Jul 31, 2012

Posted in Unprecedented

Should courts give Congress the benefit of the doubt about the constitutionality of a statute that includes a provision for expedited judicial review?


Justice Scalia seems to doubt that benefit of the doubt. If Congress includes various provisions to allow courts to quickly assess whether a law is constitutional, it does raise doubts about whether Congress actually thought it was constitutional.

LAMB: All right. Let me read this to you, ”The modern congress sails close to the wind all the time. Federal statutes today often all but acknowledge their questionable constitutionality with provisions for accelerated judicial review for standing on the part of the members of congress, and even for fallback disposition, should the primary disposition be held unconstitutional.”

SCALIA: Right.

LAMB: I want to go back to that original thing, statement, ”The modern congress sails close to the wind all the time.”

SCALIA: Yes. That followed upon our statement that, traditionally, Congress is – you assume the constitutionality of any statute that Congress enacts because it is assumed that Congress would not – indeed if there is even constitutional doubt, you give the Congress the benefit of the doubt.

In recent years however, it’s more questionable whether Congress really is even thinking about the constitutionality and that passage recites the fact that this evident from the content of their statutes. I mean, who would have ever thought, in the 19th century for example, that congress would pass a statute that says, ”In the event the stuff we’re just said is unconstitutional, we have this other provision instead,” which is what congress has done.

I mean, that makes you wonder, are they really sure this stuff is constitutional? Have they really thought about it? And I think that comment was also made in response to the charge of ”judicial activism” which is a word that doesn’t mean anything really.

It just means that the person who uses it doesn’t agree with the decision. I mean, what is judicial activism? It is certainly not doing actively what judges ought to do. Is that judicial activism? I think not. And if a statute ought to be held unconstitutional it’s not judicial activism to call it unconstitutional.

It is interesting that the Affordable Care Act, which most knew from its outset was on a collision course with the Supreme Court, did not contain any expedited provisions (like the McCain Feingold BCRA had).

David Bernstein blogged that an original version of HillaryCare included just such a provision. Alas, it seems the authors of the ACA did not take such concerns seriously.

Update (11/29/12): As I prepare for my book, I came across this bit from the 12/22/09 legislative history in the U.S. Senate from Senator Ensign:
During the committee markup of its version of the bill, Senator Hatch raised some thought-provoking constitutional questions. He offered an amendment, which I supported, to provide a process for the courts to promptly consider any constitutional challenge to the Finance Committee bill. He chose the same language that was put into the bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Unfortunately, the amendment was deemed nongermane. I am seriously concerned that the Democrats’ health care reform bill violates the Constitution of these United States.
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  • http://wildhawker.wordpress.com wildhawker

    What difference does the expedited review make?

    • Josh Blackman

      By offering an expedited review, the Congress, at least implicitly, suggests that this law need not be subject to the usual review by the courts, but rather the constitutional question is in doubt, and it needs to be resolved as soon as possible. In other words, we are doing this, but we aren’t sure it is ok, so take care of this quickly so we don’t waste time.

  • Steve

    If the courts do not give legislation with expedited-review provisions the benefit of the doubt, then what stance ought they to take? The law as enacted is the same whether it contains such a provision or not. All that an expedited-review provision does is to get the question of validity out of the way before there is too much reliance on the law and before too much money is spent.

    If a statute with such a provision is not entitled to a benefit of the doubt, then Congress will have an incentive not to include such a provision, and that is not a good thing; if the statute is declared unconstitutional years after it went into effect, a much bigger mess is likely to result than if the matter were decided more promptly.

    • Josh Blackman

      I think the reliance interests and the resulting messes are different issues. I think Scalia’s point focuses solely on the intent of members of Congress when such a provision is added. I would hope that a member of congress, when he or she takes the oath to support and defend the Constitution, only enacts laws that (according to their view at least) are constitutional. When such laws are passed, and Congress effectively says let the courts decide, that tells me that members need not necessarily hold such a view.

      • Steve

        But the Court is not a mind reader. It has to take the legislation at face value because it has no evidence to the contrary. My scenario is as plausible as yours. If the Court says “we don’t believe you,” then what should the Court believe, and what is the authority for that belief?

        • Josh Blackman

          We have had this spirited debate so many times :) I don’t have a good answer for you, except to say that some skepticism on the part of the Court may jolt Congress back into doing their job. Or not.

  • http://test JB

    Test

  • Russell

    Even assuming this were true, wouldn’t the same logic also apply to a severability clause? So Congress would have a choice of either (i) indicating doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute, and thus vitiating the presumption of constitutionality; or (ii) failing to indicate its intent with respect to severability, leading to the chance that the entire statute would fall if they were wrong?

    More fundamentally, if one thinks that expedited review is good public policy in some cases, this doctrine isn’t going to encourage it – what if a majority of each house believes that (i) the statute is constitutional; but (ii) there are reasonable, non-frivolous arguments to the contrary (perhaps advanced by the minority in each house). Their inclusion of an expedited review clause evidence isn’t actually evidence that the majority adopting the statute actually doubts its constitutionality (indeed, every Representative and Senator voting for the statute could be convinced of its constitutionality), and adopting Justice Scalia’s rule creates a disincentive to accommodating the views of the minority and permitting expedited resolution of the underlying, non-frivolous constitutional dispute. (Which is contrary to the interests of both those who believe the statute is, and those who believe it is not, constitutional.)