Jul 3, 2015

No “Motor Vehicle Campers” in the Park

A West Jefferson, Ohio law provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person … to park … upon any street … in the Village, any motor vehicle camper, trailer, farm implement and/or non-motorized vehicle for a continued period of twenty-four hours.

Andrew Cammeleri was given a citation for parking her pickup truck for longer than 24 hours. Does a pickup truck fall within this statute? No she argued. A pickup truck is not a “motor vehicle camper,” a “farm implement,” or a “non-motorized vehicle.” The trial court found that the legislature omitted the comma, and thought the intent clearly captured the pickup truck.

{¶5} The trial court held that when reading the ordinance in context, it unambiguously applied to motor vehicles and “anybody reading [the ordinance] would understand that it is just missing a comma.” The trial court then found Cammelleri guilty of violating West Jefferson Codified Ordinances 351.16(a) and ordered her to pay court costs. …

Judge Hendrickson of the Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Appellate District of Ohio reversed. As drafted, the defendant did not have a “motor vehicle camper.”

{¶ 15} In this instance, the intent of the ordinance is plain from the grammar andlanguage used in West Jefferson Codified Ordinances 351.16(a). According to ordinary grammar rules, items in a series are normally separated by commas. Chicago Manual of Style 312 (16th Ed.2010). The items included in the series of motor vehicle camper, trailer, and farm implement are separated by commas. In order to interpret the ordinance in the way the village suggests, prohibiting parking either a motor vehicle or a camper upon a street in the village for over 24 hours, a comma must be inserted between the phrase “motor vehicle” and the word “camper.” However, no such comma exists. According to the rules of grammar, “motor vehicle camper” is one item. See Karder Mach. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 9th Dist. Summit No. 14486, 1990 WL 177199, *3 (Nov. 7, 1990).

{¶ 18} By utilizing rules of grammar and employing the common meaning of terms, “motor vehicle camper” has a clear definition that does not produce an absurd result. If the village desires a different reading, it should amend the ordinance and insert a comma between the phrase “motor vehicle” and the word “camper.” As written, however, legislative intent is clear from looking at the language used in the ordinance itself.

Chief Justice Roberts was unavailable to add a comma to rewrite the statute as the legislature obviously wanted it to read.

H/T Joe H.

no-vehicles

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Jul 3, 2015

Stunning WaPo Report on Immigration – DHS “taken steps to ensure that the majority of the United States’ 11.3 million undocumented immigrants can stay in this country”

Throughout the entire litigation over DAPA, the Administration has insisted over and over and over again that this administration is deporting more Americans than ever, and Texas can’t possibly claim an abdication of authority because DHS is deporting more people than ever. Now, The Washington Post reports that new DHS policies will decrease the number of deportations for aliens that are not “convicted criminals, terrorism threats or those who recently crossed the border,” and instead focus on “integrating” these preferred aliens.

The Obama administration has begun a profound shift in its enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws, aiming to hasten the integration of long-term illegal immigrants into society rather than targeting them for deportation, according to documents and federal officials.

In recent months, the Department of Homeland Security has taken steps to ensure that the majority of the United States’ 11.3 million undocumented immigrants can stay in this country, with agents narrowing enforcement efforts to three groups of illegal migrants: convicted criminals, terrorism threats or those who recently crossed the border.

While public attention has been focused on the court fight over President Obama’s highly publicized executive action on immigration, DHS has with little fanfare been training thousands of immigration agents nationwide to carry out new policies on everyday enforcement.

While this policy lacks the hallmark of DAPA and DACA–providing work authorization–it is a much wider ranging abdication of enforcement of the immigration laws. Only aliens who fit into the class of dangerous aliens are not presumptively deportable.

But the shift in DHS’s enforcement priorities, which are separate from the DAPA program and have not been challenged in court, could prove even more far-reaching.

The new policies direct agents to focus on the three priority groups and leave virtually everyone else alone. Demographic data shows that the typical undocumented immigrant has lived in the United States for a decade or more and has established strong community ties.

Although the new measures do not grant illegal immigrants a path to citizenship, their day-to-day lives could be changed in countless ways. Now, for instance, undocumented migrants say they are so afraid to interact with police, for fear of being deported, that they won’t report crimes and often limit their driving to avoid possible traffic stops. The new policies, if carried out on the ground, could dispel such fears, advocates for immigrants say.

This is remarkable. It goes far beyond the argument that DHS lacks the resources to deport everyone here illegally. But now, they are moving the goal posts even further, so that removal isn’t even a priority at all!

In describing the initiatives, Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has echoed the language often used by advocates of comprehensive immigration reform, which remains stalled on Capitol Hill.

“We are making it clear that we should not expend our limited resources on deporting those who have been here for years, have committed no serious crimes, and have, in effect, become integrated members of our society,” Johnson said in a recent speech in Houston. He added, “These people are here, they live among us, and they are not going away.”

In other words, even if we had the resources, we wouldn’t deport them. This is a very, very different argument than the government has made in the past.

Since the new policies took effect in January, Johnson’s instructions have been conveyed to agents throughout the department. “We decided we’re going to draw a clear line between individuals who now have significant equities in the country versus those who are recent entrants,” said one department official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe internal deliberations.

“If people are not an enforcement priority,” the official said, “. . . bottom line, the secretary has said don’t go after them.”

An unnamed administration official has said, very clearly, that DHS will not pursue certain aliens. This is an even more unequivocal abdication than DAPA, which clung to the pretense that DAPA status could be revoke–even though there was a roughly 99% renewal rate.

As a result, deportations are plummeting:

Deportations, for example, are dropping. The Obama administration is on pace to remove 229,000 people from the country this year, a 27 percent fall from last year and nearly 50 percent less than the all-time high in 2012.

Fewer people are also in the pipeline for deportation. The number of occupied beds at immigration detention facilities, which house people arrested for immigration violations, has dropped nearly 20 percent this year.

And on Johnson’s orders, officials are reviewing the entire immigrant detainee population — and each of the 400,000 cases in the nation’s clogged immigration courts — to weed out those who don’t meet the new priorities. About 3,000 people have been released from custody or had their immigration cases dropped, DHS officials said.

There is little pretense for executive discretion anymore when a class of 11 million is systematically exempted from the immigration laws.

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Jul 3, 2015

#SCOTUS Book Royalties

The Justices recently released their financial disclosures. Last year Justice Breyer made $60,000 and Justice Scalia made $30,000 on book royalties.

How did the Justices with books make out with royalties?

  • Justice Scalia made $33,798 from West Services.
  • Justice Breyer made $7,214 from Random House and $126 from Kopf.
  • Like in 2013, Justice Sotomayor received “no ‘noninvestment income’ in 2014″ from her book. But she wrote that the “Knopf Double Day Group, publisher of my memoir “My Beloved World,” disbursed $25,990.00 during 2014 to promote the sale of the memoir.” In 2012, she disclosed a $1,000,000 advance and a separate $925,000 advance. As I speculated last year, she is still paying off the advance, and has not earned any royalties beyond the $2,000,000 paid up front.
  • Justice Thomas did not list any royalties for “My Grandfather’s Son.”

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Jul 2, 2015

Supplemental Briefing in Texas v. U.S. on standing post Arizona Legislature

After reading the Court’s decision in the Arizona Legislature case (I still haven’t made up my mind on the merits, but I’m inclined to agree with the Chief’s dissent), I noted that Justice Ginsburg’s standing analysis was very good news for the House of Representative’s challenge to Obamacare, and Texas’s challenge to executive action on immigration. On cue, Jonathan Turley, representing the House, filed notices of supplemental authority discussing the Arizona case. In response to a call for briefing from the 5th Circuit, the Texas SG has also filed a supplemental notice.

Perhaps most significantly, the Court distinguished Mass. v. Mellon, which the government has relied on extensively.

Arizona State Legislature bolstered Plaintiffs’ independent parens patriae standing theory by distinguishing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), a case Defendants have cited in attacking that theory. See Appellants’ (DOJ) Br. 32; DOJ Reply Br. 11.

The Supreme Court emphasized that States’ standing to sue the federal government as parens patriae depends on “the kind of claim that the state advances.” Ariz. State Leg., 2015 WL 2473452, at *10 n.10. In illustrating this point, the Supreme Court approvingly cited its decision finding standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). And, as Plaintiffs have explained, Massachusetts distinguishes between States suing to enforce federal law and suing to block federal law. See id. at 520 n.17 (explaining that a State can sue the federal government under a parens patriae theory when it is asserting “rights under federal law” rather than seeking to “protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes”).

In Mellon, the Court found no standing where Massachusetts sued the federal government to block the operation of federal statutes. Ariz. State Leg., 2015 WL 2473452, at *10 n.10; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs seek to enforce federal statutes. In other words, this lawsuit is analogous to Massachusetts’s later suit against the EPA, where the Supreme Court found standing.

And reaffirms Mass. v. EPA’s discussion of “special solicitude,” in the context of the “institutional injury.”

Arizona State Legislature confirms that States are “entitled to special solicitude in [a court’s] standing analysis.” Ariz. State Leg., 2015 WL 2473452, at *10 n.10 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520). In Arizona State Legislature, standing was premised on the fact that the Arizona Legislature’s redistricting powers were “strip[ped]” and “nullif[ied].” 2015 WL 2473452, at *8, *10. The Court recognized that was an “institutional injury.” Id. at *10.

Similarly, the States suffer institutional injuries when federal agencies fail to abide by congressional enactments that preempt state prerogatives. “When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives” that become “lodged in the Federal Government.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519. A State’s agreement to have its authority preempted on such sovereign matters—for instance, determining the lawful presence of individuals within its borders—is premised on the understanding that Congress’s enactments serve to “protect” the States. Id.

When the Executive Branch “has abdicated its responsibility under [federal statutes],” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505, it negates the basis on which the States agreed to allow federal preemption of their sovereign prerogatives. See ROA.4432-43 (district court’s opinion); Amicus Br. of Prof. Ernest A. Young 15-20. For this reason, States are accorded “special solicitude” in demonstrating their standing to sue the federal Executive. Ariz. State Leg., 2015 WL 2473452, at *10 n.10 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520).

Texas also distinguishes Justice Scalia’s remarks as inapplicable here:

Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona State Legislature suggested that plaintiffs should not have standing when they ask courts to “resolve direct disputes between two political branches of the same government.” 2015 WL 2473452, at *40 (emphasis added). Of course, the majority of the Court did not adopt this view. Regardless, Justice Scalia’s reasoning is inapplicable here. Plaintiffs are not suing other branches within their own governments; they are suing another government. Such lawsuits pose no difficulty, as exemplified by the scores of original cases in the Supreme Court involving one State suing another. See, e.g., States Br. 32 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1992), and Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1981)).

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Jul 2, 2015

POTUS Takes “Victory Lap” after King v. Burwell

The Hill Reports:

President Obama is taking a victory lap on his landmark healthcare legislation less than a week after the Supreme Court delivered a key decision in favor of the administration.

“I’m feeling pretty good about how healthcare’s going,” Obama said to applause from an audience in Nashville, Tenn.

In his first public remarks devoted to healthcare since the court’s 6-3 decision, Obama vowed to make the law “even better.”

“I think it’s important to remember that everybody who has health insurance benefited and continues to benefit from this law even though a lot of folks don’t know it,” Obama said during the town hall meeting.

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Jul 2, 2015

Robot Grabs, Crushes Man. “Prosecutors Were Considering Whether to Bring Charges, and if so, Against Whom.”

In a bizarre story from Germany, a robot at a VW plan, that was programmed to grab and manipulate auto parts, grabbed a human and crushed him.

A robot has killed a contractor at one of Volkswagen’s production plants inGermany, the automaker said Wednesday.

The man died Monday at the plant in Baunatal, about 100 kilometers (62 miles) north of Frankfurt, VW spokesman Heiko Hillwig said.

The 22-year-old was part of a team that was setting up the stationary robot when it grabbed and crushed him against a metal plate, Hillwig said.

He said initial conclusions indicate that human error was to blame, rather than a problem with the robot, which can be programmed to perform various tasks in the assembly process. He said it normally operates within a confined area at the plant, grabbing auto parts and manipulating them.

Obviously this robot didn’t get past the first rule. In a reference to the questions of liability for torts committed by robots, the article closes:

German news agency dpa reported that prosecutors were considering whether to bring charges, and if so, against whom.

Against whom, or what?

This reminds me of an Onion story last year about Ohio replacing the lethal injection with the “humane new head-ripping-off-machine” that will automatically rip off the head of anyone that sits in the chair.

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Jul 1, 2015

Highlights from Ted Cruz’s New Book About Harvard Law School, #SCOTUS, and the Texas SG

Earlier this week I blogged about Ted Cruz’s experience watching porn with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor. I’ve now bought a copy of his book, and will highlight some stories salient to legal circles–mostly about his time at HLS and SCOTUS. Long post after the jump.

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Jul 1, 2015

My Comments on the #SCOTUS Term that was on Houston Public Radio

I was on “Houston Matters” to discuss the Supreme Court term that was. I talk about King v. Burwell at 6:40, Obergefell at 9:50, the Texas Attorney General’s opinion on same-sex marriage licenses at 12:15, Glossip v. Goss at 15:50, King v. Burwell again at 18:52, the Confederate Flag license plate case at 21:03, the Texas Fair Housing case at 24:30, the stay on the Texas abortion law at 26:42, and my closing thoughts on the term at 29:00.

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Jul 1, 2015

I am on Houston Public Radio today discussing #SCOTUS

The show starts at 1 ET/12 CT. You can listen here.

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Jun 30, 2015

Alignment of 5-4 Decisions

From Kedar Bhatia’s ever-useful StatPack, we see that this year, there were eight 5-4 decisions where AMK voted with the liberals, and only five where AMK voted with the conservatives. In Walker, Justice Thomas voted with the four liberals. In Williams-Yulee, CJ Roberts joined Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. So there were 10 cases where four liberals were joined by one conservative. But the only case where four conservatives were joined by one liberal was Breyer joining in Armstrong. But even there, Breyer only concurred in judgment with Justice Scalia’s opinion, which fractured significantly. Adam Liptak discusses the “discipline” of the liberals in his insightful end-of-year piece.

5-4

 

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Jun 30, 2015

Question Presented in Fisher v. Texas II Does Not Involve Overturning Grutter

Here is the question presented by the Court in Fisher v. Texas II:

Whether the Fifth Circuit’s re-endorsement of the University of Texas at Austin’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).

This is precisely how the issue was framed in Fisher’s cert petition:

Whether the Fifth Circuit’s re-endorsement of the University of Texas at Austin’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).

This is also similar to how the question presented was framed by the Court in 2011 for Fisher I:

Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions.

Note that neither QP asks to overturn Grutter.

Recall that during arguments, Bert Rein told Justice Breyer that they were not trying to overturn Grutter.

JUSTICE BREYER: If you are going to the merits, I want to know whether you want us to — or are asking us to overrule Grutter. Grutter said it would be good law for at least 25 years, and I know that time flies, but I think only nine of those years have passed. And so, are you? And, if so, why overrule a case into which so much thought and effort went and so many people across the country have depended on?

MR. REIN: Justice Breyer, we have said very carefully we were not trying to change the Court’s disposition of the issue in Grutter, could there be a legitimate, a compelling interest in moving — in using race to establish a diverse class. What — the problem that we’ve encountered throughout the case is there are varying understandings, not of the legitimacy of the interest, but how you get there; is it necessary to use race to achieve that interest; what does a critical mass-

JUSTICE BREYER: Well, how do you want to argue it right now in the next ten minutes? I’m interested because I have a very short time to get my question out, and I need to know how you are going to argue it.

MR. REIN: Well, Justice Breyer, our argument is we can satisfy Grutter if it’s properly read.

So, once again, Fisher II can only pick around the margins of the Michigan cases. And we only have 8 Justices, with Justice Kagan recused.

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Jun 30, 2015

Did anyone else notice that Justice Thomas cited his NFIB dissent in Johnson?

Johnson v. U.S. (which I am only now getting a chance to read) finds the “residual” clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was void for vagueness, and violated the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment. Justice Thomas dissented, and argued that the void for vagueness doctrine was akin to substantive due process, and needs to be reconsidered as a matter of original meaning. It is well worth reading.

But buried in a footnote was a citation to his join dissent in NFIB v. Sebelius.

By “penal,” I mean laws “authoriz[ing] criminal punishment” as well as those “authorizing fines or forfeitures . . . [that] are enforced through civil rather than criminal process.” Cf. C. Nelson, Statutory Interpreta- tion 108 (2011) (discussing definition of “penal” for purposes of rule of lenity). A law requiring termination of employment from public insti- tutions, for instance, is not penal. See Keyishian, 385 U. S., at 597– 604. Nor is a law creating an “obligation to pay taxes.” Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 271 (1935). Conversely, a law imposing a monetary exaction as a punishment for noncompliance with a regulatory mandate is penal. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012) (SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting) (slip op., at 16–26).

The Chief cited the joint dissent in King v. Burwell as well, in case you missed that too:

It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting) (slip op., at 60) (“Without the federal subsidies . . . the exchanges would not operate as Congress intended and may not operate at all.”).

In any event, Thomas views the void for vagueness doctrine as a species of substantive due process, which he abjured in McDonald v. Chicago.

That we have repeatedly used a doctrine to invalidate laws does not make it legitimate. Cf., e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 450–452 (1857) (stating that an Act of Congress prohibiting slavery in certain Federal Territories violated the substantive due process rights of slaveowners and was therefore void). This Court has a history of wielding doctrines purportedly rooted in “due process of law” to achieve its own policy goals, substantive due process being the poster child. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 811 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The one theme that links the Court’s substantive due process precedents together is their lack of a guiding principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection from nonfun- damental rights that do not”). Although our vagueness doctrine is distinct from substantive due process, their histories have disquieting parallels.

In what also may be a first, Justice Thomas notes that the first draft in Roe was premised on a vagueness, not privacy rationale:

In more recent times, the Court’s substantive due pro- cess jurisprudence has focused on abortions, and our vagueness doctrine has played a correspondingly signifi- cant role. In fact, our vagueness doctrine served as the basis for the first draft of the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), on the theory that laws pro- hibiting all abortions save for those done “for the purpose of saving the life of the mother” forced abortionists to guess when this exception would apply on penalty of con- viction. See B. Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Burger Court 116–118 (1988) (reprinting first draft of Roe). Roe, of course, turned out as a substantive due process opinion. See 410 U. S., at 164.

 

 

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Jun 30, 2015

Justice Sotomayor Changes “Approbation” to “Opprobrium” In Horne Dissent

In Justice Sotomayor’s Horne dissent, she used what seemed to be the wrong word:

approbation

Approbation (approval) is the exact opposite of what she meant. I thought she meant disapprobation (disapproval).  Kevin Walsh made the same observation.

On June 23, the day after the opinion was published, SupremeCourt.gov quietly uploaded a new PDF. The word was changed to “opprobrium.” (According to SCOTUSServo).

opprobrium

Confusing approbation with opprobrium should be viewed with disapprobation.

 

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Jun 30, 2015

Fisher Redux: SCOTUS “Is Going To Clean Up The Mess”

The Houston Chronicle quoted me on my reaction to the Supreme Court taking Fisher another time.

The court’s decision to take up Fisher’s case again could signal that it doesn’t believe the 5th Circuit met this standard and might be poised to reverse the appeals court’s ruling, said Josh Blackman, an assistant law professor at Houston’s South Texas College of Law.

“The key point is, the fact that they took it means the 5th Circuit probably didn’t do what they were supposed to and the Supreme Court is going to clean up the mess,” Blackman said.

I suspect the 5th Circuit will be reversed. But here, as with all affirmative action cases, the question is how the 5th Circuit gets reversed. Justice Kennedy’s decision in the Fair Housing case reaffirms his level of comfort with some use of race, as he cited a few times his concurring opinion in Parents Involved. But no matter how you slice it, the 5th Circuit did not apply the level of scrutiny that Justice Kennedy urged last time. In Fisher I, Justice Sotomayor was (apparently) able to keep the Court from ruling on the merits. Let’s see what happens this time.

Totally apart from the merits, in recent years, the Court has taken several cases twice–what Richard Re called “SCOTUS repeaters“–and went on to reverse. Bond II, Zivotofsky II, Horne II.

Also, sooo many amicus briefs are going to be recycled from last time.

 

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Jun 30, 2015

SCOTUS Citations for Scalia & Garner’s “Reading Law”

Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s magisterial “Reading Law” has been cited by the Supreme Court eight times since its publication in 2012: three times with Justice Scalia joining the opinion, and six times where Justice Scalia was not in the opinion. Justice Sotomayor has three citations, Justice Kennedy has two, and one each for the Chief, and Justices Alito and Kagan. None by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, or Breyer.

Opinions joined by Justice Scalia

Yates v. U.S. (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 252 (2012). Context thus again confirms what text indicates.

T-Mobile South v. City of Roswell (2015) (Sotomayor, J.).

By relying on other parts of Title 47 of the U.S. Code—some enacted in the Communications Act of 1934 decades before the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 at issue here—the Chamber stretches to invoke this canon of construction beyond its most forceful application. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 172–173 (2012).

Heien v. North Carolina (2014) (Roberts, J.).

A law prohibiting “vehicles” in the park either covers Segways or not, see A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 36–38 (2012), but an officer will nevertheless have to make a quick decision on the law the first time one whizzes by.

Opinions not joined by Justice Scalia

Texas Dept. of Housing (2015) (Kennedy, J.)

“If a word or phrase has been … given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts …, a later version of that act perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012).

Johnson v. U.S. (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)

As one treatise puts it, “[a] statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 38, p. 247 (2012). This canon applies fully when considering vagueness challenges.

(Here, Scalia wrote the majority opinion, so Alito is jabbing Nino).

Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 114 (2012) (“[W]hen the word shall can reasonably read as mandatory, it ought to be so read”).

Scialabba v. Cuella de Osorio (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

In rushing to find a conflict within the statute, the plurality neglects a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation: We do not lightly presume that Congress has legislated in self-contradicting terms. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012) (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory…. [T]here can be no justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they can be interpreted harmoniously”). That is especially true where, as here, the conflict that Congress supposedly created is not between two different statutes or even two separate provisions within a single statute, but between two clauses in the same sentence. See ibid. (“[I]t is invariably true that intelligent drafters do not contradict themselves”).

Maracich v. Spears (2013) (Kennedy, J.).

That inconsistency and the concomitant undermining of the statutory design are avoided by interpreting (b)(4) so it does not authorize the use of personal information for the purpose of soliciting clients. See A. Scalia & B.Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012) (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory…. [T]here can be no justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they can be interpreted harmoniously”).

At one point during oral argument in King v. Burwell, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli referred to a “learned treatise.”

Your Honor raised this point about the need for clarity in ­­ in a tax deduction and IRS in the  statutory reading of tax deductions, there is a learned treatise that describes that as a false notion.

It was Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law.

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Jun 30, 2015

“De jure residential segregation by race was declared unconstitutional almost a century ago” in Buchanan v. Warley

I was struck by this sentence in the Texas Fair Housing case (which I am only now getting a chance to read, thank you very much King v. Burwell):

De jure residential segregation by race was declared unconstitutional almost a century ago, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917), but its vestiges remain today, intertwined with the country’s economic and social life.

That is an important odd way of characterizing the holding in Buchanan v. Warley. Recall that this case was decided while Plessy v. Fergusson was still good law. It was most certainly not an equal protection decision. Rather it was a (gasp) economic liberty decision, based on similar doctrine applied in (gasp) Lochner. Consider the penultimate paragraph which discusses the holding:

We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law.

In class, echoing David Bernstein, I often explain that liberty of contract in Buchanan v. Warley was used as a method of fighting segregation. And now, the Supreme Court has endorsed that reading of this (gasp) Lochner-era case.

I did a (brief) search through the Supreme Court database to see how Buchanan has been cited in the past (43 times), but there was nothing nearly this sweeping.

The closest I found was CJ Burger in Palmore v. Sidoti:

This is by no means the first time that acknowledged racial prejudice has been invoked to justify racial classifications. In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149 (1917), for example, *434 this Court invalidated a Kentucky law forbidding Negroes to buy homes in white neighborhoods.

Justice Douglas also limited the scope of the decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas:

If the ordinance segregated one area only for one race, it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149 where the Court invalidated a city ordinance barring a black from acquiring real property in a white residential area by reason of an 1866 Act of Congress, 14 Stat. 27, now 42 U.S.C. s 1982, and an 1870 Act, s 17, 16 Stat. 144, now 42 U.S.C. s 1981, both enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 245 U.S., at 78—82, 38 S.Ct. at 19—21. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189.

 

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Jun 30, 2015

Maybe The White House Is Content for Texas v. United States To Become A Political Issue Before the Supreme Court in 2016?

The government’s strategy since Texas v. United States was filed back in January has befuddled me. After Judge Hanen ruled against them (as expected), they dithered over seeking a stay, and ultimately did several weeks later. By seeking a stay, rather than just seeking an expedited appeal, the process was drawn out several months. After the 5th Circuit denied a stay, they again dithered over whether to seek a stay from the Supreme Court, and ultimately decided not to. Based on my calculations, this delay means that the issue will almost certainly not be decided by the Court until June of 2016 at the earliest (assuming the government can get a cert petition in by October, and it is argued around March). I couldn’t quite figure out why the White House was content to let this issue sit for another year before being resolved, effectively running the clock out on the Obama Presidency. The White House Domestic Policy Advisor explained the administration did not want to seek a stay, as that would only be a temporary remedy, and aliens would be afraid to sign up if the Court may ultimately find on the merits that the policy is unlawful. That answer made some sense, but I think there may be an another, far more cynical rationale.

Politico reports:

David Leopold, a veteran immigration attorney and former president of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, said the presence of both Elrod and Smith on the appeals panel indicates that the Fifth Circuit is likely to rule against the administration again — raising the chances that this case would get pushed to the Supreme Court, perhaps during the heat of the 2016 presidential race.

“The merits are broader, but we know exactly where this court is going. Smith’s and Elrod’s opinion pretty much mirrors what Judge Andrew Hanen did, absent the political diatribes,” Leopold said Monday. “Unfortunately for the GOP, if this case goes to the Supreme Court, the Court will have to fix it and the GOP will be facing yet another national loss which will be bad for them politically and further tarnish their brand with Latinos.”

A few months ago, a lawyer friend suggested that the Administration was content to drag this process out because it gives the Democrats political gain, and forces the Republicans to take tough positions on immigration. Think of how King v. Burwell put many Republicans under pressure concerning Obamacare. The immigration case doesn’t quite fit that bill, but it’s close. If this case does indeed stretch to June 2016 term, it becomes an important political issue for the 2016 Presidential election. If the Court rules for the President, the democrat President can assure immigrants that she will continue the policy, but the Republican President could lose those voters by pledging to halt it. If the Court rules against the President, the Democrat nominee will insist on an immigration bill that accomplishes what DAPA would have. Either way, the Democrats can gain–as Leopold explained, this case will be another “national loss.” for the GOP. I haven’t seen anyone make the election argument as clear as Leopold did, so I think this may be a new talking point to assuage those angry that the government did not seek a stay–especially after learning about the merits panel.

I don’t pretend to understand the political machinations of the Justice Department, but when the decisions had so much public infighting, I have to imagine this political calculus weighed in, somehow.

 

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Jun 29, 2015

CJ Roberts: “State” Means “Federal,” But “the Legislature” Can’t Mean “The People.”

A little King v. Burwell fun with Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Arizona State Legislature:

Just over a century ago, Arizona became the second State in the Union to ratify the Seventeenth Amendment. That Amendment transferred power to choose United States Senators from “the Legislature” of each State, Art. I, §3, to “the people thereof.” The Amendment re- sulted from an arduous, decades-long campaign in which reformers across the country worked hard to garner ap- proval from Congress and three-quarters of the States.

What chumps! Didn’t they realize that all they had to do was interpret the constitutional term “the Legislature” to mean “the people”? The Court today performs just such a magic trick with the Elections Clause. Art. I, §4. That Clause vests congressional redistricting authority in “the Legislature” of each State. An Arizona ballot initiative transferred that authority from “the Legislature” to an “Independent Redistricting Commission.” The majority approves this deliberate constitutional evasion by doing what the proponents of the Seventeenth Amendment dared not: revising “the Legislature” to mean “the people.”

Rick Hasen adds at Slate:

Monday’s 5–4 decision has much in common with last week’s blockbuster Obamacare ruling. In a 6–3 decision in King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court upheld the availability of federal subsidies for those signed up for Obamacare despite language in the health care law that could have been interpreted to give those subsidies only to those on state exchanges. The court rejected a narrow reading of the term “such exchanges” in the health care case because it saw its job not to read the text out of context but to follow broad congressional purpose. As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the King majority: “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”
But while Roberts was willing to be less than literal in the Obamacare case in order to further the obvious purposes of the statute, he was not so flexible in the Arizona case. At issue in Arizona was whether Arizona voters could take away the power to draw congressional districts from the self-interested and partisan Arizona Legislature and put it in the hands of an independent redistricting commission. The Constitution’s Elections Clause vests in each state’s “Legislature” the power to set the rules for congressional elections, subject to congressional override. In some earlier cases, the Supreme Court had rejected narrow readings of the word legislature, for example by letting the people use a referendum to review congressional redistricting plans from a legislature. Roberts said today that cutting the legislature out entirely violated the Constitution. “What chumps!” he declared sarcastically of those who believed the word legislature should be interpreted literally.

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Jun 29, 2015

How Does Standing Analysis in Arizona State Legislature Impact Texas v. United States (and Obamacare suits)?

I have not followed the merits of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n closely enough to weigh in on the opinion. But relevant to my research is the discussion of standing, where the state Legislature sued in federal court over the redistrict commission’s authority to make binding determinations.  Specifically, how does this impact currently pending cases concerning suits by Texas against

RBG’s opinion offers a short summary of the standing requirements:

Trained on “whether the plaintiff is [a] proper party to bring [a particular lawsuit,]” standing is “[o]ne element” of the Constitution’s case-or-controversy limitation on federal judicial authority, expressed in Article III of the Constitu­ tion. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997). “To qual­ ify as a party with standing to litigate,” the Arizona Legis­ lature “must show, first and foremost,” injury in the form of “‘invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘con­ crete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent.’” Ari- zonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 64 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992)). The Legislature’s injury also must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action” and “redressable by a favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Jun 29, 2015

Breaking: SCOTUS Halts Contraceptive Mandate Against Erie Diocese

In an after-hours order (following an order putting on hold Texas’s abortion law), the Supreme Court ordered HHS to halt the enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against the Erie Diocese. Only Justice Sotomayor would have denied it.

The application for an order recalling and staying the issuance of the mandate of the Court of Appeals pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, having been submitted to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court, the application as presented is denied. The Court furthermore orders: If the applicants ensure that the Secretary of Health and Human Services is in possession of all information necessary to verify applicants’ eligibility under 26 CFR §54.9815-2713A(a) or 29 CFR §2590.715-2713A(a) or 45 CFR §147.131(b) (as applicable), the respondents are enjoined from enforcing against the applicants the challenged provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations pending final disposition of their petition for certiorari.

Nothing in this interim order affects the ability of the applicants’ or their organizations’ employees to obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives. Nor does this order preclude the Government from relying on the information provided by the applicants, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the Act. See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U. S. ___ (2014).

This order should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits. Ibid. Justice Sotomayor would deny the application.

In other words, the Court denied the request by the Diocese to put on hold the issuance of the mandate from the Third Circuit. Justice Sotomayor agreed that the request should be denied.

However, the Court continued that HHS is “enjoined from enforcing against the applicants the challenged provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations” so long as HHS already has all of the necessary information to ensure the employees receive the contraception. Justice Sotomayor did not join this part of the order.

 

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