Blog

From The Faculty Lounge, here are 30 Questions FAR Candidates would really like to ask at the meat market. Pretty funny stuff:

1.  Why did your academic dean ask you to serve on the hiring committee, and how can I avoid the same mistake you made?

2.  Has the economic downturn affected where your committee will be dining on this trip to DC?

3.  What is the starting salary, and how quickly do retirement benefits vest?

4.  Why are YOU asking ME about scholarship, given [y]our respective output in the last three years?

5.  If I were to ask your students how your institution could be improved, what would they tell me?

6.  How important is placement?

7.  Why isn’t your law school ranked in the first tier?

8.  What role do your research assistants perform in grading final exams?

9.  Why did your recent dean search fail?

10.  Can you envision any (ANY!) situation arising in the next 50 years that would require me to teach a UCC course?

11.  How important is quality teaching in the tenure decision?

12.  Does your technology permit me to teach from home?

13.  How successful are faculty-student dating relationships at your school?

14.  Is parking free?

15.  Does your tenure committee view “Professor of the Year” accolades as the kiss of death?

16.  Will I have a window office?

17.  If you require four articles for tenure and I have already published four articles, do I start with tenure?

18.  Does blogging count as scholarship?

19.  Is teaching in the night program completely optional?

20.  How many reams of personalized letterhead stationery do you provide?

21.  Will I have more than one new prep during my first year of teaching?

22.  Will my office be equipped with cable TV hook-up?

23.  What brand of coffee do you serve in your faculty lounge, and how often are pastries and fruit provided?

24.  If you could jettison some of your faculty deadwood, which three colleagues would be gone by tomorrow?

25.  How often do you host brown-bag lunch presentations, and do I have to stay for the presentation if I have no interest in the topic?

26.  What makes your school the best fit for my talents?

27.  When did you last review and offer written comments on a draft of a colleague?

28.  Can I apply early for tenure if I use PowerPoint in my classes?

29.  Will the other seventeen folks on your faculty who teach constitutional law be upset that you’re telling me I can teach the course every semester?

30.  May I have those assurances IN WRITING?

Professor Solum just posted his long-awaited article to SSRN, titled District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism.

I encourage you to read the entire article, but I would like to focus on one area, where Professor Solum agrees with my reading of Heller.

In his article, Professor Solum wrote:

This disagreement between Justices Scalia and Stevens about the relationship between the prefatory and operative clauses points to a larger disagreement. While Justice Scalia inquired into the semantic content of the operative clause, Justice Stevens focused on the purpose or teleological meaning of the Second Amendment. In a rough way, this disagreement corresponds to the difference between original intentions originalism and original meaning originalism.

In an unpublished paper I wrote in December 2008 for Professor Malcolm’s Common Law & American Rights class, titled Originalism for Dummies, I wrote something along very similar lines. Profssor Solum linked to this article back in December 24, 2008 on the Legal Theory Blog.

[In contrast to Justice Scalia’s original public meaning approach], by focusing almost exclusively on the drafting history, Justice Stevens fails to appreciate the rich common law history of the right to keep and bear arms, and how this history would have informed the original public understanding to an observer in the late eighteenth century. Words derive meaning from what they mean in context . . . Curiously, Justice Stevens rebukes Justice Scalia for “dwelling” on historical sources, including the English Bill of Rights and Blackstone’s Commentaries, proclaiming they only shed “indirect light” on the topic. However [Justice Stevens’s] application of originalism leaves much to be desired. Perhaps Justice Stevens did not properly undertake such [an original public meaning] excursion, because to look at this history paints a very strong picture in favor of an individual right to keep and bear arms.In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court analyzed George Carlin’s famous “seven dirty words” that cannot be repeated over the airwaves. Similarly, I have put together the seven dirty words of intentionalism that should not be used in an originalist analysis. This list focuses on words which seek to ascertain the framer’s intent, rather than what the original public meaning of a text is. The words, in no particular order are: (1) wished; (2) contemplated; (3) recognized; (4) intended; (5) motivated; (6) assumed; and (7) considered. Throughout Justices Stevens’s and Breyer’s dissents, they are both guilty of relying on these concepts to try to paint a picture what was on the Framer’s mind. Keep a keen eye open for these words, because they reveal a sneaky attempt to conflate original intent, a discredited form of originalism, with original public meaning originalism, an essential method of historical analysis.

I think Professor Solum is dead-on. Scalia’s opinion is closely tied to an original public meaning inquiry, or semantic originalism as Professor Solum refers to it. Stevens’s opinion utilizes an original intent approach.  I’m pretty content with myself for independently coming to the same conclusion about such as seminal case as a preeminent theorist like Professor Solum. Gratefully, I heavily relied on Professor Solum’s theoretical work when writing this paper.

From Knoxnews, Landlords can ban guns of permit holders (H/T Instapundit):

A landlord can legally prohibit tenants who hold handgun carry permits from bringing their weapons into a rented apartment, according to an opinion from Attorney General Bob Cooper that was released today.

The opinion came in response to a request from state Rep. Tony Shipley, R-Kingsport, who said he had thought the answer would have been to the contrary.

Says the opinion: “A landlord can prohibit tenants, including those who hold handgun carry permits, from possessing firearms within the leased premises.”

Rep. Tony Shipley, R-Kingsport, who is probably not a lawyer, expresses is woeful ignorance of the Constitution:

Shipley said the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution would apply to someone living in an apartment to prevent law enforcement officers from entering without a search warrant.

“If the Fourth Amendment applies, why doesn’t the Second Amendment apply?” he said. “Can a landlord say you give up free speech, under the First Amendment, in the apartment? I think not.”

Mr. King, you think wrong. For whatever reason, most people do not realize that the Constitution imposes restrictions on state action by the government, not on private actions by individuals. Of course a landlord can force you to give up free speech to live in an apartment. I get annoyed whenever homeowners who live in developments are not allowed to fly flags. You have no first amendment right to fly a flag in a private community. If one more person on Facebook tells me, “you have the right to free speech but I disagree,” I may lose it.

I also get annoyed whenever the NRA tries to force businesses to allow gunowners to keep weapons in their cars on private parking lots. Private property is private property. If a business does not allow me to bring my gun onto their property, I have the choice to go elsewhere. If my employer does not allow me to bring a gun to work, and that is important to me, maybe I should work elsewhere.

OK. Rant over.

Check out this scary visual of every aspect of the U.S. National Debt. It makes the sign in Manhattan look like a joke. H/T Adelle L.

I wish I could program a clock like this that would blare out “Who is John Galt” every time the debt increased, say a million dollars. It would never shut up.

Professor, Former Judge McConnell writes in the WSJ that the The Pay Czar Is Unconstitutional (H/T WSJLawBlog). I have written about the Regulatory Czars before and have also queried whether they are Constitutional.

Mr. Feinberg’s ukase is the most prominent example (and not just by the Obama administration) of the exercise of power by an individual unilaterally appointed by the executive branch without Senate confirmation—and thus outside the ordinary channels of Congressional oversight.

The Appointments clause of the Constitution, Article II, section 2, provides that all “Officers of the United States” must be appointed by the president “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” This means subject to confirmation, except that “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment” of “inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”

There is no doubt that Mr. Feinberg is an “officer” of the United States. The Supreme Court has defined this term (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976) as “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”

. . .

While somewhat more disputable, Mr. Feinberg’s is probably an “inferior” officer, defined as one subject to supervision and removal by a member of the cabinet. . . . This means that Congress could, if it wished, vest the appointment of the pay czar in the secretary, without any need for Senate confirmation.

But Congress has not done so. On the contrary, it vested the authority to implement TARP’s compensation provision in the secretary of the Treasury. The secretary may sub-delegate that power to someone else—but that someone must be an “officer” properly appointed “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

The Supreme Court observed in Buckley v. Valeo that the provisions governing appointments under the Constitution reflect more than “etiquette or protocol.” They embody the Founders’ conviction that all power under U.S. laws must be exercised by officers with constitutional authority.

This makes sense. McConnell concludes:

The power to set compensation at large American businesses is especially subject to potential abuse, favoritism, arbitrariness, or political manipulation. It is no reflection on Kenneth Feinberg, who has a sterling reputation and who appears to have approached these sensitive duties with a spirit of commendable integrity, to say that the checks and balances of the Constitution should be scrupulously observed. They were not. Because he is not a properly appointed officer of the United States, Mr. Feinberg’s executive compensation decisions were unconstitutional.

This is a far cry from articles proclaiming that President Obama is ineligible to receive the Nobel Prize. The Constitution does put valid checks on the separation of Powers, and the Executive must obey them.

This is also on my works in progress list, and I am glad McConnell seems to agree with me.

Update: Check out Johnathan Adler’s take on Volokh.