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Between 2009 and 2020, Josh published more than 10,000 blog posts. Here, you can access his blog archives.

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Alberto Gonzales on the “set of predictors” the Bush Administration Used To Elevate Judges Roberts and Alito

May 30th, 2014

Alberto Gonzales, who has kept quite busy since re-entering legal academia as a Professor, and now Dean at the Belmont University College of Law, authored an interesting article in the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, titled “In Search of Justice: An Examination of the Appointments of John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court and Their Impact on American Jurisprudence.” Here is the abstract.

During 2005, President George W. Bush appointed Federal Circuit Court Judges John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court. These appointments were the culmination of years of examination of the work, character, and temperament of both men commencing during the 2000 presidential transition. Our evaluation included face-to-face interviews; an analysis of judicial opinions, speeches, and writings; and conversation with friends, colleagues, and court experts. Based on this work, a select group of Bush Administration officials developed a set of predictors that formed the basis of our recommendation to President Bush that he elevate Circuit Court Judges Roberts and Alito to the Supreme Court. This Article explains how Judges Roberts and Alito were evaluated, and our assessment of how they would perform on the Court. The Article then examines whether the Bush Administration correctly predicted how these two men would decide cases before the Court by reviewing some of their most significant opinions to date.

We begin with an explanation of the process used in developing our recommendation to the President followed by a thorough examination of the factors we weighed (such as political considerations and confirmation challenges). The Article includes a thorough, though certainly not exhaustive, review of the circuit court opinions of each man. This early body of work is then compared to their most recent work on the Supreme Court in certain key areas of the law. There is a remarkable, though not unexpected, consistency between Justices Roberts’s and Alito’s jurisprudence on the circuit courts and on the Supreme Court. Based on this comparison, the Article concludes that the Bush Administration successfully anticipated that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would decide cases using a consistent set of principles including judicial restraint, respect for precedent, and statutory interpretation based on plain language.

I’ll put the rest of this lengthy post below the fold.

(more…)

The Post-Clerkship Letdown

May 30th, 2014

Clerking is (almost always) an awesome job. I treasure the two years I spent in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and on the Sixth Circuit. I had the honor of working for two amazing judges, who mentored me in ways I will probably never fully appreciate. I also had the joy of working with co-clerks who have become life-long friends.

Yet, the denouement of the clerkship–as experienced by myself, my co-clerks, and countless other clerks I know–shares a common commiseration: “I am finishing the best job of my legal career, only one year out of law school.” In other words, this job was so awesome, and it is all down-hill from there.

Often, the follow-up to the clerkship can feel like a letdown. The clerkship, where you (often) set your own hours, (somewhat) decide which fascinating issues you want to work with, and have a single boss who is (usually) a standup judge, will dwarf over any future employment. Also, the degree of power is one I always warn incoming clerks about. It is quite scary once you realize that your writings and decisions (sometimes without a judge’s detailed consideration) affects someone’s life, liberty, and property.

But what comes next? Often, outgoing clerks join a big law firm where they are expected to work ridiculous hours, toil away at mundane tasks, and be assigned to the least interesting topics imaginable. No longer are you influencing the direction of the law through the opinions you draft. Now, if you’re lucky, you may come up with some good questions for someone else’s deposition. I can’t count how many friends experienced this post-clerkship letdown.

In particular, a number of my friends who have clerked on the Supreme Court have felt this let-down, in a very, very strong way. One minute you are writing opinions for the highest court in the land, shaping the state of constitutional law for decades to come. The next minute, you are at a firm, barred from practicing before the Supreme Court, working on inferior cases in the inferior courts. I’ve heard that many SCOTUS clerks never quite come down from the high, and always long for the taste of that power. (This fits into the D.C. power-culture quite generally).

I recently offered this advice to a friend who was wrapping up a Circuit clerkship, so I pose it here, generally. The clerkship is only the start of your career. While your second job may not be as fun as your first (it probably won’t), try not to succumb to the letdown. If you maintain the mentality that your best job was your first job, that will become reality. While the odds of you becoming a judge are slim to none, there are countless ways to improve on your legal career and achieve a sense of happiness with your work. It will take time. A key aspect of that trajectory is to drop the charade that you’ll never have a better position. As the summer draws near, and the final sittings are heard, try to avoid the post-clerkship letdown.

 

Justice Story’s Copy of the National Intelligencer From January 30, 1805

May 30th, 2014

I recently acquired from eBay a copy of the National Intelligencer – Washington Advertiser from January 30, 1805 owned by none other than Joseph Story. At the top of the newspaper is his signature, “J. Story.” The seller offered these commentaries on why Story, who at the time was in private practice in Boston, would sign and maintain the newspapers:

These newspapers were bound in book format 200 years ago for Joseph Story himself comprising the years 1804 & 1805. The binding was deteriorated so I had removed the editions and have been selling one newspaper a week for over two years now and my supply is dwindling. As for your second question, Story would have had each issue wrapped and mailed to him while in Boston. The “intelligencer’ was at the time known as the best way to keep tabs on the happenings of our Nation’s capitol next to being there personally (he did eventually relocate). He must have really valued the information gleaned from the ‘Intelligencer’ so much that he had two years worth of issues bound for future reference, each one signed by him in the same right-hand section of the masthead.

The Story Newspapers were left to me by my grandfather, an avid collector of history for over 50 years. The method of obtaining out-of-town newspapers up until the mid 19th century was by individual subscription. If a merchant purchased bundles of newspapers 200 years ago he would have suffered a great loss with the papers that did not sell. Not until the age of the steamboat and steam press did newspaper publishers offer to buy-back unsold issues as they still do to this day. I am also sure that Postmasters were not allowed to sell newspapers or conduct any unauthorized business in their official capacity.

Here it is:

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I also found fascinating the various articles and notices in the paper.

For example, the sale of a 236 acre plantation.

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Here is an ad for a runaway slave.

Some time in April last a bright Mulatto woman named Fanny, she is nearly 6 feet high and stout in proportion, thick lips, middling large eyes, very large breasts, bends forward when she stands or walks, quick in speech, and has very large feet, her apparel is not remembered, took with her a large bundle thereof, and it is probable often changes them. I have been informed she is in the service of a Mr. Thompson in Georgetown, whoever secures her in Washington city jail so that her mistress Mrs. Sarah Brooks gets her again or will deliver her to the subscriber in Upper Marlboro shall receive ten dollars and all reasonable expenses paid by Saml. J. Coolidge.

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Here is an address given by President JEfferson

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ConLaw Exam Question: Can Congress Mandate That All States Recognize Same-Sex Marriage?

May 29th, 2014

For my second question on my ConLaw exam, I flipped the obvious (and expected) same-sex marriage issue on its head. Rather than asking straight-up whether the Equal Protection Clause, or Due Process Clause, should invalidate a law banning same-sex marriage, I proposed a hypothetical law, The Protection of Marriage Act (POMA) that mandates that all 50 states recognize gay marriage. This is a tough Section 5 issue that requires students to address not only the rationality of a same-sex marriage ban, but also “congruence and proportionality” under the 14th Amendemnt. For good measure, I added a private cause of action that allows individuals to sue states that deny same-sex marriage, posing a solid Morrison 11th Amendment issue.

Plus, as a preview of things to come, a Priest who refused to perform a same-sex wedding is sued under the generally applicable POMA, which bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. POMA waives RFRA as a defense.  As a defense, he raises a free-exercise claim under Smith. I think I know how this question comes out, but I suspect some may disagree. And, because the Court didn’t address Elane Photography, I added a compelled speech issue for an atheist baker who refuses to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding because it does not inspire him.  I close with a tough policy issue on whether opposition to same-sex marriage could only be grounded in moral animus. I forced students to take both sides of the issue, which turned out to be strikingly difficult. Some students could take one side, others could take the other. The top papers understood both sides. Here is the A+ answer.

Enjoy!

Instructions: The year is 2014. You are a law clerk for Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. Three consolidated cases concerning the constitutionality of the Protection of Marriage Act (POMA) were recently argued before the Supreme Court. You have been assigned the task of writing a memorandum of no more than 1,000 words addressing five issues presented in these cases.

In the wake of United States v. Windsor (2013), which found that part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional, Congress was concerned that a number of states continue to deny same-sex couples the right to marry. To address this problem, Congress enacts, and the President signs into law, the Protection of Marriage Act of 2013 (“POMA”).

POMA has three key sections.

Section 1: Pursuant to Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, and in order to ensure that no state shall “deny any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” or “deny any person within its jurisdictions the equal protection of the laws,” all states shall guarantee to same-sex couples “marriage equality.” Marriage equality is defined as all states guaranteeing same-sex couples the ability to marry, and be treated under state law in the same manner in all respects, as opposite-sex couples.

Section 2: Same-sex couples that are denied the ability to marry can file suit in federal district court against the state in which they reside to challenge the state’s denial of “marriage equality” under POMA.

Section 3: Discrimination on the basis of marital status shall result in liability of $1,000 per discriminatory incident. Individuals shall have standing to bring claims under Section 3 in federal district court. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) shall not constitute a defense to this section.

After POMA is signed into law, three lawsuits are filed.

1. Aggie and Barge, two women who live in Houston, apply for a marriage license and are denied. Texas has a state constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage. The couple promptly filed suit against the state of Texas in federal district court, under the jurisdiction of Section 2 of POMA. The couple alleges that Texas’s refusal to allow them to marry violates Section 1 of POMA. Texas replies that Congress lacks the power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendments to enact Section 1 of POMA, as it abrogates its state sovereignty protected by the 10th Amendment, intrudes on Texas’s police power, and violates the principles of federalism. Further, Texas asserts that Congress lacks the power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to permit the couple to sue the state in federal court under Section 2 of POMA.

2. Carl and Domer, two men who live in Dallas, ask a Roman Catholic Priest to officiate at their wedding. The priest refuses. Carl and Domer file suit against the Priest under Section 3 of POMA. The Priest concedes that he has discriminated against the couple on the basis of marital status. However, he replies that being forced to perform a same-sex wedding imposes a burden on his religious beliefs, in violation of his rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The priest does not raise any claim under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

3. Edna and Fapu, two women who live in Austin, ask Grandpa, a world-famous chef, to bake a cake for their wedding. Grandpa, an atheist who rejects all religion, declines to make them a cake for their wedding. He views his baking as a form of art, and refuses to be forced to design a cake for an event that does not inspire him to create beautiful torts (the tasty kind). Edna and Fapu file suit against Grandpa under Section 3 of POMA. Grandpa concedes that he discriminated against the couple on the basis of marital status. However, he replies that being forced to design a cake for their wedding would violate his rights protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Grandpa does not assert any claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

All three of these suits are unsuccessful in the lower courts, and are consolidated on appeal to the United States Supreme Court

In a memorandum of no more than 1,000 words for Justice Kennedy, address the following five issues.

1. Does Congress have the authority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to enact Section 1 of POMA? Please also address whether Section 1 violates the 10th Amendment, Texas’s sovereignty under the principles of federalism, and Texas’s traditional police powers.

2. Does Congress have the authority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to enact Section 2 of POMA? Please also address whether Section 2 violates the 10th Amendment, Texas’s sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment, and principles of federalism.

3. Would the application of Section 3, and the imposition of civil liability to the Priest violate his right of Free Exercise under the First Amendment?

4. Would the application of Section 3, and the imposition of civil liability to Grandpa violate his right of Free Speech under the First Amendment?

5. Justice Kennedy is laboring over a question raised, but not fully answered in United States v. Windsor. Must opposition to same-sex marriage only be grounded in animus or hatred towards gays and lesbians. Please address both sides of this issue in the context of the constitutionality of the Protection of Marriage Act.

Battling Dissentals and Concurrals over Doffing and Donning on the 7th Circuit

May 28th, 2014

The 7th Circuit, one of the most agreeable courts in the land, has been divided over a case I have blogged about at some length, concerning compensation for the time it takes poultry-workers to doff and don their protective gear. In Mitchell v. JCG Industries, Judge Posner to satisfy his curiosity, conducted a judicial fashion show to time how long this process took. In dissent, Chief Judge Wood criticized this “experiment.”

Plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing en banc, and the 7th Circuit called for a response.

Now, the 7th Circuit has denied the petition for rehearing en banc. But it was divided. Chief Judge Wood, and Judges Rovner, Williams, and Hamilton voted to rehear the case, and Judge Williams issued a 7-page dissental. Not to be outdone, Judge Posner issued a 12-page concurral.

As Judge Posner noted, on the 7th Circuits such en banc battles are rare:

 Published opinions dissenting from denials of re- hearing en banc are rare; published opinions concurring in denials of rehearing en banc are virtually unheard of. But this case merits such an opinion in view of assertions and omissions in the opinion dissenting from the denial of re- hearing en banc that relate both to the appropriateness of the case for rehearing by the full court and to the grounds of the panel’s decision.

Citing the 7th Circuit Handbook (!), Posner claims en banc review here is ENTIRELY unwarranted.

It should go without saying that mere disagreement with a decision by a panel of the court is not a sufficient ground for rehearing en banc. Otherwise every case in which the panel was divided could provoke a petition for rehearing en banc and a call by the dissenting judge for a vote on whether to rehear the case en banc. Unremarked by the dissent is that there are standards for granting rehearing en banc, and for obvious reasons they do not include: “I disagree with the panel majority.” The Seventh Circuit’s Practitioner’s Hand- book for Appeals states that “‘an en banc hearing or rehear- ing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decision, or (2) the proceeding in- volves a question of exceptional importance.’ Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).” The handbook goes on to state that “rehearings en banc are designed to address issues that affect the integrity of the circuit’s law (intra-circuit conflicts) and the develop- ment of the law (questions of exceptional importance).” And there is more: Rule 35(b)(1) requires a petition for rehearing en banc to “begin with a statement that either: (A) the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Su- preme Court or of the court to which the petition is ad- dressed (with citation to the conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to se- cure and maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (B) the proceeding involves one or more questions of exception- al importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative de- cisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.” The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 35 also stresses intercircuit conflict as a basis for rehear- ing en banc.

None of these criteria for rehearing en banc is satisfied in this case or even mentioned by the dissent.  

It’s a walk-off!

Beyond these procedural intrigues, the judicial fashion show makes a few cameos.

The dissental alludes to the “experiment,” noting that it was not consistent with Rule 56:

By ex- plicitly rejecting Appellant’s affidavit and accepting the em- ployer’s time estimation (and confirming that with a court staff “experiment”), the majority ignored the evidence in the light most favorable to the employees and therefore did not conduct the proper Rule 56 analysis. In the light most favor- able to Appellant, how long it took to don and doff was an issue of fact that should have been decided by a jury.

To illustrate that en banc was not warranted, Posner notes that he did a Google search of “references to the panel decision.”

A Google search reveals a number of references to the panel decision (many critical of the “experiment” conducted by court staff in that case regarding the time it takes to don and doff the sanitary gear that poultry workers are required to wear) but nothing to suggest that the decision involves an issue of general importance.

Ahem. I think he is talking about me. And, apparently, he thinks nothing in my post suggests that this decision involved “an issue of general importance.” Of course it did. That’s why I wrote about it, and it spawned so much outrage across the blogosphere, including posts from Scott Greenfield,  Garrett Epps, Jonathan Turley, and many others (not to mention inspiring a dissental from 4 out of 10 active judges on his Court).

Posner doubles down with this jab later in the opinion.

One point remains to be considered, as it figures not only in the petition for rehearing en banc and in the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc but also in some of the online commentary on the panel decision.

Again, that would be me, and Scott, and Garret, etc. Way to citeblock Judge Posner  (and I will define citeblock as going out of your way to deprive someone of a citation, even though everyone knows you’re citing him). I’ll also note Judge Posner’s inclusion of the photograph of the banana costume, “which is in the record,” as an indirect citeblock.

Posner continues to explain, at some length, why his “experiment,” was not only proper, but necessary.

The petition denounces the experiment conducted by “unidentified members of the judiciary” (these villains are my law clerks and I), which it states violates due process and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the panel decision explains, the information produced by the experiment was not “evidence,” was not “appellate factfinding,” but was the fruits of curiosity re- garding the appellants’ implausible (in fact unbelievable) contention that it takes 15 minutes to don a few items of protective clothing. Although called “changing clothes,” the donning and doffing by these poultry workers involve not changing clothes but just putting some items of protective clothing, like an apron and a hair net, on top of one’s street clothes, and removing the same items. No way can that take 15 minutes.

 Judge Posner is “puzzled” why the dissental objected to his “experiment.”

I am puzzled finally by the dissent’s remark that “how long it took to don and doff was an issue of fact that should have been decided by a jury.” My puzzle is: how is such a fact to be determined by a jury? Suppose one worker testifies (as per Mitchell’s affidavit) that it takes 10 to 15 minutes to don and doff, and another (one aligned with management, for remember that the exclusion of donning and doffing time from compensable time was by agreement between union and management) testifies it takes 2 minutes. How is a jury to decide between them? Probably the most accurate way to resolve the dispute would be, on the model of the criticized experiment by court staff, to videotape workers doffing and donning. The problem is that the workers aligned with the plaintiffs would dawdle, and the workers aligned with man- agement would practice doffing and donning until they broke the speed record. What would the jury do? This is somewhat to the side of the issue of the case, but illustrates the important point that determining facts in a litigation can be devilishly difficult if one thinks accuracy important. 

Imagine that? How is a jury to determine a fact? Impossible. It’s better for an appellate judge to do it. “Determining facts in a litigation can be devilishly difficult.”

That settles that.

H/T @Greg51