sample of Italian judges with different caseloads and finds that “task juggling, i.e., the spreading of effort across too many active projects, decreases the performance of workers, raising the chances of low throughput, long duration of projects and exploding backlogs.” The authors highlight the role of work scheduling in employee productivity, writing that “[i]ndividual speed of job completion cannot be explained only in terms of effort, ability and experience: work scheduling is a crucial ‘inpu

This may be true, but I am not concerned. I am not a multitasker. I am a supertasker.